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1. POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 
A study i n P o l i t i c a l Geography pres e n t s problems 
as there are no c l e a r l y defined and g e n e r a l l y accepted 
l i m i t s to i t s s u b j e c t matter. P r o f e s s o r Moodie suggested 
tha t "the f i e l d of study of P o l i t i c a l Geography i s concerned 
with two b a s i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . F i r s t , and of fundamental 
importance, i s the a n a l y s i s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 
community and p h y s i c a l environment". (1) His second b a s i c 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n was that s t a t e s are s u b j e c t to change i n t h e i r 
i n t e r n a l c onditions and i n t h e i r e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
The f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n might e q u a l l y w e l l be a loose 
d e f i n i t i o n of Human Geography and P r o f e s s o r Moodie r e a d i l y 
admits that " P o l i t i c a l Geography i s an aspect of the even 
wider study known as Human Geography". (2) However, he 
draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between Human and P o l i t i c a l Geography 
i n t h a t the a r e a l u n i t of the former i s the geographical 
region, and that of the l a t t e r i s the s t a t e . T h i s i s 
perhaps an o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , f o r the r e g i o n a l geographer 
cannot ignore the p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i v i s i o n s of 
the area with which he i s concerned; indeed, r e g i o n a l 
geography must concern i t s e l f i n t e r a l i a with p o l i t i c a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l u n i t s , thus r e c o g n i s i n g t h e i r 
c l a i m to " r e g i o n a l c h a r a c t e r " . (3) The d i s t i n c t i o n i s one 
of emphasis and i n view of the growing tendency f o r the s t a t e 
to play the dominant r o l e i n human s o c i e t y , t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
becomes i n t e l l i g i b l e . P r o f e s s o r F i s h e r , i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n 
to h i s work of S.E. A s i a , sums t h i s up by saying, "For many 
ye a r s now i t has been my c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the most e f f e c t i v e 
l e v e l a t which geographical s y n t h e s i s can be made i s t h a t 
of the p o l i t i c a l u n i t r a t h e r than th a t of the n a t u r a l region 
f o r , fundamental though the l a t t e r concept undoubtedly i s to 
comparative geographical study i t i s p r i m a r i l y as a member 
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of a n a t i o n a l l y organised s o c i e t y that the modern man comes 
to terms with h i s p h y s i c a l environment", (h) One may ask 
whether or not t h i s type of study of Japan could not be done 
eq u a l l y w e l l by the P o l i t i c a l S c i e n t i s t . T h i s may w e l l be, 
but the s t a t e has a t e r r i t o r i a l a rea and a space l o c a t i o n , 
both of which are unique i n many r e s p e c t s , and other things 
being equal, the p o l i t i c a l geographer, by h i s t r a i n i n g as a 
geographer, i s b e t t e r equipped to understand the s e . 
The P o l i t i c a l Geographer comes i n t o c l o s e contact with 
geographical and non-geographical s p e c i a l i s m * Woodridge and 
E a s t w r i t e : "Whilst he must be a geographer i n outlook and 
t r a i n i n g , he must needs be conversant so f a r as i t i s p r o f i t a b l e 
to him, with p o l i t i c s and h i s t o r y (economic and p o l i t i c a l ) of 
the c o u n t r i e s with which he i s concerned", (5) The danger 
here, w h i l s t admitting th a t he cannot achieve a deep s p e c i a l i s a -
t i o n , i s th a t the p o l i t i c a l geographer w i l l dabble i n the 
s p e c i a l i s m s and f a i l to d e r i v e much from them. The i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n s between the p o l i t i c s and economy of a country are 
often profound and demand deep understanding. The P o l i t i c a l 
geographer should have - apart from h i s geographical t r a i n i n g -
a good grounding i n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e , i n economics and i n 
h i s t o r y . A case i n point i s the study of the mode of 
production i n a s t a t e and i t s impact on p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . 
Opinion ranges from the Marxian extreme where the economic 
s u b - s t r u c t u r e of the s t a t e governs the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
s u p e r - s t r u c t u r e to a more g e n e r a l l y accepted view th a t the 
economic f a c t o r has an important i n f l u e n c e on the p o l i t i c a l . 
T h i s l a t t e r view i s summed up by Rostow when he w r i t e s , 
"Men do not u s u a l l y f i g h t and die f o r f i n i t e economic g a i n s . 
They a r e , more g e n e r a l l y , moved by a l o y a l t y to i d e a s . These 
i d e a s , i n t u r n , may be l a r g e l y generated from economic l i f e , 
and from a s o c i a l l i f e s u b s t a n t i a l l y shaped by the economy". (6) 
As P r o f e s s o r M i l l e r has pointed out, there i s a danger 
i n i g n o r i n g f a c t o r s which do not seem to be remotely 
connected with the economy. He w r i t e s , "Again, i n 
est i m a t i n g the o r i g i n s of p o l i t i c a l i d e a s , we should leave 
a place f o r those which are deeply embedded i n a community's 
consciousness and do not a l t e r much i n s p i t e of economic, 
p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l change. Ideas about what i s r i g h t and 
proper have not changed much i n I n d i a and Japan, f o r example, 
i n s p i t e of the immense impact which the technology and 
p o l i t i c a l example of the West has had on these c o u n t r i e s i n 
the past century" ( 7 ) . P r o f e s s o r M i l l e r ' s viewpoint should 
a c t as an e f f e c t i v e warning to Western Statesmen who assume 
too r e a d i l y t h a t Western type p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and 
c a p i t a l i s m put Japan i r r e v o c a b l y i n t o the Western camp. 
Although we sometimes a r b i t r a r i l y d i s t i n g u i s h between 
the i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s of a S t a t e f o r the convenience 
of study, a c l o s e i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p obviously e x i s t s between 
them. For i n s t a n c e , the slump i n world trade and the r e s u l t i n g 
economic d i s t r e s s i n Japan i n 1929 was, i n l a r g e measure, 
re s p o n s i b l e f o r the r i s e to power of the m i l i t a r y a t the 
expense of the democratic elements at th a t time^ the f u l l 
consequences of t h i s take us to P e a r l Harbour. 
- k -
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2. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF POST-WAR JAPAN. 
The complete and u t t e r defeat of Japan l e f t her a 
thoroughly devastated and demoralised land. I n h i s 
estimate of the condition of post war Japan Edwin Reischauer, 
a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, w r i t e s : "Probably none 
of the other p a r t i c i p a n t s ( i n the Second World War) s u f f e r e d 
p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y such heavy damage, and no other i n d u s t r i a l i s e d 
country was so slow i n s t a r t i n g to show s i g n s of recovery. 
Approximately h a l f of the urban housing of Japan had been 
burned to the ground by American a i r r a i d s . Tokyo's 
population had shrunk by more than h a l f , Osaka's by almost 
two t h i r d s . With the d e s t r u c t i o n of the c i t i e s and the 
v i r t u a l disappearance of the merchant marine, which had 
maintained the flow of Japan's economic l i f e blood, i n d u s t r i a l 
production had plummeted, standing i n 19^6 at a mere seventh 
of the 19^1 f i g u r e . The people were clothed i n rags, i l l 
fed and both p h y s i c a l l y and emotionally exhausted." (1) 
This chaos e x i s t e d e q u a l l y i n both urban and r u r a l a r e a s , 
f o r Japanese farms had been worked by depleted man power 
because of the heavy recruitment f o r the Armed Forces , and 
there had been a s e r i o u s shortage of f e r t i l i s e r s and c a p i t a l 
investment during the war y e a r s . The r u r a l scene was 
depressing but at l e a s t the p h y s i c a l i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y of 
the land, with i t s quick r e c u p e r a t i v e powers, meant that 
a g r i c u l t u r a l output was never the same problem as i n d u s t r i a l 
output. Japan, with her s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d farm l a n d s , had 
not been able to achieve s e l f s u f f i c i e n c y i n food production 
i n the i n t e r - w a r y e a r s and the p o s i t i o n a f t e r the war was 
f u r t h e r aggravated by the l o s s of t e r r i t o r i e s which had 
provided f o o d s t u f f s and by the r e t u r n of some s i x m i l l i o n 
s o l d i e r s . I n common with many other b e l l i g e r e n t powers, 
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Japan experienced a 'baby boom' with r e t u r n of her s o l d i e r s 
a f t e r a long s e p a r a t i o n . A runaway i n f l a t i o n caused s p e c i a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r wage and s a l a r y earners when the yen f e l l to 
l e s s than one hundredth of i t s pre-war va l u e . 
The p o s i t i o n was u n r e l i e v e d l y gloomy and i n a land with 
such l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s , i t seemed doubtful i f Japan would ever 
a t t a i n a v i a b l e economy. The urgent problem f o r most Japanese 
was simply to e x i s t and i f i t had not been f o r massive United 
S t a t e s help, there would have been widespread famine i n Japan. 
However, the Japanese people have a great r e s i l i e n c e , stemming 
from frequent e f f o r t s to d e a l with the d e v a s t a t i o n caused by 
earthquakes and typhoons and a f t e r a b r i e f period of apathy, 
caused by the shock of defeat, they began recovery work with 
a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c vigour. 
The s t a t i s t i c s of Japan's post war economic growth are 
most i m p r e s s i v e : her gross n a t i o n a l product rose from 3»9 
b i l l i o n pounds i n 1950 to 19.2 b i l l i o n pounds i n 1962. Her 
r a t e of economic growth cannot be matched by any country i n the 
world and her i n d u s t r i a l and commercial techniques are now 
being c l o s e l y s t u d i e d by Western economists. The Economist 
published a symposium of essays by correspondents and one of 
these wrote that Japan, apart from p o s s e s s i n g a v a s t r e s e v o i r of 
adaptable labour, i n h e r i t e d three great advantages from her 
pre-war y e a r s ( 2 ) . These were f i r s t , mass l i t e r a c y 
(which d i s t i n g u i s h e d her from other Asian powers), second, 
the i n t e r a c t i o n of Government and p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y i n a c h i e v i n g 
a war economy with i t s production plans and the t h i r d i n h e r i t e d 
advantage "was th a t even before 19^5 Japan's topography had 
(perhaps a c c i d e n t a l l y ) i mpelled i t i n t o what now seems to 
have been e x a c t l y the r i g h t t r a n s p o r t system f o r the e a r l y 
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stages of i t s development. The main s e c r e t was th a t 
Japan's long narrow coast s t r i p s had made i t n a t u r a l t h a t 
a l l the main i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y should c l u s t e r around a 
few main r a i l w a y l i n e s , which ran along the coast l i n k i n g 
one i n l e t and n a t u r a l harbour with the next one. Those 
main r a i l w a y l i n e s (although not those harbours) are i n 
superb shape today." (3) T h i s i s not the p l a c e to go 
i n t o a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of the s t r e n g t h of the Japanese 
economy, but i t i s w e l l to remember that economic s t r e n g t h 
i s perhaps of more v i t a l concern to a n a t i o n than ever before 
i n the present n u c l e a r age. One cannot avoid the conclusion 
tha t B r i t a i n has hot paid enough a t t e n t i o n to her economic 
growth i n the post war world and has been cR£'sl'e<li too long 
with d e l u s i o n s of i m p e r i a l grandeur. Japan has been spared 
the heavy cost of defence because of her a l l i a n c e with the U.S. 
For i n s t a n c e she plans to spend 301,^00 m i l l i o n yen (£301,400,000) 
on defence during the f i s c a l year 1965-66-,which i s a comparatively 
modest t o t a l . The Guardian b i t t e r l y c r i t i c i z e d her f o r t h i s 
i n an a r t i c l e (March 14, 19&6) which seemed harsh, as few 
c o u n t r i e s have given such genuine cooperation to the West i n 
the matter of defence. I t i s to B r i t a i n ' s detriment that 
she has blundered i n t o such w a s t e f u l m i l i t a r y expenditure 
without g e t t i n g very e f f e c t i v e weaponry. Of the f u r t h e r 
charge made by the Guardian th a t Japan has not done her share 
i n c o n t r i b u t i n g to economic development i n the F a r E a s t , there 
i s more substance. The Guardian quoted the Japanese Prime 
M i n i s t e r , Mr. Sato, as saying t h a t h i s country "was i n a 
p o s i t i o n to c o n t r i b u t e v i t a l l y to peace and s t a b i l i t y , " adding 
however, that i t could not a f f o r d to s e t a s i d e one per cent of 
n a t i o n a l income f o r a i d purposes, even i n the f i s c a l year 1966. 
The Guardian a l s o pointed out that only four c o u n t r i e s i n the 
non-Communist world have a higher gross n a t i o n a l product than 
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Japan - the U.S., B r i t a i n , France and West Germany - a l l of 
which are doing f a r more to help other c o u n t r i e s to develop. 
The Japanese, i t i s t r u e , stand only twenty-second i n the 
per c a p i t a income t a b l e , but aga i n s t that must be s e t t h e i r 
r e l a t i v e freedom from defence expenditure. I n 1962 the 
f o l l o w i n g c o u n t r i e s contributed these t o t a l s to a i d developing 
c o u n t r i e s : U.S. 0 ^,520 m i l l i o n s ; B r i t a i n 2" 836.7 m i l l i o n s ; 
West Germany % 681.^ m i l l i o n s ; Japan # 281.9 m i l l i o n s . On 
grounds of equity alone one would expect Japan to c o n t r i b u t e 
more f o r the welfare of the poorer Asian c o u n t r i e s but because 
of her v i t a l dependance on world trade, i t i s s u r e l y i n her 
i n t e r e s t that the non-Communist governments of S. E a s t A s i a 
develop p e a c e f u l l y and are not v i c t i m s of Communist blandishments 
because of t h e i r own d i r e poverty. 
Japan i s a powerful country and she seems l i k e l y to 
p l a y a more independent r o l e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s i n the 
next decade. There have been s i g n s r e c e n t l y that t h i s w i l l 
come about - her attempts at mediation between Indonesia and 
Malaysia ha^tbeen an example of t h i s - but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see 
her being able to dispense with the American a l l i a n c e , i n view 
of her proximity to the two super-powers, the U.S.S.R. and 
China. Much of Japan's trade i s with the U.S. but her s k i l l s 
and t e c h n i c a l knowhow are v i t a l l y needed i n S.E. A s i a . Some 
Western economists have pointed out that China i s the n a t u r a l 
market f o r Japan - and indeed some Japanese right-wing 
businessmen, who are r e s e n t f u l of U.S. hegemony i n the F a r 
E a s t , have expressed a wish f o r the development of trade with 
Communist China, but t h i s i s a naive point of view. We have 
few examples of extensive trade between Communist and non-
Commuiiist c o u n t r i e s and China has perhaps a g r e a t e r s u s p i c i o n 
of c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s than has Soviet R u s s i a . The trade 
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l i n k s with the U.S. have provided an extensive market f o r 
Japanese cameras, r a d i o s and other consumer goods, but i t 
remains to be seen whether or not Japan can a f f o r d to ignore 
the p o t e n t i a l market i n South Eas t A s i a . 
Japan's 'economic m i r a c l e * i s a f a c t , but she s t i l l 
has great economic problems : her g r e a t e s t i s i n her dependence 
on the outside world f o r much of her f o o d s t u f f s (soya beans, 
wheat and other c e r e a l s ) , v i r t u a l l y a l l her o i l requirements 
(which i s r e p l a c i n g c o a l as the major source of power), and 
most of the raw m a t e r i a l s of i n d u s t r y . As i n the case of 
B r i t a i n , t h i s makes her more vulnerable than the super-powers, 
the U.S.A. and R u s s i a , who have considerable sources of raw 
m a t e r i a l s w i t h i n t h e i r own t e r r i t o r i e s . To pay f o r her raw 
m a t e r i a l s Japan must export on a vast s c a l e and the question 
always remains whether f o r e i g n markets can keep up with her 
extremely r a p i d r a t e of growth. There i s always a danger of 
a balance of payments c r i s i s but the Japanese have shown 
great s k i l l i n avoiding these and have not been plagued with the 
'stop-go' methods we have used i n B r i t a i n . What have been 
the i n g r e d i e n t s of Japan's i n c r e d i b l e s u c c e s s ? B r i e f l y , 
these would seem to be the tremendous energy and a p p l i c a t i o n 
of her people. Her emphasis on education, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l education, has been the r i g h t one i f we are 
r e s t r i c t i n g our enquiry to the m a t e r i a l w e l f a r e of her people.• 
However, these q u a l i t i e s of r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s and i n d u s t r y e x i s t e d 
before the war and there i s no simple explanation f o r her 
economic s u c c e s s i n the post-war world. I n e x t r i c a b l y mixed 
up with economic problems are the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l ones 
and there i s the a d d i t i o n a l f a s c i n a t i o n i n studying post-war 
Japan i n tha t i t i s a period when "democracy, western created 
with a Western developed concept of government and p o l i t i c s , 
could become r a p i d l y and f i r m l y rooted i n a nation t h a t not 
only had noi; democratic h i s t o r y and t r a d i t i o n of i t s own but 
had developed a modern governmental system of an a u t h o r i t a r i a n 
c h a r a c t e r . " (4) Democracy i n Japan was not the product of an 
e v o l u t i o n a r y growth, as i n the West, but was the r e s u l t o f a 
v a s t s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n . What made the r e v o l u t i o n s u c c e s s f u l 
was a combination of f a c t o r s , the primary ones being a l o s t 
war, with a l l the chaos and d i s l o c a t i o n s of defeat, a reasonably 
enlightened occupying power, a s o c i e t y equipped with the b a s i c 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of the modern na t i o n s t a t e , and a population 
d i s i l l u s i o n e d by a former a u t h o r i t a r i a n form of government 
that had l e t them down. I n s p i t e of o c c a s i o n a l c r i s e s , the 
f u t u r e of democracy seems to be reasonably secure i n Japan 
and i t i s perhaps mainly i n some period of acute economic 
d i s t r e s s , caused by a d i s l o c a t i o n of f o r e i g n trade, t h a t a 
r e s u r r e c t i o n of the old right-wing mi l i t j ^ ^ ? 1 5 could occur. 
This study i s concerned with the s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e s of 
Japan's economic recovery and her e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l 
developments i n the post-war p e r i o d . The i n c l u s i o n of a chapter 
on education i s perhaps a l i t t l e unusual i n a work on p o l i t i c a l 
Geography. The main j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s r e s t s , i n the 
w r i t e r ' s view, on the value of the work of the schools and 
u n i v e r s i t i e s i n helping to c r e a t e a democratic s o c i e t y i n 
Japan, and i n promoting Japan's economic growth. 
Although the chapter headings suggest a somewhat 
a r b i t r a r y d i v i s i o n of s u b j e c t matter, i t i s hoped that there 
w i l l be considerable c r o s s r e f e r e n c e between these. 
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3. SOME GEO-POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
L o c a t i o n 
Y.M. G o b l e t , i n h i s book ' P o l i t i c a l Geography and t h e 
World Map' w r i t e s : "The drawbacks o f p o s i t i o n a r e a yoke 
from whose burden no s t a t e can escape b u t an advantageous 
g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n may f a v o u r a s t a t e as much as t h e 
development o f an optimum t e r r i t o r y . " (1) A l t h o u g h we would 
n o t d i s a g r e e w i t h t h i s s t a t e m e n t , i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s t r u e t h a t 
t h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y r e c e n t r i s e t o w o r l d dominance o f t h e 'super 
powers', based on enormous t e r r i t o r i a l s t r e n g t h s , has made t h e 
p o s i t i o n o f n a t i o n s such as B r i t a i n and Japan, which possess 
s m a l l homelands, r e l a t i v e l y worse. N u c l e a r power has b r o u g h t 
about d r a m a t i c changes i n w o r l d s t r a t e g y and has u n d o u b t e d l y 
weakened t h e p o s i t i o n o f n a t i o n s w i t h s m a l l homelands, no 
m a t t e r how i m p o r t a n t t h e i r p o s i t i o n i s . Both Japan and 
B r i t a i n have e n t e r e d t h e s i x t i e s o f t h i s c e n t u r y as good 
'second c l a s s powers', a l t h o u g h i n thd case o f Japan, t h e 
success she has enjoyed i n t h e economic sphere has been 
tempered s t r a t e g i c a l l y by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e nearby mainland 
of A s i a i s dominated by Communist China and Russia. B r i t a i n , 
a t l e a s t , i s spared t h e embarrassment o f a n e i g h b o u r i n g , h o s t i l e 
c o n t i n e n t . 
I n many ways Japan's d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n i s weak; her 
t e r r i t o r y c o n s i s t s o f an arc o f i s l a n d s s t r e t c h i n g f o r a 
thousand m i l e s o f f t h e E a s t e r n shores o f A s i a . Her p r o x i m i t y 
t o t h e mainland can be seen from map 11b The main i s l a n d , 
Honshu, i s o n l y 160 m i l e s from Korea and h e r t e r r i t o r i e s are 
o n l y 250 m i l e s from t h e S o v i e t m a i n l a n d . Her m a j o r i n d u s t r i e s 
are h i g h l y c o n c e n t r a t e d and would be v u l n e r a b l e t o a i r a t t a c k 
even by c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons. However, t h i s p r o x i m i t y t o t h e 
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m a i n l a n d has been, on b a l a n c e , a g r e a t a s s e t , f o r t h i s 
has p e r m i t t e d e f f e c t i v e c u l t u r a l c o n t a c t w i t h China b u t 
a t the same t i m e h e r s u r r o u n d i n g seas have g i v e n h e r some 
p r o t e c t i o n . Trewatha - almost i n e v i t a b l y - compared Japan 
w i t h B r i t a i n when he w r o t e : "Japan's h i s t o r y has been one 
of a l t e r n a t i n g p e r i o d s o f s e c l u s i o n and communication w i t h 
t h e m a i n l a n d o f East A s i a . Each developed ( B r i t a i n and Japan) 
i n d u s t r y e a r l i e r t h a n d i d t h e a d j a c e n t c o n t i n e n t ; and t h e 
r e s u l t i n g need f o r overseas raw m a t e r i a l s i n t u r n s t i m u l a t e d 
t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f a c o l o n i a l empire. Japan, a t t h e gateway 
t o populous East A s i a , has a s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n b o t h i n an 
economic and i n a m i l i t a r y sense". (2) 
I n t h e main, Japan has c a p i t a l i z e d on h e r g e o g r a p h i c a l 
a s s e t s i n t h e p a s t : her i s l a n d s have been r e l a t i v e l y f r e e 
from i n v a s i o n f r o m t h e mainland and y e t she has been a b l e t o 
l a u n c h v i g o r o u s a t t a c k s on t h e m a i n l a n d f r o m h e r i s l a n d s . 
The Korean P e n i n s u l a - t h e so c a l l e d 'dagger atmed a t t h e 
h e a r t o f Japan* - r e p r e s e n t e d an obvious s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t 
and i t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e c o n t r o l and conquest o f 
Korea always f e a t u r e d p r o m i n e n t l y i n Japan's ' i m p e r i a l i s t 
p r i o r i t i e s ' . P r o f e s s o r C.A. F i s h e r reminded us o f t h e r e a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Korea t o Japan when he suggested t h a t t h e 
at t e m p t e d c o n t r o l o f Korea and t h e S t r a i t s o f Tsushima were 
p o s i t i v e aims o f S o v i e t Russia i n b r i n g i n g about the, Korean 
War o f t h e e a r l y 1950's. (3) 
The Japanese have a l o n g t r a d i t i o n o f m a r i t i m e s k i l l 
and t h i s has o b v i o u s l y h e l p e d them t o r e p e l i n v a d e r s and t o 
c r e a t e a modern f l e e t . The sea so ob t r u d e s i t s e l f on t o t h e 
Japanese t h a t i t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e y have always 
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enjoyed a good r e p u t a t i o n as s a i l o r s . From t h e 12th Century 
onwards t h e r e has been c o n s i d e r a b l e Japanese m a r i t i m e e n t e r p r i s e 
as f a r as t h e shores o f Malacca and Siam. A l t h o u g h m a r i t i m e 
v e n t u r e s beyond home w a t e r s were o f f i c i a l l y d i s c o u r a g e d f r o m 
th e 17th t o t h e 19th C e n t u r i e s h e r c o a s t a l f i s h e r i e s c o n t i n u e d 
on a l a r g e s c a l e and Japan l o s t none o f h e r m a r i t i m e s k i l l s . 
W i t h o u t b e i n g u n d u l y d e t e r m i n i s t i c , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o c o n c e i v e 
o f a populous n a t i o n , w i t h Japan's geography, n o t b e i n g i n v o l v e d 
i n m a r i t i m e v e n t u r e s . Even h e r r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l p l a i n s have 
l o c a t i o n s near the sea so t h a t a l l marine m a t t e r s a r e f o r c i b l y 
t h r u s t upon h e r . The h i g h c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f i n d u s t r y on these 
l i t t o r a l p l a i n s r e p r e s e n t s something o f a s t r a t e g i c weakness 
b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s i s e c o n o m i c a l l y r i g h t f o r a n a t i o n so dependent 
on raw m a t e r i a l s f r o m overseas. Her r a t i o o f l i n e a r m i l e s 
o f c o a s t l i n e t o square m i l e s o f t e r r i t o r y (1 t o 8.5 sq. m i l e s ) 
i s even h i g h e r t h a n B r i t a i n ' s (1 t o 13 sq. m i l e s ) . U n f o r t u n a t e l y 
Japan l a c k s good n a t u r a l h a r b o u r s i t e s near t h e major c e n t r e s 
o f p o p u l a t i o n . The s h a l l o w seas near t h e c o a s t a l p l a i n s 
p r e s e n t something o f a problem, a l t h o u g h improved d r e d g i n g 
t e c h n i q u e s have h e l p e d t o c i r c u m v e n t these problems. Where 
r i v e r s e n t e r t h e s h a l l o w seas near such s i t e s o f Yokohama and 
Osaka, s i l t i n g s t i l l p r e s e n t s something o f a problem. 
Even i n a b r i e f c h a p t e r on Japan's g e o - p o l i t i c a l problems 
i t would be unwise n o t t o mention t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Japan's 
f i s h i n g i n d u s t r y . Her f i s h i n g i n d u s t r y i s by f a r t h e l a r g e s t 
i n t h e w o r l d and i n c l u d e s b o t h i n t e n s i v e i n s h o r e f i s h i n g and 
deep w a t e r f i s h i n g i n many p a r t s o f t h e P a c i f i c . Only by 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f f i s h and marine p r o d u c t s i n 
t h e d i e t o f t h e average Japanese can we u n d e r s t a n d t h e degree 
of b i t t e r n e s s b r o u g h t i n t o Russo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s when t h e 
f o r m e r a p p r o p r i a t e d i m p o r t a n t f i s h i n g grounds, t i e d t o t h e 
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t e r r i t o r i e s o f S a k h a l i n and t h e K u r i l e s , which were a c q u i r e d 
by Russia a t t h e end o f t h e Second World War. Many o f t h e 
e x c e e d i n g l y b i t t e r d i s p u t e s between South Korea and Japan have 
t h e i r o r i g i n s i n d i s p u t e s over f i s h i n g grounds. 
I n t h e post-war e r a , Japan has depended on U.S. f o r c e s 
f o r h e r defence. A l t h o u g h Japan has a l a r g e merchant navy 
and a superb s h i p b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y she has n o t b u i l t a f l e e t t o 
r e p l a c e h e r broken w a r - t i m e navy. I n t h e e a r l y post-war y e a r s 
the U.S. would n o t have p e r m i t t e d any e x t e n s i v e Japanese n a v a l 
s h i p b u i l d i n g programme and t h e Japanese l e f t t h e main d e f e n s i v e 
problem w i t h t h e U.S., which f r e e d Japan from heavy n a t i o n a l 
defence e x p e n d i t u r e . 
The l o s s o f Southern S a k h a l i n and t h e K u r i l e s t o t h e 
U.S.S.R. a f t e r t h e Second World War has g r e a t l y weakened 
Japan's s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n and t h e U.S.S.R. has now v i r t u a l l y 
assumed c o n t r o l over t h e Sea o f Okhotsk. Perhaps o f g r e a t e r 
s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r Japan i s h e r p o s i t i o n i n t h e Sea o f 
Japan, w h i c h , a l t h o u g h i t i s n o t c o m p l e t e l y dominated by S o v i e t 
Russia, can g i v e Japan l i t t l e s e c u r i t y because o f h e r l a c k o f 
c o n t r o l over t h e Soya S t r a i t . ( S e e map) 11b Moreover, t h e 
tremendous submarine (.programme t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union has f o l l o w e d 
i n r e c e n t y e a r s can g i v e t h e Japanese s m a l l c o n s o l a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y 
as numbered among these are submarines capable o f d e l i v e r i n g 
atomic m i s s i l e s . I n deed, so g r e a t has been t h e s t r a t e g i c 
advantage o f t h e U.S.S.R. v i s - a - v i s Japan t h a t P r o f e s s o r F i s h e r 
quotes W. Macmahon B a l l who argues "Japan may be d r i v e n t o a l i g n 
i t s e l f w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union r a t h e r t h a n t h e Western Bloc as t h e 
o n l y p o s s i b l e means o f e n s u r i n g n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l i n t h e event 
o f a t h i r d w o r l d war". (*f) T h i s h i g h l y p e r s p i c a c i o u s s t a t e m e n t 
was made b e f o r e t h e r e were apparent s t r a i n s i n S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s 
and l o n g b e f o r e China had begun t e s t i n g atomic weapons J 
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Shorn o f h e r overseas p o s s e s s i o n s , Japan now l a c k s a 
d e f e n s i v e screen o f i s l a n d s i n t h e P a c i f i c b u t t h i s i s o f 
l i t t l e consequence as t h e main t h r e a t t o her s e c u r i t y i s f r o m 
t h e A s i a n m a i n l a n d . J a p a n - l i k e B r i t a i n - would, because o f 
her l i m i t e d means o f i n d u s t r i a l deployment, be h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e 
t o a n u c l e a r a t t a c k , d e l i v e r e d by r o c k e t s . The f a c t t h a t China 
now has n u c l e a r weapons, has caused some pessimism i n Japan i n 
r e c e n t months as she has every reason t o dread a n u c l e a r war. 
Japan as a base 
Japan c l e a r l y l a c k s a sound raw m a t e r i a l base and many 
o f h e r pre-war p o l i c i e s are o n l y i n t e l l i g i b l e i n t h e l i g h t o f 
her f r a n t i c search t o make up these d e f i c i e n c i e s . The Map 77(a> 
shows t h e e x t e n t o f Japan's t e r r i t o r i a l expansion up t o 19^3 
and l i s t s some o f the raw m a t e r i a l s she hoped t o o b t a i n from 
t h i s empire. Japan's economy was g r o s s l y o v e r s t r a i n e d i n t h e 
pre-war y e a r s ; she scraped t o g e t h e r raw m a t e r i a l s from a l l 
over A s i a and developed h e r t e r r i t o r i e s so t h a t she c o u l d squeeze 
the l a s t ounce out o f them. T h i s l a c k o f raw m a t e r i a l s i s 
s t i l l a source o f weakness b u t i n economic t e r m s , Japan has been 
a b l e t o m i n i m i z e t h i s problem by a c h i e v i n g cheap, b u l k t r a n s p o r t 
o f raw m a t e r i a l s and by m a i n t a i n i n g a h i g h s t a n d a r d o f i n d u s t r i a l 
and commercial e f f i c i e n c y . The r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f a n a t i o n i n 
w o r l d a f f a i r s depends upon a complex number o f f a c t o r s . Some 
o f t h e s e , t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n , t h e l e v e l o f economic 
development, as we have seen, a r e i m p o r t a n t , b u t e q u a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t i s t h e demographic f a c t o r . As we s h a l l see i n 
d e t a i l l a t e r i n t h i s work t h e demographic f a c t o r i s by no means 
as depressing as i t seemed i n t h e immediate post-war y e a r s . 
Japanese i n d u s t r y has b e n e f i t e d by a s t e a d y i n f l u x o f a d a p t a b l e , 
r e a s o n a b l y w e l l educated workers from t h e l a n d and moreover these 
have been a v a i l a b l e a t j u s t t h e r i g h t stage i n h e r economic 
development. Her crude b i r t h r a t e has f a l l e n d r a m a t i c a l l y 
i n t h e f i f t i e s and s i x t i e s b u t p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s about b i r t h 
r a t e are n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t and i t would be unwise t o r u l e 
out a 'demographic e x p l o s i o n 1 . 
One o f t h e p r e s s i n g problems f a c i n g Japanese statesmen 
b e f o r e t h e war was the d i f f i c u l t y o f p r o d u c i n g enough f o o d s t u f f s 
t o f e e d t h i s r a p i d l y i n c r e a s i n g p o p u l a t i o n , b u t t h i s problem 
has been a l l e v i a t e d b o t h by a f a l l i n b i r t h r a t e and by an 
i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y i n Japanese f a r m i n g . Improved t e c h n i q u e s 
have l e d t o a n e t i n c r e a s e i n f o o d s t u f f s w i t h a r a p i d l y d e c r e a s i n g 
l a b o u r f o r c e and i n t h i s , Japan has f o l l o w e d a t r e n d f a m i l i a r 
i n Western Europe and U.S.A. Al t h o u g h Japan i s now s e l f 
s u f f i c i e n t i n r i c e p r o d u c t i o n , i t s h o u l d be borne i n mind t h a t 
t h e g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d p u r c h a s i n g power o f t h e Japanese worker 
has meant t h a t he has been a b l e t o buy a w i d e r v a r i e t y o f 
f o o d s t u f f s . However, a r a b l e l a n d i n Japan i s l i m i t e d t o a 
mere 17% o f h er t o t a l a r e a and i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o conceive how 
Japan can g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e h e r a g r i c u l t u r a l o u t p u t . The 
e s s e n t i a l l y mountainous topography o f Japan i s dis a d v a n t a g e o u s . 
Her mountains make communications d i f f i c u l t and, o f co u r s e , 
have l i m i t e d l a n d use - a p a r t f r o m s i l v i c u l t u r e . Some 
economic advantage i n t h e sphere o f h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power 
augments Japan's s l e n d e r f u e l r e s o u r c e s b u t Japan's mountainous 
t e r r a i n g i v e s g r e a t n a t u r a l beauty b u t l i t t l e e l s e . The 
mountains would make Japan a d i f f i c u l t c o u n t r y t o invade i n a 
c o n v e n t i o n a l war and one o f t h e s t r o n g e s t arguments advanced 
by t h e Americans i n t h e Second World War f o r d r o p p i n g n u c l e a r 
bombs on Japan was t h e h i g h c a s u a l t y r a t e which would have been 
i n e v i t a b l e i n any i n v a s i o n o f Japan. 
On b a l a n c e , Japan i s f a v o u r e d by h e r . c l i m a t e . Macro-
c l i m a t e i s perhaps o f more s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a n a n y t h i n g e l s e i n 
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a c o u n t r y c o n s i s t i n g o f mountainous i s l a n d s . Japan's 
c l i m a t e i s e s s e n t i a l l y a composite o f c o n t i n e n t a l and 
marine elements w i t h t h e f o r m e r p r e d o m i n a t i n g . Her c l i m a t e 
g i v e s h e r extreme w i n t e r and summer t e m p e r a t u r e s w i t h r e l a t i v e l y 
h i g h ranges i n t e m p e r a t u r e b u t she i s b l e s s e d w i t h an adequate 
r a i n f a l l . Her c l i m a t e i s somewhat m o d i f i e d by t h e i n f l u e n c e s 
o f oceanic c u r r e n t s b u t these e f f e c t s a r e sometimes exaggerated 
by geographers. For example, t h e K u r o s h i o c u r r e n t has a warming 
e f f e c t b u t because i t i s on t h e l e e s i d e o f Japan d u r i n g t h e 
w i n t e r monsoon i t s d i r e c t e f f e c t on t e m p e r a t u r e s i s m i n i m i z e d . 
The c o l d 'Oyoshio c u r r e n t tends t o reduce t e m p e r a t u r e s and 
causes much c o a s t a l f o g a l o n g t h e coast o f N.E. Hokkaido and 
Honshu. N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e c l i m a t e p e r m i t s o f an a s t o n i s h i n g 
v a r i e t y o f crops r a n g i n g f r o m two crop r i c e p r o d u c t i o n i n t h e 
extreme s o u t h t o t y p i c a l c o o l temperate crops o f Hokkaido. 
The Japanese have always shown a marked d i s i n c l i n a t i o n 
t o m i g r a t e t o areas which e x p e r i e n c e marked w i n t e r c o l d and 
t h i s a ccounts f o r t h e r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l p o p u l a t i o n on Hokkaido. 
T h i s l a c k o f development has concerned s u c c e s s i v e Japanese 
Governments, e s p e c i a l l y when t h e S o v i e t Union emerged as a 
major t h r e a t t o Japan. Undoubtedly t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t 
s t r e n g t h i n Japan l i e s i n the q u a l i t y o f h e r p e o p l e : she has 
proved t o the w o r l d t h a t h e r people are w e l l d i s c i p l i n e d , q u i t e 
p r e p a r e d t o undetgo p r o t r a c t e d h a r d s h i p s i f necessary and t h a t 
t h e y have a r a r e q u a l i t y o f toughness. I t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g 
t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s l o o k s upon Japan as one o f her c h i e f 
a l l i e s , a c h o i c e d i c t a t e d p a r t l y by the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Japan's 
g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n and h e r dynamic economy and p a r t l y from 
a r e s p e c t f o r t h e q u a l i t y o f h e r p e o p l e s . 
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Far E a s t e r n p o l i t i c s are concerned w i t h a v a s t 
t r i a n g u l a r s t r u g g l e f o r power i n v o l v i n g China, t h e U.S.S.R. 
and t h e U.S.A., and i t needs l i t t l e i m a g i n a t i o n t o a p p r e c i a t e 
Japan's s i g n i f i c a n c e t o any one o f these major powers. The 
l o s s o f such t e r r i t o r i e s as Southern Vietnam would r e p r e s e n t a 
s e r i o u s breach i n t h e p o l i c y o f U.S.A.'s containment o f 
Communist China b u t t h e economic p o t e n t i a l o f such c o u n t r i e s 
i s n o t g r e a t . Japan, h o w e v e r j i s a v e r y d i f f e r e n t k e t t l e o f 
f i s h . Her m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l i s g r e a t and her l o s s would 
make America's p o s i t i o n i n t h e Far East e x t r e m e l y c r i t i c a l . 
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4. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The p e r i o d up t o t h e o u t b r e a k o f t h e Second World War. 
I n a s t u d y o f p o l i t i c a l geography c o v e r i n g almost 
t h i r t y y e ars t h e r e i s a danger t h a t , h a v i n g t h e b e n e f i t o f 
th e h i n d s i g h t o f h i s t o r y , we may f a i l t o a p p r e c i a t e how 
w o r l d problems must have seemed t o statesmen a t t h a t t i m e . 
T h i s p i t f a l l i s a dangerous one i n t h e case o f Japan where 
the i m pact o f Western t e c h n o l o g y , so o b v i o u s l y apparent t o d a y , 
may obscure t h e b a s i c c o n t i n u i t y o f p a s t t r a d i t i o n . 
K.S. L a t o u r e t t e , t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e d American h i s t o r i a n o f 
th e Far East w r i t e s : " I t i s so a x i o m a t i c as t o be a 
b a n a l i t y t o say t h a t p r e s e n t day Japan i s a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f 
the o l d Japan. Yet i t needs emphasizing. To t h e c a s u a l 
o b s e r v e r f r o m t h e West, e s p e c i a l l y t o one who has come t o 
Japan by way o f I n d i a and China and has v i s i t e d o n l y t h e 
l a r g e c i t i e s , Japan has seemed so t h o r o u g h l y t r a n s f o r m e d by 
i t s c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e Occident t h a t a complete g u l f i s 
assumed t o e x i s t between t h e o l d and t h e new. T h i s i s 
almost t h e e x a c t o p p o s i t e o f t h e t r u t h . I t i s l e s s t h a n 
a hundred y e a r s s i n c e Commodore P e r r y ended t h e Tokygawa 
s e c l u s i o n . That time has n o t been s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e 
e l i m i n a t i o n o f i n s t i t u t i o n s and s t i l l l e s s t h e b a s i c 
a t t i t u d e s o f a people as t e n a c i o u s of t h e i r i n h e r i t a n c e 
as are t h e Japanese. Behind t h e facade o f Western d r e s s , 
b u i l d i n g s , f a c t o r i e s , e l e c t r i c l i g h t s , r a i l w a y s , and 
a u t o m o b i l e s t h e p r e - P e r r y Japan l i n g e r s . I t n o t o n l y l i n g e r s , 
i t i s s t i l l p o t e n t . " (1) 
The b r i e f s t u d y o f t h e e a r l y h i s t o r y o f Japan i s 
t h e r e f o r e germane t o t h i s work. The r e a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
aspect o f t h e modern h i s t o r y o f Japan, however, i s i n t h e 
response she made t o t h e i n t r u s i o n o f t h e Western World i n 
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t h e l a s t c e n t u r y . Japan was t h e f i r s t c o u n t r y i n A s i a 
t o become i n d u s t r i a l i s e d and t h e r e f o r e t h e f i r s t i n A s i a 
t o use t h e weapons o f t h e West a g a i n s t t h e West. Japan, 
r e c i p r o c a l l y , had a g r e a t impact on t h e Western World and 
o f t h i s , R i c h a r d S t o r r y w r i t e s : "The Western World, f e e l i n g 
t h r o u g h t h e agency o f Japan t h e f i r s t i n t r u s i o n by t h e East, 
responded w i t h emotions n o t f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t from those 
e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e Japanese. T h i s p o w e r f u l i n t e r a c t i o n , 
much vOf i t a l l t h e h a r d e r t o g r a s p , has shaped Japanese 
h i s t o r y over t h e l a s t n i n e or t e n decades." (2) The major 
p a r t o f t h i s h i s t o r i c a l o u t l i n e w i l l t h e r e f o r e be concerned 
w i t h Japan a f t e r h e r c o n t a c t w i t h t h e West, b u t t o p l a c e t h i s 
i n h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , a b r i e f summary o f s i g n i f i c a n t phases 
i n h er e a r l y h i s t o r y w i l l be necessary. 
Japanese h i s t o r y up t o t h e o u t b r e a k o f t h e Second World 
War may - somewhat a r b i t r a r i l y - be d i v i d e d i n t o t h e f o l l o w i n g 
p e r i o d s : 
1. Japan; b e f o r e h e r e f f e c t i v e c o n t a c t w i t h China. 
2. The T r a n s f o r m a t i o n t h r o u g h China: Nara (710-79*0 and 
Heian (79^-1185) p e r i o d s 
3. M i l i t a r y D i c t a t o r s h i p t o 1600: Kamakura (1185-1333), 
Muromachi (1333-1568), and Momoyama (1568-1600) p e r i o d s . 
h. The Tokugawa P e r i o d (1600-1868). 
5. The M e i j i P e r i o d , i n which Japan emerges from h e r 
s e c l u s i o n (1868-1912) 
6. Japan becomes a World Power (189^-1930) 
7. The M i l i t a r i s t c o n t r o l o f Japan (1930-41). 
1. Japan, b e f o r e h e r e f f e c t i v e c o n t a c t w i t h China. 
As w i t h so many o t h e r p e o p l e s , t h e s t o r y o f t h e b e g i n n i n g s 
o f t h e Japanese i s e n s h r i n e d i n myths and l e g e n d s . These, 
however, have had r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e Japanese as t h e y 
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were c o n s i d e r e d t o be f a c t u a l l y t r u e and as such were t a u g h t 
i n t h e s c h o o l s and U n i v e r s i t i e s up t o t h e end of t h e P a c i f i c 
War. S t o r r y mentions t h e f a c t t h a t more t h a n one t e a c h e r i n 
th e academic w o r l d o f pre-war Japan l o s t h i s l i v e l i h o o d f o r 
q u e s t i o n i n g t h e accuracy o f t h e a n c i e n t l e g e n d s . (3) 
There i s no r e c o r d e d h i s t o r y i n Japan u n t i l t h e Chinese 
c h a r a c t e r s were adopted i n t h e f o u r t h c e n t u r y and i t i s n o t 
u n t i l t h i s p e r i o d t h a t n a t i v e c h r o n i c l e s become r e a s o n a b l y 
a c c u r a t e . Most s c h o l a r s , however, combining a n u c l e u s o f 
f a c t f r o m some o f t h e legends and a r c h a e o l o g i c a l f i n d i n g s are 
agreed t h a t from t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e C h r i s t i a n e r a , two c e n t r e s 
o f c u l t u r e e x i s t e d i n Japan. One was a t Izumo, on t h e s o u t h 
west o f t h e main i s l a n d , o p p o s i t e Korea, and t h e o t h e r was a t 
Yamato, a l s o on Honshu, s o u t h o f p r e s e n t day Kyoto. Yamato 
was t h e nu c l e u s o f t h e l a t e r c e n t r a l i z e d government o f Japan. 
T h i s n u c l e u s i s s a i d t o have been founded by conquerors f r o m 
Kyushu, who, l e d by Gimmu Tenno, made t h e i r way a l o n g t h e e a s t e r n 
shore o f t h a t i s l a n d and t h e n a l o n g t h e I n l a n d Sea u n t i l t h e y 
e s t a b l i s h e d themselves i n Yamato. The r a c i a l c o m p o s i t i o n o f 
of these people i s u n c e r t a i n and s p e c u l a t i o n has been made t h a t 
t h e y d e r i v e d i n p a r t from i s l a n d s i n t h e s o u t h , and p a r t from 
t h e c o n t i n e n t , by way o f Korea. A r c h a e o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e , 
however, i s more h e l p f u l and we know t h a t these people had 
advanced beyond the p r i m i t i v e s tages o f c i v i l i s a t i o n . They 
made i r o n implements, c l o t h and p o t t e r y and were capable o f 
making q u i t e i n t r i c a t e p i e c e s o f j e w e l r y . Pice was t h e b a s i c 
c r o p produced by t h i s e s s e n t i a l l y a g r a r i a n p e o p l e , b u t t h e 
presence o f d i s t i n c t o c c u p a t i o n a l groups shows a somewhat 
d i v e r s i f i e d economy. 
When we t u r n t o t h e s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n 
o f t h e se people we f i n d t h a t t h e y d i d n o t possess a h i g h l y 
c e n t r a l i z e d monarchy b u t had an I m p e r i a l F a m i l y , which was i n e f f e 
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t h e most i m p o r t a n t c l a n . These c l a n s were made up o f a 
number o f households which c l a i m e d a common a n c e s t o r ; t h e y 
worshipped a common god, and were under a common c h i e f t a i n . 
Each c l a n had i t s own l a n d s . The head o f t h e dominant c l a n , 
who was termed Emperor, had a c e r t a i n a u t h o r i t y w hich he 
e x e r c i s e d t h r o u g h t h e heads o f t h e o t h e r c l a n s . What i s 
perhaps t h e most i n t e r e s t i n g aspect o f t h i s s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e 
i s t h a t i t was s t r a t i f i e d i n h e r e d i t a r y l a y e r s and was u n l i k e 
t h e r e l a t i v e l y f l u i d s o c i e t y which developed i n China. The 
r u l e r s o f t h e c l a n s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e a r i s t o c r a c y and below these 
were o c c u p a t i o n a l groups, a l s o w i t h h e r e d i t a r y membership and 
on t h e bottom r u n g o f t h e s o c i a l l a d d e r were t h e s l a v e s . 
The r e l i g i o n o f these p eople was t h e pre d e c e s s o r o f t h e 
p r e s e n t S h i n t o f a i t h . To these e a r l y Japanese a l l o b j e c t s 
and p l a n t s were c o n s i d e r e d t o have l i f e and t h e word 'kami', 
u s u a l l y t r a n s l a t e d as 'god', was n o t c l o s e l y d e f i n e d , and 
embraced a g r e a t v a r i e t y o f o b j e c t s and b e i n g s . B e f o r e c o n t a c t 
w i t h China, a n c e s t o r w o r s h i p was n o t an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h i s 
r e l i g i o n . T h i s r e l i g i o n had w i t h i n i t no p r o f o u n d t h e o l o g y ; 
i t was a r e l i g i o n o f r i t u a l and c e r e m o n i a l b u t was i n no way 
obsessed w i t h s i n . There were p r o f e s s i o n a l p r i e s t s b u t t h e i r 
numbers were s m a l l and t h i s l i m i t e d need f o r them seems t o have 
been d i c t a t e d more by genuine t h e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and 
no t by t h e economic d i f f i c u l t i e s o f s u p p o r t i n g an ever l a r g e r 
p r i e s t h o o d . T h i s b r i e f comment on t h e e a r l y Japanese i s n o t 
a p r o f i t l e s s one, f o r t o d a y , much o f t h i s p r i m i t i v e r e l i g i o n , 
much m o d i f i e d by c o n t a c t s w i t h o t h e r f a i t h s , s u r v i v e s . 
The e a r l y Japanese s t a t e w i t h i t s c e n t r e a t Yamato 
g r a d u a l l y extended i t s b o r d e r s by conquest and e v e n t u a l l y 
conquered t h e s o u t h e r n t i p o f Korea. However, i t s h o u l d be 
remembered t h a t a l t h o u g h t e r r i t o r i a l l y t h i s s t a t e occupied no 
more th a n perhaps a t h i r d o f Honshu and a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l 
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p a r t o f t h e Korean p e n i n s u l a , i t was a g g r e s s i v e l y e x p a n s i o n i s t 
and r e j o i c e d i n m i l i t a r y e x p l o i t s . T h i s a d u l a t i o n o f t h e 
w a r r i o r has been a c o n s t a n t f a c t o r i n Japanese h i s t o r y , 
a l t h o u g h we i n t h e West a r e n o t blameless on t h i s s c o r e ! 
When we come t o ask what were t h e most i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s o f 
t h i s e a r l y s t a t e and what i s t h e i r r e l e v a n c e t o us today -
a t t e m p t i n g a s t u d y i n p o l i t i c a l geography - t h e y seem t o be 
as f o l l o w s : -
( a ) t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a h i g h l y s t a t i f i e d s o c i e t y whose 
economy was c e n t r e d on r i c e g r o w i n g . 
( b ) t h e development o f a r e l i g i o n which c o n t i n u e s t o 
e x e r t i n f l u e n c e on m i l l i o n s o f Japanese t o d a y . 
( c ) t h e gr o w t h o f an e x p a n s i o n i s t s t a t e which e x t o l l e d 
m a r t i a l e x p l o i t s . 
2. T r a n s f o r m a t i o n t h r o u g h China. 
Most s c h o l a r s are agreed t h a t t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f 
Japan by Chinese c u l t u r e i s t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t phase i n 
Japanese h i s t o r y . The a b s o r p t i o n o f i d e a s c o n s t i t u t e d a 
r e v o l u t i o n f a r more t h o r o u g h g o i n g t h a n t h a t which came 
from c o n t a c t w i t h t h e West c e n t u r i e s l a t e r . I n a v e r y 
r e a l sense t h e r e v o l u t i o n i n Japanese l i f e which came from 
t h e c o n t a c t w i t h China i n t h e s i x t h , s e v e n t h and e i g h t h 
c e n t u r i e s was a p r e c u r s o r t o t h e r e v o l u t i o n w hich came from 
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e West: i t accustomed t h e Japanese t o t a k e 
f r o m a f o r e i g n c u l t u r e j u s t what t h e y f e l t t h e y needed and 
t h e y d i d t h i s over a l o n g p e r i o d o f t i m e . When we examine 
t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f Japan, t h e l a t e r d r a m a t i c changes i n 
Japan a f t e r t h e M e i j i R e s t o r a t i o n , when Japan ended a l o n g 
p e r i o d o f s e c l u s i o n and t h e n r e a d i l y ' accepted Western i d e a s 
and t e c h n i q u e s , cease t o become an u n i n t e l l i g i b l e v o l t e f a c e , 
w hich t h e y o f t e n seem t o be i n any s u p e r f i c i a l s t u d y o f 
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Japanese h i s t o r y . Japan was t h u s f o r many c e n t u r i e s t h e 
p u p i l and China t h e t e a c h e r . China, t o h e r d e t r i m e n t , 
has never e a s i l y accepted t h e r o l e o f p u p i l and i t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g t o see how q u i c k l y i n t h e p r e s e n t c e n t u r y she 
has q u i c k l y assumed t h e r o l e o f t h e t e a c h e r i n t h e Communist 
w o r l d . The r e a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t , however, i n d i s c u s s i n g 
t h e r e l a t i v e degrees o f r e c e p t i v i t y t o new i d e a s o f China and 
Japan i s t h a t i n t h e case o f t h e l a t t e r , two r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
phases o f c o n t a c t w i t h o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e w o r l d - t h e Chinese 
and t h e Western - were e n g i n e e r e d by t h e r u l i n g c l a s s e s whereas 
i n t h e case o f China, h e r major r e v o l u t i o n was b r o u g h t about 
by t h e u n d e r - p r i v i l e g e d c l a s s e s , w h i c h c o m p l e t e l y u p s e t h e r 
c l a s s s t r u c t u r e . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s o f b a s i c i m p o r t a n c e . 
I t meant t h a t Japan has r e t a i n e d t h i s s t r a t i f i e d s o c i e t y which 
we mentioned i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r and w h i l e changes seemed -
and were - r e v o l u t i o n a r y , t h e y d i d n o t c o m p l e t e l y sweep a s i d e 
t h e p a s t . 
No l o g i c a l o r d e r seems t o e x i s t f o r t h e changes b r o u g h t 
about i n Japan by h e r c o n t a c t w i t h China even i f , i n t h e i n t e r e s t s 
o f c l a r i t y , we t r y t o s e p a r a t e them. We may i d e n t i f y t h r e e 
m a j o r a s p e c t s o f t h e S i n i c i s a t i o n o f Japan; t h e f i r s t concerns 
th e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f Chinese L i t e r a t u r e and Language, t h e second 
i s t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f Buddhism and t h e t h i r d i s concerned w i t h 
p o l i t i c a l changes. 
I t s h o u l d be remembered t h a t Chinese f i r s t came i n t o 
Japan as a t o t a l l y f o r e i g n language and t o use Chinese c h a r a c t e r s 
t o w r i t e Japanese was as much a t o u r de f o r c e as i t would be t o 
w r i t e E n g l i s h w i t h them. D i f f i c u l t as i t was f o r s c h o l a r s t o 
master t h e Chinese language, i t gave t h e Japanese when t h e y had 
mastered i t 'the v a s t and v a r i e d p r o d u c t s o f t h e Chinese m i n d 1 . 
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Not o n l y d i d i t g i v e t h e Japanese new t e c h n i q u e s b u t i t 
meant t h a t a r i c h l i t e r a t u r e was a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e 
r e l a t i v e l y few, l i t e r a t e p e o p l e . "The Japanese s t u d i e d 
Chinese a r c h i t e c t u r e , s c u l p t u r e , and p a i n t i n g , founded 
s c h o o l s on t h e c o n t i n e n t a l p a t t e r n , and l e a r n e d m e d i c i n e , 
astronomy (and a f i x e d c a l e n d a r ) , b e t t e r methods f o r c a s t i n g 
m e t a l s and f a s h i o n i n g t o o l s , and Chinese music". ) By 
slow s t a g e s , t h e Japanese i n t r o d u c e d s i m p l i f i c a t i o n o f 
Chinese c h a r a c t e r s w i t h more p h o n e t i c w r i t i n g , b u t t h e y 
never e f f e c t i v e l y f r e e d themselves o f t h e burden o f t h e 
awkward Chinese c h a r a c t e r s . A l t h o u g h t h e Chinese language 
l i n k e d Japan w i t h a g r e a t c i v i l i z a t i o n i t has n o t been an 
unmixed b l e s s i n g : i n t h e l a s t c e n t u r y i t has made c o n t a c t 
w i t h t h e West e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t and t h e sheer e f f o r t o f 
a c h i e v i n g l i t e r a c y by young Japanese t a k e s f a r t o o l o n g . 
Buddhism was f i r s t b r o u g h t t o Japan from China 
by a l i e n s towards t h e end o f t h e s i x t h c e n t u r y . As a 
r e l i g i o n i t never s u p p l a n t e d S h i n t o which was t h e dominant 
f a i t h i n Japan a t t h a t t i m e . A f t e r some ye a r s Buddhism 
was f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d and w i d e l y d i s s e m i n a t e d t h r o u g h o u t 
Japan. When Buddhism was i n t r o d u c e d i n t o Japan i t 
encountered a good d e a l o f o p p o s i t i o n b u t i t s espousal by 
t h e Soga c l a n , t h e dominant c l a n a t t h a t t i m e , l e d t h e 
I m p e r i a l f a m i l y - a f t e r some v a c i l l a t i o n - t o accept i t . 
I n t h e seventh and e i g h t h c e n t u r i e s Buddhism f l o u r i s h e d i n 
Japan. W e l l endowed m o n a s t e r i e s were e s t a b l i s h e d and l i k e 
t h e i r C h r i s t i a n c o u n t e r p a r t s i n m e d i e v a l Europe, t h e y were 
g r e a t c e n t r e s o f l e a r n i n g . Not o n l y d i d t h e B u d d h i s t 
m o n a s t e r i e s p r o v i d e s p i r i t u a l c u l t u r e and h e l p f o r t h e 
p o o r e r people b u t th e y a l s o h e l p e d t o b u i l d dykes, roads and 
b r i d g e s . Buddhism had a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d p h i l o s o p h y t h a n 
S h i n t o i s m and as u s u a l l y happens when a more advanced f a i t h , 
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connected as i t was w i t h a great c u l t u r e , comes i n t o 
contact w i t h a more p r i m i t i v e r e l i g i o n , i t makes great 
headway. S t o r r y also p o i n t s out t h a t "not only Buddhist 
but also Confucian i n f l u e n c e i s t o be detected i n what the 
Japanese c a l l the ' C o n s t i t u t i o n of 17 A r t i c l e s ' - i t was 
a set of e t h i c a l maxims - promulgated by Prince Shotokjt i s 
alleged t o have s t a t e d , 'cannot be achieved unless i t i s 
based on knowledge, and the sources of knowledge are 
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shinto". ( ^ ) . 
I n the sphere of government, the Japanese f a i l e d t o 
reproduce i n t h e i r new s t a t e some of the more important 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Chinese system. The Chinese bureaucracy 
was i n theory - at any r a t e - open to anyone, regardless of 
s o c i a l p o s i t i o n , i f they q u a l i f i e d i n the competitive c i v i l 
s e rvice examinations but t h i s never applied i n Japan; the 
higher o f f i c e s of the c e n t r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n being occupied 
by the scions of the most powerful claws. The p o s i t i o n of 
Emperor was enhanced and attempts were made at c e n t r a l i s i n g 
power under the crown but these were not successful. A 
s i g n i f i c a n t development was the s h i f t of p o l i t i c a l power 
to a h e r e d i t a r y regency, or c i v i l d i c t a t o r s h i p , of the 
powerful Fujiwara f a m i l y between the n i n t h and t w e l f t h 
c e n t u r i e s . Though emperors continued to r e i g n , t h e i r 
Fujiwara m i n i s t e r s , t a k i n g advantage both of the f a c t t h a t 
the emperor was o f t e n a minor and required an i n t e r p r e t e r of 
the d i v i n e emperor's will,assumed powers t h a t were v i r t u a l l y 
sovereign. 
Meanwhile, i n the provinces, land t h a t the seventh and 
eig h t h century law codes from China had placed i n the hands 
of the many small landowners tended t o become concentrated 
i n l a r g e estates. These new, enlarged holdings were tax 
f r e e and c o n s t i t u t e d v i r t u a l l y autonomous s t a t e s . The 
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landowners came i n time t o form a new a r i s t o c r a c y , o f t e n 
c a l l e d feudal from the dual p o l i t i c a l and economic nature 
of t h e i r tenure. These feudal heads were e s s e n t i a l l y 
m i l i t a r i s t i c and were of t e n engaged i n i n t e r n e c i n e wars. 
I t was during t h i s period t h a t the Japanese f r o n t i e r s of 
settlement were extended t o the n o r t h at the expense of 
the Ainus, probably the oldest i n h a b i t a n t s of Japan. 
About 1150» two f a m i l i e s of p r o v i n c i a l n o b i l i t y 
contended f o r supremacy. A general of the T a i r a clan 
f i r s t usurped c i v i l a u t h o r i t y p r e v i o u s l y reserved f o r 
Fujiwara m i n i s t e r s . A f t e r a c i v i l war, the Minamoto clan 
replaced the T a i r a clan and a new age of c e n t r a l i s e d m i l i t a r y 
d i c t a t o r s h i p began. 
M i l i t a r y D i c t a t o r s h i p t o 1600: 
Kamakura (1185-1353) Muromachi (1333-1568) and 
Momoyana (1568-1600) Periods. 
Yoritomo, the successful general of the Minamoto c l a n , 
established himself i n Kyoto which had become the new c a p i t a l 
i n the Heian p e r i o d , and set up the i n s t i t u t i o n of the Bakufu, 
or " t e n t government", which superseded the c i v i l bureaucracy. 
Yoritomo reigned under the Shogun or Commander-in-Chief. 
The c a p i t a l was again moved, on Yoritomo's i t e t i g a t i o n , t o 
Kamakura, to the east of Kyoto, near the s i t e of present day 
Tokyo. I n theory he was a m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r of the crown but 
he was, i n e f f e c t , the de f a c t o r u l e r of the s t a t e . The 
st a t e was Minatomo clan law w r i t large but even though the 
e x i s t i n g government was shorn of much of i t s power, i t 
continued t o co-exist w i t h Yoritomo's system. The c e n t r a l i s e d 
d i c t a t o r s h i p of Kamakura was e f f e c t i v e i n r e p e l l i n g invasions 
by the Mongol hordes under Kublai Khan. The second and most 
important v i c t o r y , over the Mongols, aided by a typhoon (the 
now legendary Kamikaze, or " d i v i n e wind") i n the S t r a i t of 
Tsushima, was so c o s t l y t h a t i t weakened the Bakufu and l e d 
to i t s d o w n f a l l . 
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A new dynasty of shoguns, the Ashikaga, provided 
f i f t e e n r u l e r s from 1338 u n t i l l a t e i n the s i x t e e n t h 
century, but most of them f a i l e d i n the attempt t o give 
u n i f i e d , secure government. An idea of the confusion 
which e x i s t e d i n the fo u r t e e n t h century may be obtained 
from the f a c t t h a t f o r a considerable period there were 
two Emperors, both backed by considerable forces and both 
claiming - or r a t h e r , t h e i r supporters were claiming - t h a t 
each was the one and only l a w f u l emperor. 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h China, was 
encouraged by the c e n t r a l government and by the daimyo, 
or feudal l o r d s , and t h i s a t t r a c t e d Portuguese t r a d e r s who 
landed i n Kyushu i n 15^2. The Portuguese and Spaniards 
brought superior muskets and had advanced ideas about 
b u i l d i n g f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , a l l of which were w e l l received 
i n Japan. Missionaries from these countries made great 
headway and i n some cases f Japanese nobles, no doubt hoping 
t o f a c i l i t a t e trade or perhaps obtain m i l i t a r y advantage 
over r i v a l s , p o s i t i v e l y encouraged C h r i s t i a n missionaries. 
These u n s e t t l e d times made m i l i t a r y prowess more' 
important than ancestry as a measure of s o c i a l p r e s t i g e . 
The older f a m i l i e s l o s t lands and s t a t u s , and power was 
gained by u p s t a r t s who obtained the backing of the merchants 
i n the towns. The new overseas trade and the need f o r 
expensive f o r t i f i c a t i o n s gave b i r t h t o c i t i e s where the 
merchants, using both coin and c r e d i t , grew i n importance. 
Between 1565 1600, three m i l i t a r y men l e d the 
r e - u n i f i c a t i o n of Japan. The f i r s t of them was Oda Nobunaga 
who conquered many of the provinces and broke the power of 
the formidable Buddhist monasteries. Oda Nobunaga was 
murdered i n 1582 and h i s successor, Hideyoshi was a man 
of peasant stock. Hideyoshi p a c i f i e d and u n i f i e d the 
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the n a t i o n and prompted by the need f o r keeping 
h i s vast armies occupied, launched an a t t a c k on Korea. 
During t h i s unsuccessful i n v a s i o n he died i n 1598 and 
h i s successor, Tokugawa Ieyasu, consolidated h i s p o s i t i o n 
by naming himself h e r e d i t a r y Shogun i n 1603. 
The Tokugawa Period (16OC-1868) 
When Ieyasu assumed power he d i d not r e v o l u t i o n i s e 
the forms of government. The I m p e r i a l House was preserved 
w i t h the o l d kuge, or court n o b i l i t y , but they were completely 
removed from any e f f e c t i v e power and performed purely a 
ceremonial r o l e . The c a p i t a l of the Shogun was established 
at Yedo and a huge c a s t l e was b u i l t t h e r e . The daimyo 
(f e u d a l l o r d s ) were t i g h t l y c o n t r o l l e d by the Shogun i n the 
Tokugawa p e r i o d ; t h e i r wives and f a m i l i e s had t o be l e f t 
i n the c a p i t a l as hostages when the daimyo were i n t h e i r f i e f s 
and by compelling these l o r d s t o undertake p u b l i c works i n 
t h e i r lands, they could be kept i n check. 
The Tokugawa period saw Japan regimented as never before 
under a u t o c r a t i c d i r e c t i o n . This was a peri o d of peace which 
l a s t e d f o r almost two and a h a l f centuries but i t depended 
upon a s k i l f u l balance of forces - p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and 
economic. The persecution of Ch r i s t i a n s which had begun 
under Hideyoshi's r u l e was i n t e n s i f i e d i n Tokugawa Japan and 
l e d t o the complete p r o s c r i p t i o n of C h r i s t i a n i t y . Foreign 
i n f l u e n c e s were feared and Japan was sealed more e f f e c t i v e l y 
against Western contacts than any other major land i n the Far 
East. I n t e r n a l l y the Tokugawa was a peri o d of urban expansion 
and w i t h i n the c i t i e s there was a great increase i n the merchant 
cla s s . Some of the less successful daimyo even engaged i n 
trade which, however, s t i l l r e s u l t e d i n loss of s o c i a l standing. 
I n the main, the daimyo resented the r i s e of the merchant class 
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but o f t e n they depended on the merchants f o r t h e i r 
support. 
The peasants s u f f e r e d g r e a t l y from the exactions of 
the land l o r d s and being at the bottom of the s o c i a l system, 
they s u f f e r e d more i n p r o p o r t i o n than any other class and 
t h e i r despair o f t e n l e d t o f u t i l e r e v o l t s . The money 
economy which replaced the o l d one, based on r i c e , favoured 
the merchants against the m i l i t a r y , f o r the incomes of the 
l a t t e r were t r a d i t i o n a l l y drawn from the land and i t s produce. 
Chinese p o l i t i c a l theory had been i n c r e a s i n g l y studied 
as an aspect of Confucianism and t h i s theory taught l o y a l t y 
to the Emperor but d i d not take cognizance of e i t h e r Shogun 
or Bakufu. A l l unconsciously, the Tokugawa per i o d was 
preparing Japan f o r her entry i n t o a world of powerful 
n a t i o n s t a t e s . The Tokugawa e f f o r t s at u n i f y i n g Japan were 
successful and were accustoming the Japanese t o c e n t r a l i s e d 
c o n t r o l . M i l i t a r y t r a d i t i o n s were s t i l l an important 
featu r e i n Japanese l i f e , indeed m i l i t a r y feudalism survived 
as i t had not i n Europe. Moreover Japan's i s o l a t i o n had 
bred an intense n a t i o n a l i s m , and t h i s , a l l i e d t o her m i l i t a r y 
t r a d i t i o n , was to make her a formidable power once she obtained 
Western techniques l a t e r i n the century. 
The main changes brought about by the M e i j i Restoration. 
The appearance of the American Commodore Perry and h i s 
squadron forced the Japanese i n t o trade t r e a t i e s which 
•snowballed* when the major western powers r e a l i s e d t h a t 
the Americans had s t o l e n a march on them. The repurcussions 
i n Japan were great. The r e s t o r a t i o n t o power of the M e i j i 
Emperor was nominal but as p a r t of t h i s process, the Shogunate 
was abolished by a c o a l i t i o n of western feudatories who then 
assumed power. The new government accepted r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
other world powers as normal and expressed a w i l l i n g n e s s t o 
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conform to t r e a t y commitments. 
The Emperor turned out t o be extremely able and although 
he d i d not come t o dominate h i s government, he l e n t h i s support 
to the movement t o a b o l i s h feudalism. F i n a n c i a l l y , and 
i n e v i t a b l y s o c i a l l y , the daimyo and the samurai s u f f e r e d w i t h 
the a b o l i t i o n of feudalism but the peasants were undoubtedly 
b e t t e r o f f . Payments of r i c e as r e n t were commuted t o money 
payments and the whole system of land tenure was r e v i s e d . The 
old d i s t i n c t i o n between the Kuge, or court n o b i l i t y and the 
Samurai was destroyed and one c o l l e c t i v e n o b i l i t y took t h e i r 
place. An e f f e c t i v e bureaucracy was established and although 
the Samurai were prominent i n t h i s , admission to the c i v i l 
s ervice was c o n t r o l l e d by examination and i t was mandatory f o r 
a c i v i l servant t o serve away from the f i e f i n which he had 
been born. 
Japan also introduced a C o n s t i t u t i o n and Parliamentary 
government - even i f these d i d seem more impressive on paper they were, 
than i n f a c t / . She introduced compulsory primary education 
and developed secondary and higher education along Western 
l i n e s . I n four decades a f t e r the a r r i v a l of Perry, Japan 
had f a c t o r i e s , r a i l w a y s , a telegraph system and a merchant 
navy. The Shinto r e l i g i o n was revived and t h i s became a veh i c l e 
of Japanese p a t r i o t i s m . The whole transformation of Japan was 
staggering and by the end of the nineteenth century she had 
become the most p o w e r f u l , t r u l y Asian s t a t e , i n the world. 
When we come t o examine the innovations we f i n d t h a t 
there was not such a profound r e v o l u t i o n i n Japanese s o c i e t y 
t h a t we might expect. The r u l i n g classes i n Japan were the 
ones who engineered these changes. I n Japan the leadership 
was taken c h i e f l y by the samurai and a few of the Kuge but 
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the r e v o l u t i o n was not one of the p r o l e t a r i a t , peasantry or 
middle class. This, indeed, may w e l l have been the reason 
why l i b e r a l democracy d i d not succeed i n Japan. The economic 
changes were i n t e r e s t i n g i n t h a t the s t a t e was a very a c t i v e 
p a r t i c i p a n t i n i n d u s t r i a l and commercial expansion, a feature 
which i s common i n Japan today. However, i n e s t a b l i s h i n g 
the economic r e v o l u t i o n the s t a t e made extensive use of e x i s t i n g 
economic concerns. I t developed model i n d u s t r i e s and then 
turned them over t o leading i n d u s t r i a l i s t s at bargain p r i c e s . 
W i thin t h i s system, the enormously powerful f a m i l y concerns, 
the M i t s u i , the M i t s u b i s h i and the Zaibatsu came t o power. 
Concomitant w i t h the changes i n commerce, the reform of Japanese 
currency and banking were important steps forward. As m i l i t a r y 
preparedness - the h u m i l i t i a t i o n of the t r e a t i e s forced upon 
Japan by the West was a constant reminder t o the r u l e r s about 
the need f o r t h i s - was the p r i n c i p a l aim of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , 
munitions p l a n t s , heavy i n d u s t r i e s , and communications f a c i l i t i e s 
were the f i r s t t o be esta b l i s h e d , I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note 
t h a t Russia, a f t e r the 1917 Revolution, sensing the danger of 
i n t e r v e n t i o n by C a p i t a l i s t powers, followed a s i m i l a r course of 
a c t i o n i n g i v i n g heavy i n d u s t r i e s p r i o r i t y i n her economic 
development. Many goods f o r domestic consumption continued t o 
be produced under the domestic system, though w i t h i n a few 
decades consumer goods were being produced by the f a c t o r i e s 
on a large scale. Before 189^ f o r e i g n commerce was not great 
but t h i s increased enormously at about the t u r n of the century. 
Taken at t h e i r face value, Japan's p o l i t i c a l and 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes, her economic r e v o l u t i o n and l e g a l reforms 
were most impressive. Few people can have r e a l i s e d t h a t the 
t r a d i t i o n a l s p i r i t and basic i n s t i t u t i o n s of Japan had been 
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i n t e n s i f i e d r a t h e r than weakened. Japanese n a t i o n a l i s m , 
o f t e n denigrated i n the West, where na t i o n a l i s m was j u s t 
as p e r n i c i o u s , had been strengthened during the long p e r i o d 
of Tokugawa peace and was responsible f o r the change. Now, 
w i t h the h i n d s i g h t of h i s t o r y , we see massive world c o n f l i c t 
as almost i n e v i t a b l e f o r Japan. 
Japan becomes a world Power 189^-1930« 
The Japanese showed an unusual ambivalence i n t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e t o the West: i n a sense they considered they were 
a superior race headed by a descendant of the gods, and yet 
they resented the p a t r o n i z i n g a i r s of t h e i r Western mentors 
who had imposed the unequal t r e a t i e s on her. The s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of the date 189^ i s t h a t i t was the year of the renunciation 
of an unequal t r e a t y by Great B r i t a i n . The year 189^ also was 
the year i n which Japan began her t e r r i t o r i a l expansion. 
The causes of Japanese Expansion. 
I n view of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the governing classes 
i n Japan i n b r i n g i n g about the r e v o l u t i o n a r y changes i n the 
second h a l f of the nineteenth century i t i s possible t o regard 
the t e r r i t o r i a l expansion of Japan a f t e r 189^ as the work of 
a handful of c h a u v i n i s t s . This i s an o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of 
a very complex problem. Japan was a vigorous n a t i o n , r a p i d l y 
i n c r e a s i n g i n population and wealth; the very weakness of 
her neighbour, China, accentuated her s t r e n g t h . Moreover, 
she occupied a h i g h l y s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n which commanded the 
sea approaches to the east of Asia. The Western powers had 
ne a r l y a l l acquired empires by force or the t h r e a t of force and 
so the example of r e a l p o l i t i k was t h r u s t upon her. When 
Japan,too, embarked upon war as a major instrument of p o l i c y , 
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i t worked - i n the e a r l y wars. She gained r e c o g n i t i o n as a 
Far Eastern power a f t e r the Sino-Japanese war of 189*1—95» and 
the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 made her a world power. 
Both c o n f l i c t s concerned f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e i n Korea and 
Manchuria. The former war gained f o r Japan Western admiration 
of her progress; i t gave her Formosa and the Pescadores 
and won her several commercial advantages i n China. The 
peace t r e a t y o r i g i n a l l y granted Japan the Liao-tung Peninsula 
(on the Manchurian coast) but the so-called T r i p l e I n t e r v e n t i o n 
of Russia, France and Germany forced her t o cede t h i s . The 
deep resentment f e l t i n Japan over the T r i p l e I n t e r v e n t i o n 
undoubtedly confirmed b e l i e f s about Western d u p l i c i t y . China's 
a n t i - f o r e i g n , Boxer Rebellion gave Japan a f u r t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y 
of sending troops and helped t o confirm her stat u s as a power. 
The Rebellion also worked t o Russia's advantage by g i v i n g her 
an op p o r t u n i t y t o occupy Manchuria when the other powers were 
pre-occupied w i t h the suppression of the Boxers. The Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e of 1902, apart from i t s p r a c t i c a l use i n a 
period of intense f r i c t i o n w i t h Russia, meant much to Japanese 
esteem and not a l i t t l e i n the e a r l y years of the century, t o 
an i s o l a t e d Great B r i t a i n . The war against Russia i n 1905 
assured her "paramount, p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , and economic 
i n t e r e s t s " i n Korea, secured i n Southern Manchuria the s p e c i a l 
r a i l w a y and commercial r i g h t s which had been Russia's, and 
gave her southern Sakhalin. 
Although Japanese c o l o n i a l conquests looked impressive 
i t i s d o u b t f u l i f they were r e a l assets t o her economy. On 
the c r e d i t side &he used them as sources f o r raw ma t e r i a l s 
and as o u t l e t s f o r her exports. On the d e b i t s i d e , the wars 
which brought these possessions were a great s t r a i n on her 
economy and a l l the c o l o n i a l conquests required help from the 
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I m p e r i a l Treasury t o preserve v i a b l e economies. For a 
v a r i e t y of reasons the colonies never proved a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
o u t l e t f o r Japanese settlement. 
The population of the islands.,of Japan was r a p i d l y 
m u l t i p l y i n g . Between 1872 and 189^ i t had r i s e n from 
approximately t h i r t y f i v e m i l l i o n s t o f o r t y one m i l l i o n s . 
I n 1930 i t was s i x t y f o u r m i l l i o n s . The pressure of 
population was a potent argument i n favour of Japan's 
t e r r i t o r i a l expansion. The expansionists could claim t h a t 
the bulk of the most s u i t a b l e lands had already been seized 
by Western powers and were closed t o settlement by A s i a t i c s 
and so Japan was e n t i t l e d t o grab what she could get. More 
cogent reasons f o r the t e r r i t o r i a l expansion of Japan, at l e a s t 
i n the eyes of the apologis t s of t h i s course of a c t i o n , were 
the inadequate n a t u r a l resources of Japan. The i n d u s t r i a l 
development of Japan depended upon slender mineral resources; 
her production of i r o n ore was small and her coal production 
was inadequate f o r her needs. This i s not the place i n t h i s 
study t o dwell upon Japan's l i m i t a t i o n s i n n a t u r a l resources 
but t h i s , plus the f a c t t h a t she had a r a p i d l y i n c r e a s i n g 
population t o support i n a country desperately short of arable 
land, makes a good argument f o r t e r r i t o r i a l expansion. 
The F i r s t World War 191^-1919 
The outbreak of World War I i n 191^ was a golden 
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r Japanese expansion. The European powers 
were unable to extend t h e i r holdings i n the Far East and 
Japan was able t o obtain concessions from them t h a t she 
would never have gained i n peace time. Although Japan 
became a b e l l i g e r e n t i n accordance w i t h her t r e a t y w i t h 
Great B r i t a i n , she d i d not need t o do much f i g h t i n g . She 
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occupied the German i s l a n d s i n the P a c i f i c - the Marianas, 
Carolines and Marshalls and assisted i n the convoying of 
a l l i e d forces through the P a c i f i c and Indian Oceans, but 
her armed i n t e r v e n t i o n was i n s i g n i f i c a n t . The P a c i f i c 
i s l a n d s were held by Japan as a mandate from the League 
of Nations and i n theory were not to be f o r t i f i e d . On 
grounds of resources the i s l a n d s were not of great value -
although Palau i n the Carolines had large phosphate deposits 
which were of great value to Japan - but t h e i r s t r a t e g i c 
value was enormous. The i s l a n d s c o n s t i t u t e d a s h i e l d against 
a h o s t i l e approach from the south and east and could be 
stepping stones f o r f u r t h e r expansion. 
The war was a period of great i n d u s t r i a l expansion 
and Japan's s h i p b u i l d i n g capacity increased enormously. 
However, Japan was not e n t i r e l y successful i n her expansionist 
aims i n the war. When she sought t o impose the infamous '21 
Demands' on China her plans were to get c o n t r o l of Fukien, 
Shantung, Southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and acquire 
what was v i r t u a l l y a p r o t e c t o r a t e over the remainder of China. 
The U.S.A. r e j e c t e d the Japanese approach as being contrary t o 
i t s 'Open Door' p r i n c i p l e and t h i s p r i n c i p l e was r e - a f f i r m e d i n 
the L a n s i n g - I s h i i Agreement of November, 1917 which d i d , 
however, recognize somewhat nebulously, s p e c i a l Japanese 
i n t e r e s t s i n China. The U.S. also baulked Japanese e f f o r t s 
to annex t o northern p a r t of Sakhalin and the p o r t s bordering 
on the Amur River and the P a c i f i c Ocean. Japan had had serious 
disputes w i t h the United States i n the years before World War I 
over immigration problems and these were continued i n the post-
war years. The United States proved to be anything but 
h e l p f u l over naval re-armament and t h i s , plus an accute 
American s e n s i t i v i t y about any outside i n t e r f e r e n c e i n China, 
made America the r e a l enemy. The older Western powers had 
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had t h e i r i m p e r i a l i s t ambitions blunted by the devastating 
e f f e c t s of the war and were not seen as major t h r e a t s . 
Communist Russia presented a d i f f e r e n t problem; by the 
t h i r t i e s she had become r e l a t i v e l y strong and hindered 
Japanese ambitions i n Manchuria. 
Economic Developments 189^-1930. 
Throughout t h i s p eriod Japan's i n d u s t r i a l p o t e n t i a l 
increased enormously. Her n a t i o n a l wealth increased but 
her p r o s p e r i t y was unevenly d i s t r i b u t e d . The Zaibatsu, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , f l o u r i s h e d and became more potent i n economic 
l i f e and p o l i t i c s . A g r i c u l t u r e remained the black spot 
on the nation's economy, the land being g r o s s l y overpopulated 
and farming techniques, although superior t o most i n South 
East Asia, were backward. 
I n the i n d u s t r i a l sphere, the production of t e x t i l e s 
was g r e a t l y expanded. The competitiveness of her t e x t i l e 
i n d u s t r y t roubled the Western powers who could not match the 
i n c r e d i b l y low labour costs of Japan. I n the t e x t i l e 
i n d u s t r i e s approximately four f i f t h s of the workers were women, 
and these could be employed at even lower wages than could men. 
Most of the women so employed were from f a m i l i e s of farmers, 
and t h e i r earnings r e l i e v e d t h a t s o r e l y pressed element of the 
popul a t i o n . I n 1928 the production of s i l k i n Japan was two-
t h i r d s t h a t of the e n t i r e world and the bulk of t h i s was 
exported t o the United States but the depression of 1929 i n the 
United States had a disastrous e f f e c t on the Japanese economy. 
Although the production of r e l a t i v e l y cheap cotton and woollen 
goods had r i s e n , Japan's dependence upon raw s i l k , a l u x u r y 
item and i n demand c h i e f l y i n one country, made her h i g h l y 
vulnerable. Moreover, I n d i a and China were f a i r l y c e r t a i n t o 
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become serious competitors i n the t e x t i l e trade i n the not 
too d i s t a n t f u t u r e . 
The Railway System 
I n 1906 and 1907 the State bought the l a r g e 
m a j o r i t y of p r i v a t e l y owned r a i l w a y l i n e s i n Japan. 
P r i v a t e ownership of minor l i n k l i n e s was permitted but 
i t i s f a i r t o say t h a t the railways were s t a t e c o n t r o l l e d 
from a f a i r l y e a r l y stage i n t h e i r development. Japan 
has an extremely good record i n the b u i l d i n g and operation 
of railways and even i n the p e r i o d of despair a f t e r World 
War I I , the railways i n Japan were q u i c k l y restored to a 
high l e v e l of e f f i c i e n c y . I t has been said t h a t the high 
operating e f f i c i e n c i e s of Japanese railways caused the 
Japanese t o neglect t h e i r roads i n the i n t e r - w a r years. 
Shipping 
The wars w i t h China and Russia, w i t h t h e i r serious 
t r a n s p o r t problems, g r e a t l y s t i m u l a t e d the s h i p b u i l d i n g 
i n d u s t r y i n Japan. World War I gave a f u r t h e r stimulus to 
t h i s i n d u s t r y . The demand f o r ships to replace those sunk 
by German 'U' Boats l e d t o almost a doubling i n the tonnage 
launched i n Japanese Shipyards between 191^- and 1917. I n 
the mid - l 8 9 0 ,s Japan purchased more from Great B r i t a i n than 
any other n a t i o n but by 1930 the United States had replaced 
B r i t a i n as Japan's most important t r a d i n g partner and i n t h a t 
year, China was a more important market f o r Japanese goods 
than B r i t a i n . I n those years her imports of raw m a t e r i a l s 
and machinery were of the highest importance. The f a c t t h a t 
the import of machinery i s very much subordinate to the import 
of raw m a t e r i a l s i n Japan today i s the measure of the advance 
and s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of her i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e . 
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A g r i c u l t u r e 
Although the expansion of Japanese i n d u s t r y was 
perhaps the outstanding feature of her economy i n these 
years, nevertheless, a g r i c u l t u r e was the major s i n g l e 
occupation of hep people. The system of tenantry combined 
w i t h absentee landlords had., been a feature under the 
Tokugawa. I n becoming an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d country, Japan 
chose t o develop her manufactures and f o r t h i s , she needed 
cheap food f o r her f a c t o r y workers. She d i d not give t a r i f f 
p r o t e c t i o n t o her farmers and her whole tax s t r u c t u r e favoured 
the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and merchants at the expense of the 
landlords and peasant p r o p r i e t o r s . But the p o s i t i o n was not 
one of gross governmental neglect of the land. The 
government provided many schemes whereby t e c h n i c a l assistance 
was made a v a i l a b l e t o the farmers and extensive use of 
f e r t i l i z e r s was advocated. The p o s i t i o n was anything but 
wretched and the urban p r o s p e r i t y brought higher p r i c e s f o r 
farm products so t h a t the years of the First World War were 
very favourable indeed f o r the farmer but u n f o r t u n a t e l y , 
t h i s was followed by a great a g r i c u l t u r a l depression i n 
the immediate post-war p e r i o d . The gains i n a g r i c u l t u r e , 
however, l i k e those of i n d u s t r y , were absorbed by the r i s i n g 
p opulation and permitted no p e r c e p t i b l e improvement i n the 
standard of l i v i n g f o r the masses. At the same time there 
was no mechanization of a g r i c u l t u r e as there had been of 
i n d u s t r y , and small scale c u l t i v a t i o n continued t o be the 
r u l e . The pressure of people on the land, though l i g h t e r 
at times of great i n d u s t r i a l expansion, was always s u f f i c i e n t 
to make i t less p r o f i t a b l e t o use machines than men. Moreover 
there were p a r t i c u l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s of the type of a g r i c u l t u r e 
i n Japan about which Michael and Taylor w r i t e : " I r r i g a t e d 
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a g r i c u l t u r e presents a d i f f i c u l t problem f o r the modernizer, 
even where there are both the w i l l t o mechanize and the 
necessary c a p i t a l " . (5) The peasants blamed most of t h e i r 
t r o u b l e s on the c i t i e s and developed a marked h o s t i l i t y to 
them. They saw the i n f l u e n c e of the West i n the c i t i e s w i t h 
the changes i n dress and i n the a t t i t u d e s to the f a m i l y and 
to women, and t h i s confirmed any i n i t i a l suspicions they had 
and made them most receptive t o any a n t i - f o r e i g n propaganda 
put out by the government. 
The Zaibatsu 
Before we go on to discuss b r i e f l y p o l i t i c a l aspects, 
i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o mention t h a t p e c u l i a r Japanese growth, 
the Zaibatsu, because t h e i r r o l e i n the economy i n e v i t a b l y 
l e d t o t h e i r growing p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . The Zaibatsu 
were f a m i l y corporations which had played a prominent p a r t 
i n Japan's i n d u s t r i a l expansion both i n the e a r l y years of 
the M e i j i r e s t o r a t i o n and i n the t w e n t i e t h century. Their 
growth of power i n the years of the F i r s t World War was 
phenomenal. They expanded t h e i r operations i n i n d u s t r y , 
trade and finance and i n t h e i r c o n t r o l of c a p i t a l , through 
large holdings i n banks and insurance companies, they were 
also outstanding. The M i t s u i and M i t s u b i s h i became associated 
w i t h leading p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . I n the cabinet which was i n 
o f f i c e i n 192*^1925 /both the Premier and the M i n i s t e r of 
Foreign A f f a i r s were r e l a t e d by marriage t o the M i t s u b i s h i 
i n t e r e s t s and there was even a M i t s u b i s h i c l i q u e i n the 
r o y a l household. 
So great was t h i s i d e n t i t y of Zaibatsu and p o l i t i c a l 
i n t e r e s t s t h a t the e f f o r t s of the Army t o set up an independent 
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c a p i t a l i s t o rganisation i n Manchuria, i n the 1930's, 
become i n t e l l i g i b l e and can be seen as a r e a c t i o n against 
what the Army considered was an e f f e t e p o l i t i c a l - Z a i b a t s u 
grouping. I n general, the Zaibatsu favoured peaceful 
economic pe n e t r a t i o n of China, which characterized Japan's 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the 1920's and was anathema t o many of 
the m i l i t a r i s t s who favoured m i l i t a r y a c t i o n t h e r e . 
The P o l i t i c a l Scene 189^-1931. 
A f t e r the Emperor had granted the Japanese people 
t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n i n 1889, parliamentary government made 
much progress i n Japan. The basis of franchise by which the 
lower house of the Diet was elected was widened and the 
str u g g l e centred on the Diet's e f f o r t s t o achieve power 
s i m i l a r t o t h a t of the B r i t i s h House of Commons by which i t 
could e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l the cabinet. Japan never r e a l l y 
curbed the power of the armed forces but i t seemed t h a t goal 
might have been achieved i n the 1920's. The i m p e r i a l 
ordinance of 1889 gave m i n i s t e r s of the army and navy d i r e c t 
access to the Emperor on ' m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s of secrecy and 
grave importance', without n e c e s s a r i l y discussing these w i t h 
the Premier. Another ordinance s t i p u l a t e d t h a t both m i n i s t e r s 
of war and the navy must be senior o f f i c e r s , and as these 
m i n i s t e r s were a u t o m a t i c a l l y cabinet m i n i s t e r s , i t meant 
t h a t the armed forces had great i n f l u e n c e i n the a c t u a l 
government$ f o r i t was seldom t h a t a high ranking o f f i c e r 
would take up t h i s o f f i c e without the consent of h i s colleagues. 
Unfortunately the Parliamentary c o n t r o l of the purse s t r i n g s 
was not strong enough because the c o n s t i t u t i o n l a i d down t h a t 
i n the event of Parliament r e f u s i n g t o pass a budget then the 
one f o r the previous year was t o be repeated. 
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In addition to the imperial i n s t i t u t i o n and the 
power of the armed forces, both continuations from Japan's 
past, there were other factors which v i t a l l y affected the 
working of the new constitution. The clan oligarchs 
continued to dominate the cabinet and further strengthened 
t h e i r position through two extra-parliamentary bodies. The 
f i r s t of these, the genro, or elder statesmen, consisted of 
past servants of the Imperial cause who came with advancing 
age to enjoy the special t r u s t of the Bnperor and the 
government. The second body, the Privy Council, came in t o 
being i n 1888 to approve the new Constitution before i t s 
promulgation. I t had powers of review and veto as well as 
advisory functions, and, l i k e the genro, became a centre 
of great influence. 
I n the years following, the Second World War we have 
had many instances of f a i l u r e where the Westminster type of 
parliamentary government has been applied to newly independent 
countries i n Africa, which have no long t r a d i t i o n of t h i s 
type of government. Admittedly, the Japanese constitution 
was an abstract from the constitutional theory of many countries 
but i t was essentially an imposition on Japan and i t f a i l e d . 
Yet i n spite of the machinations of the Armed Forces, the 
Zaibatsu and the Genro i t r e a l l y looked i n the 1920's as 
i f Japan might achieve parliamentary democracy. However, 
serious reverses early i n the 1930's irreparably damaged the' 
democratic cause. Hence the significance of the date of the 
next section i n t h i s chapter. 
The M i l i t a r i s t Control of Japan 1930-^1 
The years 1930-^1 were years i n which the Japanese 
economy, p a r t i c u l a r l y between the World Depression of 1929-31 
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and the Sino-Japanese War of 1937i passed through a period 
of extremely rapid economic growth. Japan demonstrated 
her command of new s k i l l s and technologies; she made 
extensive additions to her ca p i t a l equipment at home and 
she invested heavily i n regions beyond her shores. "At a 
time when inter n a t i o n a l trade as a whole was stagnating, 
her e f f o r t s flourished. In a wide range of products and 
i n a d i v e r s i t y of markets she became a formidable competitor 
of the older i n d u s t r i a l countries of the West, while to the 
countries of Asia ahe made available a variety of consumption 
goods at prices which t h e i r impoverished inhabitants could 
afford to pay. These remarkable achievments were not, of 
course, f o r t u i t o u s . The ground had been well prepared for 
many previous decades". (1) 
One of the cogent reasons why the m i l i t a r y interests 
managed to gain more power i n t h i s period was t h i s very 
prosperity which Professor Allen describes above. Precisely 
the same economic resurgence favoured the Nazis i n Germany 
from 1933 onwards. Before we go on to describe i n some 
d e t a i l how the m i l i t a r y interests gained power i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
to see how they brought about changes i n the economy. The 
m i l i t a r y cliques, as we have seen, were antagonistic to the 
Zaibatsu and were intent on weakening t h e i r power. The 
Zaibatsu i n Army eyes, were associated with 'decadent' 
l i b e r a l elements that had weakened Japan i n the 1920's and 
the Army wished to break t h e i r power. Both i n Manchuria and 
Japan proper they turned to new capital groups (Shinko-Zaibatsu) 
to provide c a p i t a l f or strategic industries. They also used 
t h e i r influence to strengthen the associations of small 
manufacturers and traders with the object of freeing these 
enterprises from the domination of the merchant companies 
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owned by the old Zaibatsu. The m i l i t a r y elements i n the 
Government assisted and promoted schemes for nationalization 
i n the large industries; the e l e c t r i c power industry was 
nationalized i n 1938 and i n the same year the National 
General Mobilization Law gave the Government far-reaching 
powers of economic control - i n short, i t was the economic 
preparation f or war. 
When we turn to more p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s - although 
sometimes the d i s t i n c t i o n between the economic and the 
p o l i t i c a l i s somewhat a r b i t r a r y - we are faced with the 
problem of how and why did the m i l i t a r y elements assume 
power i n Japan. 
The c r i t i c a l point at which Japan turned towards 
a m i l i t a r y solution of her problems was the so called 
Manchurian Incident of September, 1931. A group of 
soldiers of the Kwantung or the Japanese Manchurian Army, 
imbued with the idea that Japan could be saved only by 
expansion on the Asiatic continent and 'reform' at home, 
presented Japan and the world with a f a i t accompli. On 
the night of September 18th, 1931» they exploded a bomb 
on the railway near Mukden, and used t h i s alleged Chinese 
provocation as an excuse for taking over the c i t y of Mukden, 
and embarking upon the conquest of the three north-east 
provinces of China. The plan had the ultimate aim of 
making Manchuria a colony of the Army. Manchuria had been 
ruled as a v i r t u a l condominium of China, Japan and Russia 
but sooner or l a t e r i t was inevitable that short of p a r t i t i o n , 
the most powerful nation would oust the others. Manchuria 
possessed vast areas of f e r t i l e s o i l , was r e l a t i v e l y t h i n l y 
populated, and i t had strategic significance i n that i t s 
southern ports were well placed for the control of the 
- hi -
northern part of China proper. The population of 
Manchuria was mainly Chinese, largely because of settlement 
i n the early part of the twentieth century and l e g a l l y , 
Manchuria belonged to China. At the time, the Three 
Eastern Provinces, as the Chinese called Manchuria were 
ruled by Chang Hsueh-Liang who was disposed to co-operate 
with the Nationalist government of China, which was anything 
but pro-Japanese. I t w i l l be remembered that as a result 
of the Russo Japanese war of 1905» Japan gained special 
railway and commercial rig h t s i n Southern Manchuria and i n 
addition to these, Japan had gained concessions i n Manchuria 
from China i n 1915« Japan had gained an extension of her 
twenty-five year lease to Liaotung (Kwantung) i n 1915 and 
China claimed that t h i s was obtained under duress, which was 
indeed true. In 1931 the Kwantung army began the annexation 
of Manchuria. This action had tremendous world-wide repur-
cussions; i t flouted the authority of the League of Nations, 
proved to the m i l i t a r i s t s that the other major world powers 
would not e f f e c t i v e l y check aggression, and was done with 
complete disregard of the home government. 
The Mukden Incident was no mere flash i n the pan. 
Extreme r i g h t wing elements, usually i n the form of some 
picturesquely named society had long been active i n Japan. 
Their actions were strengthened by the apparently moderate 
approach to China i n the 1920's by the Japanese Government 
and by the disappointing results of the London Naval 
Disarmament conference of 1930. The depression i n 1929 
had added to the general malaise, and r u r a l discontent, a 
steady feature of Japanese l i f e , was important because the 
Army was largely recruited from peasants and landowners. 
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Richard Storry who made a detailed study of 
Japanese nationalism, points out that u n t i l the end of 
the F i r s t World War there were few important n a t i o n a l i s t 
associations and that t h e i r p r o l i f e r a t i o n and strengthening 
came i n the 1920's and 1930's. Storry isolated three essential 
elements of Japanese nationalism which were common to most 
r i g h t wing societies; "The three elements - l o y a l t y to the 
Throne, sense of mission, and be l i e f i n the possession of 
superlative inborn q u a l i t i e s - constituted the essential 
national character or policy of Japan". This nationalism 
i s termed 'Kokutai' and he goes on to say, "Many other factors 
- economic, p o l i t i c a l and social - played a part. Nevertheless, 
i n the l a s t resort, the grotesque ideology of the kokutai was 
at the source of the oomplex manifestations of Japanese 
Nationalism." (6) The extremists, often members of young 
o f f i c e r movements, pursued a course of assassination of 
leading p o l i t i c a l figures whom they considered opposed to 
t h e i r chauvinistic ends. " A l l the combinations and 
permutations which took place i n government between 1936 and 
1941, however, could not a l t e r the process, which r e a l l y 
began with the Manchurian Incident of 1931• (7) 
Before we leave the Manchurian Incident, the commonly 
accepted view of t h i s has been that the m i l i t a r y took the 
i n i t i a t i v e at Mukden and that many p o l i t i c i a n s connived at 
t h i s . Recent work suggests that rather more onus should be 
placed on the p o l i t i c i a n s i n Japan than has been done i n the 
past. 
Takehiko Yoshihashi, i n a work published i n 1963, 
claimed that Mori Kaku, the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of 
Foreign A f f a i r s was the real v i l l a i n . Mori advocated 
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Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations and attempted 
to create a highly centralized form of government based on 
close relations between the p o l i t i c i a n s and the army. 
Yoshihashi excuses the weak Foreign Minister, Tanaka, and 
writes he (Tanaka) "was neither, chauvinist nor expansionist. 
He was i n a large measure a victim of his subordinates - men 
l i k e Mori Kaku and his firebrands of the Kwantung Army, who 
stopped at nothing to f u l f i l l t h e i r expansionist ambitions". (8) 
After the Manchurian incident the m i l i t a r y extremists 
had the b i t between t h e i r teeth. A clash between Japanese 
and Chinese troops at Marco Polo Bridge near Peking i n July, 
1937 precipitated h o s t i l i t i e s and the Tokyo government was 
forced to back her armies i n China by dispatching more troops. 
The Japanese troops made great progress i n China but never 
completely subjugated the Chinese Nationalist forces. 
Protestations about Japanese aggression f a i l e d to stop the 
war and Japan, l i k e H i t l e r Germany, regarded the Western 
powers as decadent and incapable of decisive action. 
When B r i t a i n and France entered World War I I 
Japan had further opportunities f or aggression. In 19^0, 
Japan forced the Vichy government to give her m i l i t a r y 
privileges i n Indo-China, which helped to blockade Nationalist 
China. Her m i l i t a r i s t ' s dream, however, was to create an 
economic and p o l i t i c a l empire based on Japan, to embrace the 
whole of East Asia - the so called Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Scheme. I n June, 1937i A r i t a the Foreign Minister, 
announced that the countries of East Asia and the South Seas 
were 'geographically, h i s t o r i c a l l y , s o c i a l l y and economically 
very closely related to each other." There was, therefore, 
a h i s t o r i c a l determinism about t h i s and i t seemed l o g i c a l that 
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Japan should organize and dominate the "New Order" or 
"Co-prosperity Sphere". Japan, quite c l e a r l y , was 
interested i n making up f o r her deficiencies i n raw materials 
and o i l , which the Netherlands East Indies, i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
possessed i n f a i r quantities. In spite of her t o t a l i t a r i a n 
a f f i n i t i e s with I t a l y and Germany which led Japan to sign 
the T r i p a r t i t e Pact i n September 19^0, Japan was not disposed 
to enter a f u l l scale war with Russia. Her main i n t e r e s t 
was i n expansion i n South East Asia and the Pact gave Japan, 
as ikr as the Axis Powers were concerned, a free hand i n that 
part of the world. 
I t i s an extremely d i f f i c u l t task to compress the 
salient points of a decade of intense p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y 
i n t o a b r i e f introductory study. We w i l l therefore examine 
b r i e f l y , Japan's relations with the three major powers, B r i t a i n , 
the U.S.A. and Soviet Russia. 
B r i t a i n and Japan 1930-41. 
At the time of the Manchurian Incident, B r i t a i n went 
of f the Gold Standard and was obsessed with her own economic 
d i f f i c u l t i e s but nevertheless, she was stout l y opposed to 
the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. In l a t e r years of t h i s 
decade, B r i t a i n resented the loss of her p o l i t i c a l and economic 
influences i n China to Japan and to the intense annoyance of 
the Japanese, gave some support to the Chinese Nationalist 
government. The Japanese, quite r i g h t l y , assessed the 
real weakness of B r i t a i n i n the Far East and knew that the 
B r i t i s h were pre-occupied with the Axis Powers i n Europe. 
The U.S.A. and Japan. 
The aggressions of Japan were of more concern to the 
U.S. than they were to B r i t a i n . The United States Secretary 
of State, Stimson, attempted to pursue the t r a d i t i o n a l 
'Open Door' Policy of the United States. After the 
Manchurian Incident he wished to apply economic sanctions, 
to Japan and i n view of the significance of United States 
trade to Japan, these might have been effective but he 
claimed B r i t a i n lacked resolution and would not support 
him. There i s some element of t r u t h i n t h i s f o r B r i t a i n 
had been smarting over a n t i - B r i t i s h r i o t s which had taken 
place i n China the previous year and anyway, Manchuria was 
very much on the periphery of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . The 
f a i l u r e of Sir John Simon, the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, 
to assist the United States i n the application of economic 
sanctions was widely held to be a cause of the marked 
f a i l u r e of B r i t a i n and the U.S.A. i n checking Japanese 
aggression. ( 9 ) . Lord Avon (Sir Anthony Eden, as he then was) 
claimed to have studied Foreign Office papers and suggested 
that Stimson's proposals were quite nebulous and gave Simon 
l i t t l e to go on. (10) Both governments seem to have been 
equally g u i l t y of t i m i d i t y i n t h e i r relations with Japan. 
After 1937* when Japanese forces attacked the U.S. gunboat 
Panay, United States opposition to Japan stiffened considerably. 
In 1936, the Japanese government denounced the treaty signed 
at the Washington Conference 1921-22 which l i m i t e d naval 
armaments and the building of certain f o r t i f i c a t i o n s on 
islands i n the Pacific. This probably worked to the 
disadvantage of Japan as the United States began on an 
intensive naval ship-building programme. In 1939» certain 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y important raw materials were placed on an 
embargo, and were not permitted to be exported from the 
United States to Japan. The United States Government was 
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r e a l l y alarmed at the way Japan took advantage of the 
embarassment of the French government i n 19^0 and declared 
that i t was unfriendly to the substitution of Japanese for 
French Authority. F i n a l l y , on July 25th, 19^1 the United 
States President ordered both Chinese and Japanese assets i n 
the United States to be frozen. In retrospect, United 
States actions were not strong enough; the Japanese army 
leaders, i n p a r t i c u l a r , believed, that the Americans had no 
re a l w i l l to f i g h t and they had seen few actions from the 
United States government at t h i s time to disabuse them of 
the notion. The Japanese Navy had a . f a i r idea of the real 
strength of the United States Navy and r i g h t up to the 
declaration of war against the United States, i t opposed 
a l l out war. 
Japan's Relations With The U.S.S.R. 
At the outset of the Mukden incident and Japanese 
aggression i n Manchuria, Russia - surprisingly enough -
was not ho s t i l e towards Japan. Russia was most unhappy 
about the KuontLntang's att i t u d e to the Communists i n China 
and indeed had engaged China i n a b r i e f undeclared war over 
the Chinese Eastern Railway i n 1929* Russia was concerned 
that Japan would not control anti-Soviet White Russians i n 
Northern Manchuria, but when the Japanese appeared reasonable, 
and even p o l i t e l y requested permission from the Russians to 
move troops on the Chinese Eastern Railway, relations improved 
and i n 1932, diplomatic relations were re-established between 
the two countries. However, f r i c t i o n over the boundaries 
between Manchuria and Russian t e r r i t o r i e s to the north soon 
increased, and Japanese interference i n Outer Mongolia further 
exacerbated these rel a t i o n s . Clashes between Russian and 
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Japanese forces along the border were f a i r l y frequent -
almost annual events - from 1935 onwards. I n 1938, a 
minor defeat of the Japanese forces by the Russian caused 
concern i n Tokyo i n view of the big involvements of the 
bulk of her army i n China. 
Japan increasingly came to view Russia as the 
greatest menace to her and t h i s i s one of the reasons why 
she signed the anti-Commintern pact with Germany i n 1936. 
H i t l e r never r e a l l y admired the Japanese and his i n d i f f e r e n t 
a t t i t u d e to them may be seen i n the way he never even 
informed the Japanese beforehand of his proposed attack 
on Russia i n 19^1 and the Japanese reciprocated by not 
informing the Germans of t h e i r proposed attack on Pearl 
Harbour. (11) . H i t l e r never f a i l e d to appreciate a b i t 
of honest to goodness aggression but he certainly did not 
counsel Japan to attack the United States, although he did 
urge her to attack Singapore. 
The war i n China was not completed according to 
schedule and Japan had to be cautious not to antagonize 
the U.S.S.R., specially as trouble with the U.S.A. and 
Br i t a i n was looming up. I t was r e a l l y these heavy 
commitments both by Japan i n China and l a t e r by the U.S.S.R. 
i n the war against Germany that led to a status quo between 
these countries, only to be broken by Russia's declaration 
of war against Japan i n 19^5-
The Reasons for the Attack on the Western Powers i n 19^ -1 
We have emphasised the significance of the Manchurian 
Incident as being the time when the army gained control of 
Japanese foreign policy. Many writers have stressed the 
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deficiencies i n Japan's economy, i n p a r t i c u l a r her 
deficiencies i n raw materials and her population problem, 
as being the r e a l l y decisive factor i n bringing about 
Japanese Imperialism. There i s obviously a good deal 
i n t h i s argument and cert a i n l y the effects on the economy 
of the slump i n 1929 helped to predispose Japanese public 
opinion to army leadership. There i s much, too, i n the 
argument that the army leaders - more than the Naval chiefs, 
as we have seen - r e a l l y believed that they could win the 
war, but t h i s i s looking at the problem from the wrong end. 
We must t r y to determine why the army got control of the 
government. In t h i s , p o l i t i c a l immaturity played a part 
and the t r a d i t i o n of Kokutai (national honour) which Storry 
mentions, was undoubtedly strong. The lack of cohesion i n 
government gave the chauvinistic m i l i t a r y leaders far too 
much scope. Shigemitsu, who was j a i l e d by the A l l i e s f o r 
his work i n the Japanese government before Tojo's r i s e to 
power, wrote a very perspicacious comment: "Countries such 
as B r i t a i n , once they establish a new policy, are i n a 
position to act precisely on lines l a i d down. Enviable 
indeed i s the excellence of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and executive 
machinery. However splendid Japan's policy might be, her 
organs of government lacked co-ordination. The Army was 
s e l f - w i l l e d i n i t s interference and p o l i t i c a l parties were 
unversed i n foreign diplomacy and no s o l i d support was coming 
from public opinion". (12) The r e a l danger came from the 
u l t r a - n a t i o n a l i s t groups which could force weak governments 
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5. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Second World War and the Occupation 
This chapter w i l l not be concerned with the detailed 
aspects of strategy and accounts of campaigns as t h i s i s 
more the task of the m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n but nevertheless, 
the main outline of the war i s relevant to t h i s study. 
The i n t e r n a l developments of Japan - even though 
they are closely related to war policy w i l l be dealt with 
as a separate section. There w i l l be a further section 
on the Armistice, which was signed by the A l l i e d Powers and 
Japan i n 19^-5» and an account of the main aims of the A l l i e d 
Powers i n con t r o l l i n g Japan up to the signing of the Peace 
Treaty i n 1952. 
The f i n a l section, w i l l give some account of the 
t e r r i t o r i a l losses which Japan suffered and which were 
agreed to at the Yalta Conference and confirmed i n the 
Peace Treaty. 
The Second World War 1941-V?. 
Although the Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s manipulated i n t e r n a l 
p o l i t i c s most s k i l f u l l y , planned the economy w e l l , and 
astutely carried out the m i l i t a r y campaigns, they lacked 
judgment i n the int e r n a t i o n a l f i e l d . As Sir Eslor Dening 
has pointed out, one of t h e i r errors was to appoint as 
ambassador to Berlin a general to whose opinions they were 
inclined to l i s t e n , thus forming an erroneous conception of the 
prospects of a f i n a l German vi c t o r y . (1) But the graver 
error was to make war on the United States, as an uncommitted 
power with greater resources than any other power i n the world. 
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The successes of the Japanese forces i n the f i r s t 
six months of the war were t r u l y astounding. A major 
part of the United States Pacific Fleet was crippled at 
Pearl Harbour and Malaya and the Dutch East Indies were 
seized, with t h e i r r i c h supplies of o i l , rubber, t i n , bauxite 
and other raw materials. Most of the indigenous peoples of 
these t e r r i t o r i e s genuinely looked upon the Japanese as 
libe r a t o r s but by a combination of high handedness i n 
dealing the l o c a l populations and because of ruthless 
economic exploitation, t h i s good w i l l was dissipated, and 
the true hollowness of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was brought 
home to the people i n these lands. 
Once the i n i t i a l v i c t o r i e s were won, the Japanese 
forces were dispersed over a vast area of the Pacific and 
complete control of the sea and a i r was necessary for her 
both to exploit these t e r r i t o r i e s and to develop her strategy. 
This control did not l a s t for long. Six months a f t e r the 
outbreak of war the Japanese Fleet suffered a check i n the 
Battle of the Coral Sea and a month l a t e r , at the Battle of 
Midway (June1952) the United States i n f l i c t e d a severe defeat 
on the Japanese. 
When the Japanese war e f f o r t came under some s t r a i n , 
her economic planning was r i g i d and lacked co-ordination. 
The m i l i t a r i s t s refused to face the facts and when even they 
were prepared to concede i n lykk that Japan could not win the 
war, they hoped that the very heavy losses which the Americans 
had sustained i n capturing island bases i n the Pacific would 
be mul t i p l i e d greatly when the A l l i e d forces invaded Japan and 
she would consequently obtain better terms than those of 
unconditional surrender. 
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Fortunately for the Japanese people, the u t t e r 
f u t i l i t y of continuing the war, brought home to them i n 
the holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, meant that there 
was a strong enough combination i n governing cir c l e s to 
overrule the generals and to secure the Imperial sanction 
fo r Japan to surrender. So much time and attention has 
been given to the Atom bomb attacks on Japan, perhaps quite 
r i g h t l y i n view of the fact that they mark a completely 
new phase i n warfare, that i t i s often forgotten how much 
damage had been i n f l i c t e d on Japanese c i t i e s by conventional 
a e r i a l attack. Japan was economically i n ruins and 
completely demoralized at the time of her surrender. 
Internal Developments i n Japan during the War Years. 
As might be expected, the f i g h t i n g services became 
increasingly dominant i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n war-time Japan, 
especially i n view of Japanese authoritarian t r a d i t i o n s 
i n t h i s respect and the p e r s i s t e n t ' d r i f t i n t h i s direction 
i n the 1930's. With the rise to power of Eojo and the 
replacement of the gentlemanly Konoye, rougher and more 
j i n g o i s t i c men came to the fore. Efforts were made to 
merge p o l i t i c a l parties to preserve a common front and the 
Imperial Rule Association was created i n e f f o r t to do t h i s . 
The trades unions were called upon to accept a government 
sponsored labour front which was called the P a t r i o t i c 
I n d u s t r i a l Society. However, the e f f o r t s by the m i l i t a r y 
to completely emasculate parliamentary government were not 
en t i r e l y successful. The Constitution had been a g i f t to 
the people from the M e i j i Emperor and to destroy t h i s would 
have been an afront to the Emperor's revered memory. The 
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Emperor was not happy about the m i l i t a r y extremists and 
could always plead f i l i a l piety when refusing to approve 
of a change of the consitution. Japan, i n wartime, 
presented a pretty f a i r picture of a t o t a l i t a r i a n power at 
war and with a massive propoganda campaign, the government 
did not suffer from any lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
the populace. State Shintoism was stressed but i t i s 
in t e r e s t i n g to note that serious persecution of Christians 
was not a feature of war time Japan. (2) 
The heavy emphasis on the development of the i r o n 
and steel industry continued with greater i n t e n s i t y . Efforts 
were made to develop the economic pot e n t i a l of Manchuria 
especially when the shortage of shipping favoured the shorter 
sea haul. The shortage of shipping presented a persistent 
problem to Japanese war leaders who had grossly underestimated 
the offensive power of U.S. submarines. I n 1 9 ^ i t has been 
estimated that war losses of shipping exceeded replacement 
building several times and by the time of the Armistice, Japan 
had l i t t l e more than one m i l l i o n tons of merchant shipping 
afloat out of the ten m i l l i o n tons with which she started the 
war. The shortage of f e r t i l i s e r s , when foreign sources were 
cut o f f , was a persistent problem and what was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
g a l l i n g to the Japanese, was the existence of supplies of rice 
from t r a d i t i o n a l exporting countries (Burma, Thailand and 
Indo China) who were obviously denied access to t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l 
markets, which could not be shipped on a large scale to Japan. 
Tojo, the Prime Minister, believed that the country was 
well prepared for war. Ten years of planned i n d u s t r i a l 
development from 1931 to 19^1 had brought very considerable 
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r e s u l t s and i n d u s t r i a l output had r i s e n from s i x b i l l i o n yen 
to t h i r t y b i l l i o n yen. There was the emphasis on heavy 
i n d u s t r y to the detriment of t e x t i l e s and other l i g h t i n d u s t r i e s . 
T e x t i l e s , which accounted f o r ^ >h% of t o t a l i n d u s t r i a l 
production i n 1930 were down to ~\Z% i n 19^2. The shabbiness 
of both the Japanese people and her army was one of the things 
which s t r u c k observers when they v i s i t e d Japan at the end of 
the war. Japanese production of aeroplanes had r i s e n from 
kOO planes i n 1930 to 5,000 planes a year i n 19^1. Aluminium 
production rose from 19 tons to 71,000 tons a year i n the: 
same period; s t e e l rose from 1.8 m i l l i o n tons to 6.8 m i l l i o n 
tons; c o a l from 27.9 m i l l i o n tons to 55*6 m i l l i o n tons and 
e l e c t r i c power more than doubled. (3) The a c q u i s i t i o n of 
t h i s great empire r e q u i r e d a tremendous o r g a n i s a t i o n which the 
Japanese did not have. The c o n t r o l of p o l i t i c a l l i f e and the 
economies of these t e r r i t o r i e s was under e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of 
the Army which could not p o s s i b l y discharge these f u n c t i o n s 
and f i g h t e f f e c t i v e l y . By 19^5, because of shortage of s u p p l i e s 
and the bombing of p l a n t s , Japan's s t e e l production was reduced 
from seven m i l l i o n tons i n 1939 to one and a h a l f m i l l i o n tons. 
Supplies of o i l became so low that many Japanese s h i p s were 
unable to go to sea i n 1 9 ^ . The peak i n Japanese i n d u s t r i a l 
output was reached i n 1 9 ^ i but by 19^5 t o t a l i n d u s t r i a l output 
was down to hQP/o of that peak year. 
The inescapable f a c t i s that Japan did not e f f e c t i v e l y i 
organize her economic resources i n the war; she lacked a 
c e n t r a l agency to plan her resources - the cabinet planning 
board i which was dominated by the army, had to have i t s 
p o l i c i e s implemented by the various m i n i s t r i e s which were 
often a t loggerheads with each other. The Cabinet Planning 
Board was abolished i n 19^3 when Tojo emulated Asquith i n a 
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previous war and s e t up a M i n i s t r y of Munitions. Tojo 
h i m s e l f was to be the M i n i s t e r and even i f he did have 
the dynamism of a Lloyd George, h i s other heavy commitments 
hindered him. His main plan was to attempt to r e s o l v e the 
s t r u g g l e s of the Army and the Navy, who were a t each other's 
t h r o a t s to obtain more of the s l e n d e r s u p p l i e s of raw m a t e r i a l s 
which were a v a i l a b l e . When the r e a l outcome of the war was 
not i n doubt, a group of former premiers brought about Tojo's 
f a l l i n J u l y 1 9 ^ . 
Japan was thus a broken nation when she was a s s a i l e d 
by the Atom bombs. Apart from the human tragedy i m p l i c i t 
i n t h i s a c t the importance of'nuclear s e n s i t i v i t y ' has 
v i t a l l y a f f e c t e d Japan i n her r e l a t i o n s with other powers, 
not the l e a s t with the U.S.A., but the i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s 
w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r i n t h i s work. 
The Occupation of Japan 
The A l l i e s had come to s e v e r a l d e c i s i o n s about the 
p r i n c i p l e s under which Japan would surrender. The Cairo 
d e c l a r a t i o n (1st December 19^3) signed by C h u r c h i l l , Roosevelt 
and Chiang Kai-Shek, and l a t e r approved by the U.S.S.R., 
covered only t e r r i t o r i a l questions, l a y i n g down tha t Japan 
should l o s e i s l a n d s she had obtained s i n c e 191^? and providing 
independence f o r Korea and the r e t u r n of former Chinese 
p o s s e s s i o n s to China. Other p a r t s of the Japanese Empire 
were d e a l t with a t Y a l t a (11th February, 19^5) when S t a l i n 
acted as host to Rossevelt and C h u r c h i l l . At t h i s conference 
i t was s e c r e t l y agreed that the U.S.S.R. should obtain 
Southern S a k h a l i n , the K u r i l e s and c e r t a i n r i g h t s i n Deiren, 
Port Arthur and Manchuria. The gain of S a k h a l i n and the 
K u r i l e s would e f f e c t i v e l y give the U.S.S.R. c o n t r o l of the 
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Sea of Okhotsk and the demand f o r Port Arthur brought 
i n t o focus the s i m i l a r i t y of p o l i t i c a l design of both 
C z a r i s t and Communist R u s s i a . The a c q u i s i t i o n of these 
t e r r i t o r i e s was contingent on the d e c l a r a t i o n of war by 
the U.S.S.R. on Japan. F u r t h e r t a l k s a t Potsdam i n J u l y , 
between the U.K., U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and China l a i d 
down t h a t Japanese sovereignty should be r e s t r i c t e d to the 
i s l a n d s of Japan proper, that Japan should be disarmed and 
t h a t m i l i t a r i s m should be e x t i r p a t e d and democracy s u b s t i t u t e d 
f o r t h i s . Japan's war i n d u s t r y was to be destroyed and she 
was to remain i n A l l i e d occupation u n t i l these o b j e c t i v e s 
had been completed. The terms of the Proclamation were 
undoubtedly harsh, the nub of i t being the l o s s of t e r r i t o r i e s 
s e i z e d by v i o l e n c e and greed s i n c e 1895» 
Aims of the A l l i e d Powers. 
On September 6th 19^5» P r e s i d e n t Truman approved a 
document 'United S t a t e s I n i t i a l Post Surrender P o l i c y f o r 
Japan' which had been drawn up by the American S t a t e , War, 
and Navy Departments. A F a r E a s t e r n Commission was e s t a b l i s h e d 
i n Washington D.C. which had r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the United 
S t a t e s , B r i t a i n , A u s t r a l i a , Canada, New Zealand, the U.S.S.R., 
the Netherlands, China, I n d i a and i n 19^9 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of 
the P h i l i p p i n e s , Burma and P a k i s t a n were brought i n t o the 
Commission. This commission was "to formulate the p o l i c i e s , 
p r i n c i p l e s , and standards i n conformity with which the f u l f i l l m e n t 
by Japan of i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under the terms of surrender may be 
accomplished" and these d e c i s i o n s were to be implemented by 
the U.S. government through i t s agency i n Japan, the Supreme 
Commander f o r the A l l i e d Powers. From the American point of 
view i t was much b e t t e r to leave the c o n t r o l of Japan i n Japan 
r a t h e r than to have r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on committees nowhere near 
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the country. R u s s i a was not happy about the e x c l u s i v e 
p o s i t i o n that the U.S.A. had obtained and as a r e s u l t of 
her r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , an A l l i e d Council f o r Japan was s e t 
up i n Tokyo and t h i s was to have an American Chairman but 
was to have U.S., R u s s i a , Chinese and B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 
The Supreme Commander of the A l l i e d f o r c e s , the 'pro-consul' 
MacArthur, never allowed t h i s c o u n c i l to become anything other 
than a formal body without r e a l power. 
The aims of the occupation were: the e l i m i n a t i o n of 
m i l i t a r i s m i n Japan; the prosecution of war c r i m i n a l s -
but t h i s was not to i n c l u d e the Emperor - the e l i m i n a t i o n of 
l e a d e r s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r Japan's aggr e s s i v e p o l i c i e s ; the 
payment of r e p a r a t i o n s i n kind; the d e s t r u c t i o n of war 
i n d u s t r i e s and the i n i t i a t i o n of s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , economic 
and e d u c a t i o n a l reforms to c r e a t e a v i a b l e democracy i n Japan. 
The U.S. planners had a b a s i c f a i t h i n democracy perhaps 
expressed with more ardour than the B r i t i s h themselves would 
have used. So often they b e l i e v e d that the i m p o s i t i o n of 
t r i e d and proved American i n s t i t u t i o n s would be the panacea 
fo r Japan, sometimes n e g l e c t i n g the background of p a r t i c u l a r 
problems created by a very d i f f e r e n t environment; but n e v e r t h e l e s s 
the b a s i c i d e a to give Japan democracy has proved to be a sound 
one. The Americans b e l i e v e d that i f the m i l i t a r i s t s were 
exterminated and that the Zaibatsu were dismantled - here we 
see honest to goodness American Trust Busting at work - then 
the scene would be s e t f o r r e a l democratic developments to take 
p l a c e . The main t h e s i s of the argument here i s t h a t i n s p i t e 
of obvious e r r o r s , S.C.A.P. (Supreme Commander, A l l i e d Powers) 
did remarkably w e l l i n Japan, but l i k e so many developments i n 
government, i t takes a long time to a s s e s s the r e a l e f f e c t s of 
t h i s . 
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The disarmament of Japan was c a r r i e d through very q u i c k l y ; 
most army u n i t s abroad surrendered without too much d i f f i c u l t y , 
and the s o l d i e r s were brought home as shipping became a v a i l a b l e . 
The M i n i s t r i e s of War and Navy and the I m p e r i a l General S t a f f 
were a b o l i s h e d . Tojo and s i x other l e a d e r s were sentenced 
to death a t an I n t e r n a t i o n a l War Crimes T r i a l which was s e t 
up i n Tokyo and s i m i l a r courts were s e t up i n t e r r i t o r i e s 
formerly held by Japan. The Tokyo t r i b u n a l had a panel 
of judges of the main A l l i e s and was s e t up to d e a l with 
cases of a l l e g e d major war crimes. 
The b a s i c plan f o r government was that the Japanese 
themselves should c a r r y out the reforms i n t h e i r government, 
on the d i r e c t i o n of S.C.A.P. What was important about the 
changes i s summed up by J.M. Maki: "What American p o l i c y 
conceived and what American a c t i o n accomplished found an 
immediate response i n the Japanese - one that arose e i t h e r from 
acceptance of the f a c t of Japan's temporary immobility to 
r e s i s t the occupation or from a more p o s i t i v e welcome f o r 
the changes i n s p i r e d by i t " 
THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 
The Emperor of Japan possessed d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e s 
as f a r as most Japanese were concerned and the Americans 
were faced with the problem of demoting him but they did 
not p a r t i c u l a r l y wish him to leave o f f i c e . The Emperor 
emerged from the war with some d i g n i t y . Undoubtedly he 
had not used h i s o f f i c e to the f u l l i n curbing the m i l i t a r y , 
but then he had been i n a most d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n . The 
mystique surrounding the Emperor was d i s s i p a t e d both by the 
e f f o r t s of S.C.A.P. and by the Emperor h i m s e l f who expressed 
a wish to abdicate i n favour of h i s son. H i r o h i t o ' s 
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a d v i s e r s suggested that he should not abdicate as t h i s would 
do i r r e p a r a b l e harm to the I m p e r i a l House as i t would appear 
to the Japanese people that t h i s was done a t the behest of 
General MacArthur. Many Japanese thought the Emperor 
behaved with magnificent d i g n i t y as he completely a s s o c i a t e d 
h i m s e l f with the misery of h i s people. To f u r t h e r emphasize 
h i s 'demotion 1 the Emperor i s s u e d a r e s c r i p t i n 19^6 i n which 
he formally renounced any claims to d i v i n e or semi-divine 
s t a t u s . He d e l i b e r a t e l y t r i e d to make h i m s e l f more a c c e s s i b l e 
to h i s people to help break up the remote image he possessed. 
MacArthur hoped that the Emperor would f i l l the r o l e something 
l i k e that of a monarch i n a Western democracy, and the Emperor 
accepted t h i s view and thus the monarchy, t a r n i s h e d and bat t e r e d , 
s u r v i v e d . 
I n the a f f a i r s of C i v i l government the powers of the 
Cabinet were d r a s t i c a l l y reduced, e s p e c i a l l y those i n v o l v i n g 
c o n t r o l of the people. Government c o n t r o l s over the p o l i c e , 
education and l o c a l government were q u i c k l y removed. The 
P r i v y Council and the i n f l u e n t i a l but informed Council of 
Former Prime M i n i s t e r s , both advisory organs to the Emperor, 
were a b o l i s h e d . Some of the a c t i o n s i n devolution were l a t e r 
seen to have gone too f a r . The Japanese p o l i c e , v i r t u a l l y 
an arm of the m i l i t a r y , had a rep u t a t i o n f o r corruption and 
b r u t a l i t y and so great were the e f f o r t s to present a change of 
a t t i t u d e of the p o l i c e , that i n l a t e r y ears the p o l i c e l o s t 
a good deal of morale and e f f i c i e n c y and were often found to 
be incapable of de a l i n g with a higher l e v e l of crime and 
sometimes with s p i r i t e d student demonstrations, which were 
f e a t u r e s of post-war Japan. I n pl a c e of the a u t h o r i t a r i a n 
s t r u c t u r e , the occupation c r e a t e d an executive with diminished 
powers and a l e g i s l a t i v e branch which was to be supreme. A 
j u d i c i a l branch was created to pro t e c t the r i g h t s and freedom 
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of the people. When we look at the r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of these major po i n t s of government i t i s easy to see the 
i n f l u e n c e of American C o n s t i t u t i o n a l theory. The occupation 
s t r e s s e d the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the people i n l o c a l government 
as being a most s u i t a b l e t r a i n i n g ground f o r people i n . 
democratic p r a c t i c e . 
Probably the most important a c t i o n by S.C.A.P. was 
the c r e a t i o n of a new c o n s t i t u t i o n for Japan. A committee 
of the Japanese cabinet produced an amended c o n s t i t u t i o n but 
t h i s f a i l e d to s a t i s f y the Supreme Commander. His s t a f f 
worked on three b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s : f i r s t , t h a t the monarchy 
i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform should remain, secondly, war as an 
instrument i n pursuing n a t i o n a l p o l i c y was to be foresworn f o r 
ever and t h i r d l y , ' a l l forms of feudalism' were to be a b o l i s h e d . 
The c o n s t i t u t i o n was accepted by the D i e t with s l i g h t amendments 
and became the New C o n s t i t u t i o n i n October, 19^6. Perhaps 
the most i n t e r e s t i n g s i n g l e f e a t u r e of the C o n s t i t u t i o n was 
t h a t t h i s was not considered to be a magnanimous g i f t of the 
Emperor to h i s people but t h a t sovereignty r e s t e d with the 
people; and the D i e t became the highest organ of the s t a t e . 
The old c o n s t i t u t i o n l a i d emphasis on the d u t i e s of the 
c i t i z e n but the emphasis was on the c i t i z e n s ' r i g h t s i n the 
new c o n s t i t u t i o n . Women were e f f e c t i v e l y emancipated - i n 
law, at l e a s t and Sunken (human r i g h t s ) became a phrase much 
bandied about but not taken too s e r i o u s l y by the Japanese. 
One of the fundamental f e a t u r e s about t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n was 
the f a c t that i t was imposed by a v i c t o r i o u s power on a beaten 
power and the Japanese showed a g'ood deal of apathy i n accepting 
i t . However, so thorough was the American 'shake up' of 
Japanese S o c i e t y that many of these reforms i n s i n u a t e d themselves 
i n t o Japanese l i f e and became most acceptable f e a t u r e s of the 
hew Japan. For i n s t a n c e , few Japanese would wish to see the 
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reappearance of the h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d M i n i s t r y of 
Education and most would p r e f e r the c o n t r o l of School 
Boards, l o c a l l y e l e c t e d . The bi-cameral l e g i s l a t u r e 
was preserved but the House of Peers was replaced by a 
House of C o u n c i l l o r s and was very much subordinate to 
the Lower House. A m a j o r i t y of members of the cabinet 
must be members of the D i e t - t h i s i s a departure from 
U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r a c t i c e - and the premier and a l l 
the m i n i s t e r s must be c i v i l i a n s . 
I n the economic sphere the Zaibatsu were soon 
attacked by S.C.A.P. We mentioned the Zaibatsu i n the 
e a r l i e r p a r t of t h i s chapter as being dominant i n the 
Japanese economy from the e a r l y days of the M e i j i R e s t o r a t i o n . 
G.C. A l l e n compared t h e i r powers with the Fuggers of Medieval 
Augsburg. These concerns played a v i t a l p art i n the 
development of the Japanese economy and assumed a power' 
f a r g r e a t e r than any combine or t r u s t i n a Western country. 
T h e i r power dates from the time a f t e r the M e i j i R e s t o r a t i o n 
when the bureaucracy wished to implement i t s p o l i c i e s of 
modernisation but lacked an e f f e c t i v e middle c l a s s with the 
c a p i t a l and s k i l l to c a r r y i t out. (5) A l l e n w r i t e s : 
" I t was not enough to s t r i k e o ff the s h a c k l e s of the old 
regime; p o s i t i v e measures had to be taken to ensure that the 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r development were s e i z e d and th a t the 
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s of the country were observed i n any 
i n d u s t r i a l growth that occurred". These business f a m i l i e s 
had been engaged i n banking and commerce on a l a r g e s c a l e , 
and had served as agents of the daimyo i n the management 
of t h e i r revenues. The c l o s e dependency of the Government 
on the Zaibatsu i n e v i t a b l y l e d to abuses of t h i s p r i v i l e g e d 
p o s i t i o n . "During the M e i j i e r a c l o s e connections were 
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e s t a b l i s h e d between p a r t i c u l a r statesmen, who had d e f i n i t e 
p o l i c i e s to c a r r y out, and p a r t i c u l a r business f a m i l i e s 
who could provide res o u r c e s and means to a s s i s t them. 
I n r e t u r n f o r the f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e they gave to the 
Government, the Zaibatsu from time to time acquired S t a t e 
p r o p e r t i e s at low p r i c e s and r e c e i v e d valuable c o n t r a c t s . " (6) 
They reached the peak of t h e i r powers i n 1929 when Party 
government was making headway and the power of the D i e t 
was strong. I t should not be thought, however, t h a t the 
Zaibatsu were the only business concerns i n Japan of any 
s t a t u s - Okura i n mining and t e x t i l e s , Ansano i n cement, 
Furukawa i n copper, were j u s t a few - but the Zaibatsu 
occupied a s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n not only because of t h e i r c l o s e 
r e l a t i o n s with the government but a l s o because of the wide 
range of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . The v a r i o u s Zaibatsu were often 
keen r i v a l s but n e v e r t h e l e s s t h i s did not prevent them from 
i n v e s t i n g i n each other. The m i l i t a r y looked with great 
s u s p i c i o n upon the Zaibatsu, contending that t h e i r c l o s e 
and i n t h e i r eyes corru p t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p with parliamentary 
l e a d e r s l e d to a decay i n n a t i o n a l moral f i b r e . We have 
seen the m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l over Manchuria as an e f f o r t to 
r e d r e s s the e v i l s which e x i s t e d i n the homeland. I n 
1931 the depression d i s c r e d i t e d the Minseito government and 
brought v i o l e n t a t t a c k s upon the Zaibatsu and these culminated 
i n the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Baron Don, the c h i e f executive of 
M i t s u i , by the 'Young O f f i c e r ' group. The Zaibatsu, i n 
keeping with most va s t i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s (the Krupps 
combine i n Germany showed great a d a p t i b i l i t y both under 
H i t l e r and s t i l l managed to s u r v i v e A l l i e d attempts to 
dismember i t s empire a f t e r the war), showed r a r e powers of 
a d a p t i b i l i t y . Allen w r i t e s : "The M i t s u i , which was the main 
t a r g e t of c r i t i c i s m , withdrew from trade i n minor a g r i c u l t u r a l 
products and s o l d to the p u b l i c l a r g e holdings of shares i n 
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some of i t s l e a d i n g companies. I t made a donation of 
three m i l l i o n Yen f o r the r e l i e f of d i s t r e s s , and i t 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1933 a fund of t h i r t y m i l l i o n yen f o r the 
promotion of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . A f t e r the 1936 "February 
I n c i d e n t " members of the M i t s u i f a m i l y annohnced t h e i r 
i n t e n t i o n of g i v i n g up t h e i r business i n t e r e s t s and the 
Zaibatsu o s t e n t a t i o u s l y involved i t s e l f i n new e n t e r p r i s e s 
of s t r a t e g i c importance, such as s y n t h e t i c o i l production. 
The Zaibatsu i n the pre-war years r e a l i s e d t h a t they could 
not d i r e c t l y oppose the m i l i t a r i s t s with t h e i r demand f o r 
the quasi war-time economy ( J u n s e n j i K e i z a i ) and so co-
operated with them but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to b e l i e v e t h a t they 
did with much enthusiasm. But i t would be wrong to b e l i e v e 
t h a t the Zaibatsu were dragged w i l l y - n i l l y i n t o Japan's 
aggressive p o l i c i e s and were not culpable i n any assessment 
of war g u i l t ; f o r the Zaibatsu were an i n d i s p e n s a b l e a i d 
to development of newly conquered t e r r i t o r i e s and, as Maki 
w r i t e s ( 7 ) • " i n s p i t e of t h e i r d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r s and 
motivations, there was abundant reason f o r the m i l i t a r y , the 
bureaucracy, and the Zaibatsu to stand together and serve as 
the d r i v i n g f o r c e s of Japan's a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and aggression" 
The Zaibatsu offended the good American sense of f r e e 
e n t e r p r i s e , apart from t h e i r obvious i m p l i c a t i o n i n Japanese 
aggressions, and with a 'Trust b u s t i n g ' z e a l , S.C.A.P. s e t 
about dismantling these i n s t i t u t i o n s . They were o f f i c i a l l y 
d i s s o l v e d and stockholders were compensated with ten year, 
non-negotiable bonds. The Zaibatsu, although never quite 
a c h i e v i n g t h e i r former dominance, have recovered from these 
a s s a u l t s . American p o l i c y to Japan, i n f l u e n c e d by her need 
f o r a r e l i a b l e a l l y i n the F a r E a s t , changed consid e r a b l y 
a f t e r - and during - the Korean War. The only s e r i o u s t h r e a t 
to the Zaibatsu i n Japan today would be the r e t u r n to power 
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of a strong s o c i a l i s t government. 
The complete defeat of Japan not only s h a t t e r e d her 
war making p o t e n t i a l and d i s t o r t e d i d e a s of n a t i o n a l 
i n v i n c i b i l i t y but i t a l s o r e s u l t e d i n the s e r i o u s l o s s of 
t e r r i t o r i e s which we have already o u t l i n e d . The P o l i t i c a l 
Geographer must be concerned here with the e f f e c t s of these 
l o s s e s of t e r r i t o r y both on Japan's economy and on her 
s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n . We w i l l t h e r e f o r e examine these 
t e r r i t o r i e s . 
JAPAN'S LOST TERRITORIES 
Manchuria (Manchukuo) 
Japan had i n v e s t e d h e a v i l y i n the i n d u s t r i a l development 
of Manchuria. As was s t a t e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, the 
Kwantung Army hoped to create an example of s t a t e c a p i t a l i s m 
that would be an example to the mainland a f t e r Manchuria was 
occupied by the Army i n 1931- Although the plans f o r settlement 
never m a t e r i a l i z e d , Manchuria was the scene of great i n d u s t r i a l 
development between 1931 and 19^5. "Japanese c a p i t a l investment 
had brought about s p e c t a c u l a r progress i n mining, manufacturing; 
the b u i l d i n g of h y d r o - e l e c t r i c works on the Sungai and the 
general development of the area as a market f o r Japanese 
manufactured goods." I n 19^5 there were 750,000 Japanese 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and i n d u s t r i a l workers i n Manchuria: a l l were 
r e p a t r i a t e d under the terms of the peace settlement." (9) 
The S o v i e t F o r c e s , which occupied Manchuria i n 19^5i p r e t t y 
w e l l s t r i p p e d the country of a l l moveable c a p i t a l but some 
of t h i s p l a n t and machinery returned when Manchuria f e l l under 
Chinese a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Mainly because of the ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s p a r r i n g ' that had taken place i n the previous century, 
Manchuria had a- good r a i l w a y network. Both Japan and R u s s i a 
had preserved a very a c t i v e i n t e r e s t i n these r a i l w a y s and 
f o r a time, p r i v a t e American i n t e r e s t s were in v o l v e d i n them. 
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I n l o s i n g Manchuria Japan l o s t a l o t of c a p i t a l 
t h a t would obviously have been b e t t e r i n v e s t e d i n Japan 
proper. Manchuria had never been adequately s e t t l e d by 
the Japanese but Japan had b e n e f i t e d by imports of raw 
m a t e r i a l s , both i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l . The l o s s 
of Manchuria r e p r e s e n t s the l o s s of a h i g h l y s t r a t e g i c 
base on the mainland but t h i s view pre-supposes a p a t t e r n 
of f u r t h e r Japanese I m p e r i a l i s m . Manchuria possesses a 
population of t h i r t y m i l l i o n Chinese and recent n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements i n c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s have shown how worthless 
are t e r r i t o r i e s with l a r g e indigenous populations. Moreover, 
the r e t e n t i o n of Manchuria would give Japan most vulnerable 
f r o n t i e r s with two enormous powers, China and the U.S.S.R. 
Few Japanese p o l i t i c i a n s have expressed much genuine r e g r e t 
at the l o s s of Manchuria. 
CHINA 
The l o s s of her p o s i t i o n i n China was s e r i o u s for 
Japan but i n view of the e s t a b l i s h e d power of the Communists 
there, any form of occupation would have r e s o l v e d i t s e l f i n t o 
a war of a t t r i t i o n . The complete l o s s of the market i n China 
fo r Japanese products was perhaps the g r e a t e s t long term l o s s 
f o r her but i n view of the h o s t i l e r e l a t i o n s between the two 
n a t i o n s , there does not seem to be any immediate s o l u t i o n to 
t h i s problem. I n many ways t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s t r a g i c because, 
Japanese c a p i t a l goods and t e c h n i c a l 'know-how' would be 
tremendously valuable to China at t h i s stage i n her development. 
SOUTHERN SAKHALIN AND THE KURILES 
The Japanese r e s e n t deeply the l o s s of these 
t e r r i t o r i e s . 
Southern S a k h a l i n was obtained from R u s s i a by the 
Treaty of Portsmouth i n 1905. Most of S a k h a l i n has at l e a s t 
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f i v e months of the year with average temperatures below 
f r e e z i n g point and, as might be expected, i t had few 
Japanese s e t t l e r s . The l o s s of Sa k h a l i n means the l o s s 
of c o a l f i e l d s which, under Japanese c o n t r o l , produced 
500,000 tons of c o a l a year and the l o s s of a considerable 
source of s o f t wood supply and most important of a l l , 
v a l u able f i s h i n g grounds. S t r a t e g i c a l l y , the l o s s of 
Sakh a l i n i s great and with the extravagant claims to 
t e r r i t o r i a l waters t h a t the Russians i n v a r i a b l y make, i t 
brings R u s s i a very c l o s e to Hokkaido. I n a d d i t i o n to 
Sak h a l i n , the l o s s of the K u r i l e s l e a v e s R u s s i a i n complete 
command of the Sea of Okhotsk. The K u r i l e s are s t i l l 
claimed by Japan, as vi g o r o u s l y as any other l o s t t e r r i t o r y , 
f o r she occupied them i n 1875 as a r e s u l t of a compromise 
agreement with R u s s i a over the occupation of S a k h a l i n . The 
l o s s of these t e r r i t o r i e s r e p r e s e n t s a s e r i o u s problem for 
Japan's defence and the l o s s of t h e i r f i s h i n g grounds i s 
quite s e r i o u s to a nation so dependent on f i s h i n g . 
FORMOSA(Taiwan) 
Formosa was acquired from China at the end of the 
war of 189^-5' From a geographical point of view, i t i s 
p a r t of the double-cropping r i c e area of Southern China. 
I n s p i t e of having a considerable mountainous e a s t e r n s e c t i o n 
there are a r e a s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the west, of arable land. 
Formosa was important to Japan i n two ways; f i r s t , d e s p i te 
a l a r g e population, i t could produce a s u r p l u s of r i c e f o r 
export and secondly, i t could produce t r o p i c a l crops which 
Japan could not. The growing of sugar cane was important 
and over a m i l l i o n tons of sugar were produced before 
l i b e r a t i o n . 
The Japanese pursued a s e n s i b l e a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y 
i n Formosa during t h e i r occupation. They undoubtedly 
i n s p i r e d new farming techniques on the i s l a n d but Japanese 
- 73 -
farmers never e s t a b l i s h e d themselves on the i s l a n d 
because they could not compete with the hard working 
Chinese. 
The Japanese developed the c o a l r e s e r v e s which are 
of poor q u a l i t y and about one and a h a l f m i l l i o n tons of 
c o a l were mined i n 19^5* Of the h y d r o - e l e c t r i c p o t e n t i a l 
3,300,000 kw, about 10 per cent was developed. 
On balance, i t would seem tha t Japan i s b e t t e r 
without Formosa. The i s l a n d i s obviously of enormous 
st r a t e g i c ' i m p o r t a n c e , but the population i s predominantly 
Chinese and w i l l probably, i n time, be incorporated i n 
Chinese t e r r i t o r y . The s i t u a t i o n on the i s l a n d i s 
complicated by the e x i s t e n c e of Chiang Kai-Shek's f o r c e s 
but few observers can doubt that t h i s i s l a n d w i l l u l t i m a t e l y 
pass i n t o Chinese r u l e . The American f l e e t i s the one reason 
why i t has not done so a l r e a d y . The f a n t a s t i c a l l y r a p i d 
i n c r e a s e i n population (the population of n e a r l y eight m i l l i o n s 
has p r a c t i c a l l y t r e b l e d i t s e l f i n the l a s t f i f t y y e a r s ) means 
that Formosa would have l i t t l e r i c e f o r export, and the f a c t 
that Japan i s now s e l f s u f f i c i e n t i n r i c e production a l s o 
m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t i t s u s e f u l n e s s to Japan. 
KOREA 
Korea always loomed l a r g e i n the plans of Japanese 
l e a d e r s . The p e n i n s u l a has obvious s t r a t e g i c advantages 
and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , was a bridgehead f o r c o n t i n e n t a l expansion. 
As e a r l y as 1873I Japan forced the Koreans to s i g n a t r e a t y 
which opened up Korean ports to Japanese t r a d e . From t h i s 
time onwards, Japanese p o l i c y was d i r e c t e d towards the 
occupation of Korea, which was achieved i n 1910. Apart 
from the s t r a t e g i c a s p ect, the Japanese saw Korea as an 
under-populated country with considerable scope f o r economic 
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development. 
Japanese c o n t r o l of Korea was g e n e r a l l y r e p r e s s i v e . 
Japan was always extremely nervous about Russian i n t e r e s t s 
i n the p e n i n s u l a up to the war with R u s s i a i n 19C4 and a f t e r 
t h i s , she feared Korean n a t i o n a l i s t movements, often c l a i m i n g 
some a f f i n i t y with China. The north of Korea had good 
deposits of i r o n ore and a n t h r a c i t e but i n g e n e r a l , the 
i n d u s t r i a l development of Korea was not g r e a t . The r a i l w a y 
system was w e l l developed, conforming to a sound s t r a t e g y 
which the Japanese u s u a l l y showed i n t h e i r r a i l w a y b u i l d i n g . 
The n e t t l o s s to the Japanese, viewed i n economic terms 
only, i s quite c o n s i d e r a b l e . I n the t h i r t i e s Japan imported 
r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e amounts of r i c e and c o a l (7m. tons i n 19^3) 
was the most important m i n e r a l . The Koreans provided a 
source of labour i n the c o a l f i e l d s of Japan and were often 
d r i v e n i n t o the l e s s agreeable occupations as a r e s u l t of 
poor conditions i n Korea. The post war problem of t e r r i t o r i a l 
waters has been acute, e s p e c i a l l y from a f i s h i n g point of view, 
and has l e d to much b i t t e r n e s s between the two governments i n 
recent y e a r s . The l o s s of Korea could be most s e r i o u s f o r 
Japan i f the p e n i n s u l a f e l l under the i n f l u e n c e of Communist 
China. This does not seem l i k e l y i n view of American support 
of the South Korean government but a f f a i r s i n Korea are of 
p a r t i c u l a r concern to Japan and are l i k e l y to remain so* 
I f the whole of Korea had f a l l e n to the Communists i n the 
e a r l y 1950's then the p o s i t i o n would have been c r i t i c a l f o r 
Japan. Korea possesses good, i c e - f r e e harbours that could 
be a source of o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n - the type of a c t i o n which 
has been applied by Indonesia a g a i n s t Malaysia r e c e n t l y -
where s m a l l s c a l e , h i t and run t a c t i c s maintain a high s t a t e 
of t e n s i o n . Whichever way one looks at i t , a dagger pointed 
to the heart of Japan or a springboard for c o n t i n e n t a l i n v a s i o n , 
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Korea r e t a i n s i t s importance f o r Japan. 
THE JAPANESE SOUTH SEA ISLANDS 
A f t e r World War I Japan was given the mandate over 
former German posse s s i o n s of the Marianne, M a r s h a l l and 
Ca r o l i n e Groups which had been occupied by a Japanese Naval 
Force. Economically, these i s l a n d s were not important to 
Japan although they did provide phosphates, copra and. sugar 
f o r the Japanese economy. S t r a t e g i c a l l y , they were most 
important, providing a defensive screen i n the P a c i f i c . 
These i s l a n d s have now been taken over by the United S t a t e s 
as t r u s t e e s h i p s under the United S t a t e s Charter. P u b l i c 
opinion i n Japan has long favoured the r e t u r n of the Ryuku 
group of i s l a n d s and i n 1953» the Americans returned the 
northern group to Japan but r e t a i n e d the Southern Group. 
The Americans have t r i e d to give as much i n t e r n a l freedom to 
the Okinawans as p o s s i b l e but t h e i r bases have cost a great 
d e a l and the use of them - t h i s i s of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e -
f a l l s under her j u r i s d i c t i o n and i s not s u b j e c t to Japanese 
approval. Charles F i s h e r wrote the fol l o w i n g about the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of these i s l a n d s ( a l l the i s l a n d s , which were 
former German posse s s i o n s and were l o s t a f t e r the war). 
'•Strategy and sentiment apart, however, none of these l e s s e r 
i s l a n d s has any great value, and t h e i r r e s t o r a t i o n to Japan 
would be of n e g l i g i b l e economic importance." (10) 
SUMMARY OF THE LOSS OF TERRITORIES 
The l o s s of these t e r r i t o r i e s has meant that Japan has 
l o s t v a l uable sources of raw m a t e r i a l s which were under her 
d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l . However, the l o s s of these i s not 
e n t i r e l y bad. Many of these t e r r i t o r i e s would have had 
i n t r a c t a b l e problems caused by having l a r g e populations f or 
whom the Japanese were hated i m p e r i a l i s t masters. As the 
i 
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terms of trade i n the post-war world have not favoured 
the producers of primary products, Japan has been able 
to obtain her raw m a t e r i a l s without much d i f f i c u l t y . 
The main loss to Japan i s e s s e n t i a l l y i n the sphere of 
st r a t e g y - and i n the case of the K u r i l e s or Sakhalin -
t h i s i s defensive, not o f f e n s i v e s t r a t e g y . 
- 77 -
( 1 ) Japan. 
S i r E. Dening P.73 E. Benn. 1960 
( 2 ) A Short H i s t o r y of the Far East. 
K.S. Latourette P.636 Macmillan 19^9 
( 3 ) Japan's Economy i n War and her Reconstruction 
J.B. Cohen P.293 Minneapolis 19^9 
( 4 ) Government and P o l i t i c s i n Japan 
John M. Maki P.33 Thames & Hudson 1962 
( 5 ) A Short Economic H i s t o r y of Modern Japan 
G.C. A l l e n P.125 A l l e n & Unwin 19^6 
( 6 ) I b i d P.125 
( 7 ) I b i d P.148 
( 8 ) Government & P o l i t i c s i n Japan 
John Maki P.28 Thames & Hudson 1962 
( 9 ) The Monsoon Lands of Asia 
P.P. Eawson P.195 Hutchinson 1963 
( 1 0 ) The Prospect f o r Japan. The Changing World 
East and Moodie. 
m 





Source; Royal Geographical Society 
0 JAPAN PROPER. 
TERRITORIES CONTROLLED BY JAPAN IN19 ^ 3 . 
Japan should, according to her l e a d e r s , have augmented hpr 
meagre s u p p l i e s of raw m a t e r i a l s and f o o d s t u f f s by her conquests 
but her l o s s of e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of the seas f r u s t r a t e d these 
p l a n s . 
I n s t e a d of obtaining r i c h s u p p l i e s of o i l from 
the Dutch E a s t I n d i e s , t i n and rubber from Malaya and r i c e from 
South E a s t A s i a , she was faced with the i n t o l e r a b l e burden of 
supplying her armies, dispersed throughout a va s t t e r r i t o r y . 
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JAPAN'S TERRITORIAL LOSSES TO THE U.S.S.R. 
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1. South Sakhalin had been obtained from Russia by the 
Treaty of Portsmouth 1905. 
2 . The K u r i l e Islands were obtained from Russia by the Treaty 
of 1876. 
The Japanese are deeply r e s e n t f u l about the loss of the K u r i l e 
I s l a n d s . I n 1956 the Russians r e j e c t e d the idea of r e t u r n i n g 
even the Southern most K u r i l e I s l a n d s , K u n a s i r i and Etorof-u but 
promised to hand over Shikotah and Habomai i f the U.S. Forces 
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Source: An A t l a s of World A f f a i r s . A. Boyd 
Methuen, 1964 . 
Korea i s an area of great p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y and i s a 
souccegof danger to Japan. Apart from the p o s s i b i l i t y of f u r t h e r 
c o n f l i c t between North and South Korea,with the i n e v i t a b l e involvement 
of the Great Powers, r e l a t i o n s between South Korea and Japan have 
been s t r a i n e d . The main problems i n the post-war e r a have been 
over the d e f i n i t i o n of t e r r i t o r i a l waters and from problems c°ncerning 
the r e p a t r i a t i o n of Koreans from Japan. 
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6 . THE POLITICAL SCENE 
The main purpose of t h i s chapter i s t o t r y to assess 
whether or not Japan i s a v i a b l e democracy. The constant 
anxiety found i n dealing w i t h Japanese p o l i t i c s i s t h a t a 
major economic or i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s could b r i n g t o the 
fo r e r i g h t wing, re a c t i o n a r y elements. This i s p r e c i s e l y 
what happened i n Japan i n the e a r l y t h i r t i e s and although 
the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of any major power - not the l e a s t 
Japan - are h i g h l y complex, the p o l i t i c a l geographer must 
take account of them. Our main problem then i s f i r s t , t o 
judge whether or not the C o n s t i t u t i o n has a widespread 
acceptance i n Japan because t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a formal 
statement of democratic purpose and second, what i s equally 
important, t o t r y to assess the strengths of the extreme 
p a r t i e s of the l e f t and r i g h t , as these must c o n s t i t u t e the 
greatest p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t t o l i b e r a l western democracy i n 
Japan. F i n a l l y , t o b r i n g the study up to date, we w i l l 
w r i t e about Sokagakkai. Which, although i t i s p r i m a r i l y 
a r e l i g i o u s conception, stemming from Buddhism, exercises an 
inc r e a s i n g degree of p o l i t i c a l power ;. 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l and P o l i t i c a l changes i n Japan. 
The basic framework f o r the United States p o l i c y a f t e r 
the Japanese surrender was l a i d down i n the p o l i c y paper 
"United States I n i t i a l Post-surrender P o l i c y " . The P o l i c y 
was w e l l prepared and - what proved t o be most important -
i t was ready before the f i r s t U.S. s o l d i e r set f o o t on the 
mainland of Japan. The P o l i c y s t a t e d d e f i n i t e goals and also 
the means by which they could be achieved. The Japanese 
Government, besides most of the A l l i e d Powers, gave i t 
acceptance - a l b e i t somewhat grudgingly at times. The P o l i c y 
reads as f o l l o w s , the f i r s t o b j e c t i v e being a negative one 
but the second promising the c r e a t i o n of a new s o c i e t y : 
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(a) "To insure t h a t Japan w i l l not again become a menace 
to the United States or to the peace and s e c u r i t y of the 
world." 
(b) "To b r i n g about the eventual establishment of a 
peaceful and responsible government which w i l l respect the 
r i g h t s of other states and w i l l support the o b j e c t i v e s of the 
United States as r e f l e c t e d i n the i d e a l s and p r i n c i p l e s of the 
Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires 
t h a t t h i s government should conform as c l o s e l y as may be t o 
p r i n c i p l e s of democratic self-government, but i t i s not the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the A l l i e d Powers to impose upon Japan 
any form of government not supported by the f r e e l y expressed 
w i l l of the people." 
These aims were t o be reached by the f o l l o w i n g means: 
(a) "Japan's sovereignty w i l l be l i m i t e d t o the i s l a n d s of 
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor o u t l y i n g 
i s l a n d s as may be determined, i n accordance w i t h the Cairo 
Declaration and other agreements to which the United States 
i i 
i s or may be a p a r t y . 
(b) "Japan w i l l be completely disarmed and d e m i l i t a r i z e d . 
The a u t h o r i t y of the m i l i t a r i s t s and the i n f l u e n c e of m i l i t a r i s m 
w i l l be t o t a l l y e liminated from her p o l i t i c a l , economic and 
s o c i a l l i f e . I n s t i t u t i o n s expressive of the s p i r i t of 
m i l i t a r i s m and aggression w i l l be vigorou s l y suppressed." 
(c) "The Japanese people s h a l l be encouraged t o develop a 
desire f o r i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t i e s and respect f o r fundamental 
human r i g h t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the freedoms of r e l i g i o n , assembly, 
speech, and the press. They s h a l l also be encouraged t o 
form democratic and representative organisations." 
(d) "The Japanese people s h a l l be afforded o p p o r t u n i t y 
to develop f o r themselves an economy which w i l l permit the 
peacetime requirements of the population to be met." 
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The P o l i c y also l a i d down t h a t the Occupation would 
be d i r e c t e d by a U.S. Commander f o r an i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d 
and t h a t the Emperor and the Government would be subordinate 
to the Supreme Commander who was to u t i l i z e the e x i s t i n g 
machinery of the Japanese Government. There WAS t o be complete 
disarmament, former m i l i t a r i s t s were to be barred from holding 
p u b l i c o f f i c e , and war c r i m i n a l s were to stand t r i a l . P o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s were t o be encouraged and p o l i t i c a l prisoners were 
freed from p r i s o n and the large i n d u s t r i a l combinations 
(Zaibatsu) were to be dismantled. The whole P o l i c y was 
q u i t e r e v o l u t i o n a r y and may be summed up as the programme 
of the three 'D's - d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , disarmament and 
democratization. The Japanese themselves were f u l l y aware 
t h a t the basic method of working was f o r "the Occupation, 
by means of d i r e c t i v e s issued under the a u t h o r i t y of the 
Supreme Commander, to order the Japanese Government t o do 
c e r t a i n t h i n g s designed to achieve the o b j e c t i v e s of the 
occupation; the Japanese Government then i n s t i t u t e d the 
requ i r e d action'.* (1) 
Most American w r i t e r s - w i t h some j u s t i f i c a t i o n - are 
proud of the Occupation Period i n Japan. They admit mistakes 
by the Occupying Power but on the other hand they r i g h t l y p r a i s e 
the reasonable behaviour of the U.S. Army of Occupation and are 
gen e r a l l y laudatory about the supreme commander, General MacArthur. 
MacArthur, who developed a mystique i n Japan, appealed to the 
Japanese, as much as any Westerner could. He was the great 
pro-consul, remote and detached who dispowed j u s t i c e and 
followed h i s mandate. 
The Americans were probably wise i n not removing the 
Emperor from o f f i c e . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , the Emperor i s now 
"the symbol of the s t a t e and of the u n i t y of the Japanese 
people; 1 1 p o l i t i c a l l y , although he i s without r e a l power, he 
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i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarch but c u l t u r a l l y he i s a l i n k 
w i t h the h i s t o r i c past. He i s no longer a demi-god -
c e r t a i n l y i n the eyes of most Japanese - but i s a w e l l 
respected, d i g n i f i e d and studious monarch. 
The executive branch of Japanese Government had, 
w i t h the M i l i t a r i s t s and Zaibatsu leaders, obtained f a r 
too much power i n pre-war Japan but nevertheless the 
apparatus of bureaucracy was reasonably e f f i c i e n t and was 
v i t a l f o r the execution of the Supreme Commander's plans. 
One would hardly say the Japanese C i v i l Servants went about 
t h e i r work w i t h a reforming zeal but i t was r a t h e r from an 
ingrained sense of duty t h a t they c a r r i e d out t h e i r tasks. 
The bureaucracy provided t h a t c o n t i n u i t y which was necessary 
from the old government to the new. 
The r e a c t i o n of the Japanese people against m i l i t a r i s m 
and a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m i n the post-war world i s sometimes under-
estimated by Western w r i t e r s . When m i l i t a r y w r i t e r s have 
complained about the r e l a t i v e l y small Japanese arms expenditure 
i n recent years they would be wrong t o wholly ascribe i t t o 
Japanese c u p i d i t y and s e l f i n t e r e s t . Pacifism has a genuinely 
strong hold i n Japan - no matter how strange t h i s may seem to 
Westerners - and t h i s Pacifism i s a compound of many experiences, 
which include those of the war and a r e a l i s a t i o n of the ho r r o r s 
of atomic warfare. Many of the older generation i n Japan 
(youth i s not e n t i r e l y i n the saddle i n Japan) remember the 
arrogance of both p o l i c e and m i l i t a r y and are c a r e f u l t o prevent 
a resurgence of these evils^which i s , of course, a commendably 
healthy a t t i t u d e i n a democratic s o c i e t y . 
The r e a l l y v i t a l document i n Post War U.S. Japanese 
r e l a t i o n s i s the C o n s t i t u t i o n which i s the embodiment of 
the Supreme Commander, A l l i e d Powers' i d e a l s . U.S. w r i t e r s 
- 82 -
who are ' c o n s t i t u t i o n minded' are perhaps a l i t t l e more 
laudatory about i t than other Western w r i t e r s and the 
Japanese themselves. The c o n s t i t u t i o n of Japan was 
imposed upon her by a power which had defeated her i n war. 
The U.S. M i l i t a r y Government, d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the attempts 
of the Japanese themselves, who were r e l u c t a n t t o a l t e r 
r a d i c a l l y the r o l e of the Emperor, imposed the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
on the Japanese people. Although the C o n s t i t u t i o n was 
f o r m a l l y passed by the Diet i n October, 1946, there i s no 
doubt i n the minds of most Japanese t h a t i t was imposed upon 
them, even i f they derive advantage from i t . Ivan Morris 
w r i t e s : "This c o n s t i t u t i o n can, i n a sense, be regarded as 
the epitome of a l l i d e o l o g i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and economic reforms 
t h a t were c a r r i e d out during the e a r l y post-war years w i t h the 
aim of undermining the t r a d i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and of p r o v i d i n g 
the foundations of a modern democratic s o c i e t y i n Japan!1 ( 2 ) 
One of the great drawbacks i n any defence of the C o n s t i t u t i o n 
i s t h a t i t d i d not come as a r e s u l t of widespread popular 
demand but r a t h e r as an i m p o s i t i o n from above, by a f o r e i g n 
power. Most of the reforms introduced by the Occupation remain 
on the Statute Book but "a f a r more important question f o r 
Japan's f u t u r e i s whether the democratic i d e a l s which they 
embody can become an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the nation's symbolism 
instead of f o r e i g n imports l i n k e d i n people's minds w i t h defeat 
i i 
and occupation. ( 3 ) Professor Maryama has w r i t t e n : - - -
"democracy i n t h i s country has not yet i n f i l t r a t e d i n t o the 
d a i l y l i v e s of the people, although i t has accomplished the 
outward l e g a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes i n the Japanese s t a t e 
s t r u c t u r e . I n other words, democracy i s s t i l l an imported 
product and has not yet developed to the stage where i t has 
become a p o s i t i v e symbol t o regulate the Japanese way of l i f e , 
completely d i s p l a c i n g the old nationalism." ( 4 ) 
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I t i s not w i t h i n the province of t h i s study to go 
i n t o elaborate d e t a i l s about the Japanese C o n s t i t u t i o n but 
nevertheless some o u t l i n e of Government would seem t o be 
necessary. These paragraphs are not p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h 
the defects of the C o n s t i t u t i o n but r a t h e r w i t h the machine 
i t s e l f . The framers of the C o n s t i t u t i o n were alarmed at the 
prospect of a l e g i s l a t i v e body becoming weak and subordinate 
t o the executive and they gave a l l possible s t r e n g t h t o the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . The National Diet was to be rep r e s e n t a t i v e of 
the people, i t s members being chosen i n fr e e e l e c t i o n s , based 
on u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e . The House of C o u n c i l l o r s , the Upper 
House, has 250 members, 150 elected from l o c a l constituencies 
and 100 from the nation at l a r g e . The House of Representatives 
has 467 members elected from 117 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , each r e t u r n i n g 
from 3 t o 5 members. The wholly elected, non-nominated Upper 
House, w i t h h a l f the seats being contested every three years 
years, f i t s i n w i t h U.S. c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i d e a l s but i f anything, 
the House of Councillers i n Japan has r a t h e r less power than 
the Senate i n the U.S. p o l i t i c a l framework. The C o n s t i t u t i o n 
s p e c i f i c a l l y states t h a t the Lower House, the House of 
Representatives, i s the dominant part n e r . This l a t t e r p o i n t 
i s emphasised i n the c o n t r o l of the Lower House over a l l 
budgetary matters. The important p r i n c i p l e of supremacy of 
the Diet i s seen i n i t s monopoly of a l l l e g i s l a t i o n . A l l 
powers emanate from l e g i s l a t i v e measures made by the Diet 
and even the exercise by the executive of the r i g h t of 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y a c t i o n i s possible only i f a u t h o r i t y has been 
granted under law. This emphasis on the law making fu n c t i o n s 
of the Diet was an e f f o r t to prevent a recurrence of the pre-
war system whereby a wide range of m i n i s t e r i a l orders and 
I m p e r i a l ordinances had the force of law and could not be 
challenged i n the I m p e r i a l D i e t . The Japanese c o n s t i t u t i o n 
i s a strange h y b r i d ; i t has a predominance of U.S. p r a c t i c e 
-Sk-
in i t . Both Houses have standing committees f o r the major 
a f f a i r s of government, ranging from the Cabinet i t s e l f t o 
the Audit Committee. The main standing committees are, 
however, obviously r e l a t e d to the cabinet and the main 
m i n i s t r i e s and t h i s has l e d to a strengthening of the 
executive branch at the expense of the l e g i s l a t u r e . The 
Prime M i n i s t e r and the Cabinet must be members of the D i e t , 
a s i t u a t i o n nearer the B r i t i s h than the U.S. p r a c t i c e , and 
the power of the Diet i s repeatedly stressed. We, i n B r i t a i n , 
have been most concerned about the r e l a t i v e weakness of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e and w i t h the r i s e of the p a r t y caucus and the 
bureaucrat t o e f f e c t i v e power, and recent events i n Japan 
have shown t h a t she too has t h i s problem, even i n s p i t e of a 
r a t h e r more 'defensive' c o n s t i t u t i o n than the B r i t i s h . 
The Japanese p o l i c e under the M i n i s t r y of Home A f f a i r s 
were repressive agents under the old government. I n 194-7, 
c o n t r o l of the p o l i c e was dispersed to l o c a l l e v e l s but t h i s 
proved to be i n e f f i c i e n t . The attempts to c e n t r a l i s e the 
p o l i c e once more s t i r r e d up the old memories of pre-war and 
war-time repressions among many Japanese, The pt&ice were 
put under p r e f e c t u r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n i n 1954 but the N a t i o n a l 
Public Safety Commission s t i l l has o v e r a l l power and i t s 
chairman must be a M i n i s t e r of State and i s thus responsible to 
the D i e t . The potters of the Armed Forces are s t r i c t l y 
circumscribed and are subject t o very e f f e c t i v e c i v i l i a n 
c o n t r o l . 
The Japanese l e g a l system was completely overhauled 
and there emerged four basic n a t i o n a l codes: the Criminal Code, 
the C i v i l Code, the Code of Criminal procedure, and the Code 
of C i v i l Procedure. The Supreme Court has the power to 
declare l e g i s l a t i v e and executive acts as u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
but has c o n s i s t e n t l y refused to do so, maintaining t h a t the 
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remedy f o r l e g i s l a t u r e t h a t may be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s 
through p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . The framers 
of the C o n s t i t u t i o n had hoped t h a t the Supreme Court i n t h i s 
respect would act l i k e the U.S. Supreme Court which does declare 
acts as ' u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ' but i t has maintained a usage more 
i n common w i t h B r i t i s h p r a c t i c e i n preserving - i n theory a t 
any r a t e - the u n q u a l i f i e d supremacy of Parliament. The 
Supreme Court c o n t r o l s the t r a i n i n g of p o t e n t i a l lawyers and 
works through the Legal Research and T r a i n i n g I n s t i t u t e . The 
Chief J u s t i c e i s designated by the cabinet and appointed by the 
Emperor and the fourteen other j u s t i c e s are appointed by the 
cabinet but t h e i r appointment does not r e q u i r e formal approval 
of the Emperor. Justic e s of the Supreme Court are subject 
to occasional votes of confidence by the e l e c t o r a t e but t h i s 
measure has not been p a r t i c u l a r l y successful. Some observers 
would contend t h a t the Japanese C o n s t i t u t i o n sometimes goes a 
l i t t l e too f a r to preserve the paramountcy of the l e g i s l a t i v e 
or e l e c t o r a l processes. 
There i s no doubt t h a t the bulk of Japanese opinion 
would favour the r e t e n t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n although we 
might not hear paeons of praise to the Americans f o r presenting 
i t t o the Japanese people. 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
The continued existence of a v i a b l e democracy i n 
Japan i s of v i t a l i n t e r e s t t o the Western Powers. The 
l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c cause throughout Asia would s u f f e r an 
i r r e t r i e v a b l e setback were democracy to f a i l i n Japan. So 
many of the smaller nations i n Asia have succumbed t o m i l i t a r y 
d i c t a t o r s h i p s t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see much hope f o r 
s u r v i v a l f o r democracy i n Asia i f Japanese democracy f a i l e d . 
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Although the main t h r e a t s to Japanese democracy come 
from the extreme L e f t and Right Wings, there have been a 
number of i n t e r n a l s t r a i n s on the Japanese system. For 
instance, the emergence of s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s , where p e r s o n a l i t i e s 
have outweighed p r i n c i p l e s , bloc v o t i n g i n r u r a l areas where 
v i l l a g e leaders have been i n f l u e n t i a l enough t o wipe out 
e f f e c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n , and violence, have a l l been t h r e a t s t o 
the s t a b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l machine. But the biggest problem, 
however, has been to maintain a two p a r t y system. The two 
main p a r t i e s , the Liberal-Democratic and the S o c i a l i s t , 
although d i f f e r i n g i n p o l i t i c a l philosophy, are b a s i c a l l y i n 
favour of democracy and t h e i r dominance has helped the cause 
of democracy. Any great d i f f u s i o n of power brought about by 
the loss of power by e i t h e r of the major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s 
would have favoured smaller extremist groups, to the detriment 
of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . 
The L i b e r a l Democratic Party 
The Liberal-Democratic Party, which i s admittedly 
t o r n w i t h f a c t i o n a l r i v a l r y , represents a strong conservative 
t r a d i t i o n i n Japan. I t was created by a merger of the L i b e r a l 
and the Democratic p a r t i e s i n 1955* Although i t stands f o r 
the maintenance of a p o l i t i c a l status-quo i t represents a very 
d i f f e r e n t brand of conservatism from t h a t which was put forward 
by r i g h t wing p a r t i e s i n the t h i r t i e s . Maki w r i t e s : "Thus, 
i n the ea r l y 1960's conservatism means something f a r d i f f e r e n t 
from what i t meant only two decades e a r l i e r . I t i s important 
t h e r e f o r e , t o note a few of the things t h a t the new conservatism 
does not stand f o r : the o l d p r a c t i c e of emperor worship; the 
subjugation of women; the omnipotence of the male head of the 
f a m i l y ; the concentration of economic power i n the hands of 
the Zaibatsu; a s i n g l e p a r t y system; the a u t h o r i t a r i a n s t a t e 
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w i t h i t s p o l i c e suppression and d e n i a l of freedom; and, 
f i n a l l y m i l i t a r i s m and aggression." ( 5 ) A d i s t u r b i n g 
feature of t h i s p a r t y has been the way i n which the pre-war 
p o l i t i c i a n s have dominated a f f a i r s i n the post-war era, but 
as these are now a d i m i n i s h i n g band of o l d men, a younger, 
more dynamic type of leader has emerged. The p a r t y t o o , 
has uneven support,which i s not unusual f o r conservative 
p a r t i e s i n modern i n d u s t r i a l s t a t e s , i n t h a t i t has a predominant 
st r e n g t h i n the country and i s r e l a t i v e l y weak i n the major 
i n d u s t r i a l centres. 
The S o c i a l i s t Party 
Socialism was introduced t o Japan towards the end of 
the nineteenth century but i t never r e a l l y took a f i r m hold 
i n Japanese p o l i t i c s , p a r t l y because of the tremendous 
conservatism i n outlook of most Japanese before the war and 
p a r t l y because of the repressive measures taken against i t 
by Japanese governments. Freed from these r e s t r a i n t s the 
S o c i a l i s t p a r t y grew r a p i d l y i n the post war years and indeed, 
r u l e d the country f o r a short time i n 19^7 and 19^8 . Although 
the p a r t y has strong support from trades-unions, from students 
and teachers and from those Japanese who were h o s t i l e t o U.S. 
i n f l u e n c e , i t has never been a t r u l y powerful p a r t y because 
of serious i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t s . I t has been b e d e v i l l e d 
w i t h the c o n f l i c t between the M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t f a c t i o n and 
the social-democratic side of the p a r t y . The f e a r of the 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y side of the Party has a l i e n a t e d support from 
many people, p a r t i c u l a r l y tradespeople, who were nevertheless 
not wholly s a t i s f i e d w i t h the a l t e r n a t i v e p a r t y , the L i b e r a l 
Democratic. The main enemies of the S o c i a l i s t p a r t y t h e r e f o r e 
have been i n t e r n e c i n e s t r i f e and the continuance of general 
p r o s p e r i t y i n Japan which must i n e v i t a b l y help the more 
conservative L i b e r a l Democrats t o r e t a i n power. Within the 
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p a r t y , the Soviet-Sino breach and the possession of nuclear 
weapons by China has weakened the Marxist f a c t i o n . 
We w i l l now examine the extremist p a r t i e s which 
obviously represent the main t h r e a t to democracy. 
Pa r t i e s of the Extreme Right 
Japanese nationalism t h a t was used i n perverted ways 
by so many of the r i g h t wing p a r t i e s and pressure groups 
before the war has numerous h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t o 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t from t h a t i n most other c o u n t r i e s . " I t 
was o r i g i n a l l y b u i l t up from p r o v i n c i a l sentiments and 
depended on t r a d i t i o n a l l o c a l l o y a l t i e s , p a t e r n a l i s i t i c 
f a i l i n g s , and q u a s i - r e l i g i o u s myths. The M e i j i o l i g a r c h y 
succeeded by means of s t a t e education and propaganda i n 
m o b i l i z i n g t h i s pre-modern form of nat i o n a l i s m to break 
down feudal b a r r i e r s and to create a sense of n a t i o n a l 
u n i t y , l o y a l t y t o the c e n t r a l government, and enthusiasm f o r 
a n a t i o n a l mission of aggraridizement". ( 6 ) With the collapse 
of the Japanese 'mission', nationalism s u f f e r e d a heavy blow 
but i t has re-emerged i n a d i f f e r e n t guise. Delmar Brown 
warned against underestimating the force of Nationalism i n 
post-war Japan f o r "the sense of l o y a l t y t o the n a t i o n has 
not changed but r a t h e r the expressions and manifestations of 
t h a t l o y a l t y . A review of Japan's h i s t o r y during the l a s t 
three decades shows how potent the force of nat i o n a l i s m became -
even d r i v i n g the n a t i o n to adopt p o l i c i e s and tcC take steps 
t h a t ran counter to i t s own best i n t e r e s t s , f o r nat i o n a l i s m 
was charged w i t h emotionalism t h a t l e f t no room f o r the 
adoption of measures d i c t a t e d s o l e l y by reason. I t i s 
the r e f o r e of v i t a l concern t o a l l those who support the i d e a l s 
of freedom and peace to see t h a t Japan's new nat i o n a l i s m does 
not merge w i t h ihe Communist advance and does not r e v e r t once 
more to the o l d emotional u l t r a n a t i o n a l i s m t h a t was based on 
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fear and t h a t was whipped up to a f a n a t i c a l height by 
a government bent on the achievement of s t a t e goals by 
the use of force against f o r e i g n enemies". (7) 
Pre-war Japanese leaders repeatedly stressed the 
dangers of a t t a c k from othe r I m p e r i a l i s t powers and so 
maintained a h i g h l y charged n a t i o n a l i s m . Many Western 
observers s t i l l consider the Right wing t o be a f a r more 
serious menace than the L e f t wing because the extreme 
r i g h t i s t s are more i n tune w i t h Japanese t r a d i t i o n s i n 
general than are the Communists. Brown p o i n t s out t h a t : 
"many of the r i g h t wing s o c i e t i e s today do not derive from 
the 1930'.s but have t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l r o o ts i n the Edo and 
M e i j i Periods". (8) He instances Tokugawa Confucianism and 
the a grarian zenophobia of the Bakanatsu period which s t i l l 
f i n d echoes i n post war r i g h t wing s o c i e t i e s . The extreme 
r i g h t i s strongest i n p r o v i n c i a l and r u r a l areas where t h e i r 
element of conservatism f i n d s more support than the i c o n o c l a s t i c 
• f o r e i g n 1 ideas of r e v o l u t i o n , which communism teaches. 
The Party of the Extreme L e f t 
This i s synonymous w i t h the Communist p a r t y and as 
such would appear to have greater u n i t y than the f i s s i p a r o u s 
Right. However, t h i s i s not e n t i r e l y t r u e as d o c t r i n a l 
p o l i c i e s have weakened the Communist p a r t y . The Communists 
enjoyed a 'honeymoon' p e r i o d i n the immediate post-war p e r i o d . 
The p a r t y had never been numerically strong and had s u f f e r e d 
severe repression from successive pre-war Japanese governments 
but i t s organisation was q u i c k l y established during the 
Occupation and i t got o f f to a f l y i n g s t a r t . A climax was 
reached i n the general e l e c t i o n i n 19^9 5 when the Communists 
won j u s t under 10 per cent ( s l i g h t l y less than three m i l l i o n ) 
of the popular vote of t h i r t y f i v e seats i n the House of 
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Representatives. And i n a more p o s i t i v e sense we have 
the f a m i l i a r p e n e t r a t i o n i n the trades unions where a power 
was established which was out of a l l p r o p o r t i o n to t h e i r 
numerical s t r e n g t h , One f a c t i o n i n the Party l e d by Nosaka 
i n s i s t e d on the a c q u i s i t i o n of power by democratic means but 
there was a greater f a c t i o n , i d e o l o g i c a l l y purer and conforming 
more w i t h Marxism, t h a t i n s i s t e d on violence and r e v o l u t i o n . 
This tended t o d i s c r e d i t the p a r t y and w i t h i t s thunder s t o l e n 
by the S o c i a l i s t s i n t h e i r opposition t o Japan's subordinate 
r o l e t o the U.S.A., the p a r t y has not increased i n s t r e n g t h but 
has decreased i n the l a s t decade. The p a r t y has appealed 
to the younger people - the students i n p a r t i c u l a r - who 
were n a t u r a l l y less r e s p e c t f u l of ol d i n s t i t u t i o n s and t o 
whom r e v o l u t i o n had an appeal but Russia's intransigence over 
the prisoner of war problem, and the t e r r i t o r i a l gains made 
by Russia at the expense of Japan, have not helped the Communist 
cause. The s p l i t between Russia and China has f u r t h e r weakened 
Communism i n Japan and f i n a l l y , the comparative economic 
wellbeing of Japan a f t e r the Korean war, has been a d i s i n c e n t i v e 
to the spread of communism. The f a c t t h a t Communism i s 
wedded t o r e v o l u t i o n makes i t impossible f o r the p a r t y t o 
work i n a l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e . Maki suggested t h a t the 
Communist p a r t y represented the only serious t h r e a t and d i s -
counted the u l t r a n a t i o n a l i s t groups who were, he claimed, out 
of step w i t h the times - but t h i s may w e l l be h i s American 
obsession w i t h Communism 
SOKAGAKKAI 
I n Japan, Sokagakkai exerts a growing i n f l u e n c e on 
p o l i t i c s because of i t s hold over about one-tenth of the 
country's population. 
Sokaggakai was established i n 1928, by a Japanese 
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p h i l i s o p h e r and scholar, Mr. Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, but 
i t was only a f t e r the end of the second World War t h a t i t 
a t t r a c t e d f o l l o w e r s by the thousands. The &Lth f i t t e d the 
vacuum l e f t by the d e s t r u c t i o n of standards and values which 
were suddenly no more i n the despair of defeat. Sokagakkai 
philosophy i s derived from Buddhism and o f f e r s the Japanese 
happiness by doing away w i t h " e g o i s t i c thoughts". I t s 
o f f i c i a l pamphlets s t a t e : "Sokagakkai aims t o b r i n g f a i t h , 
i n d i v i d u a l happiness and construct a peaceful s o c i e t y by 
p r a c t i s i n g the true r e l i g i o n . We must th e r e f o r e change the 
e g o i s t i c thoughts of i n d i v i d u a l s by a character r e v o l u t i o n " . 
Sokagakkai claims t h a t i t i s not u l t r a - n a t i o n a l i s t i c nor 
f a s c i s t but nevertheless, i t i s w e l l organised and enjoys 
p a r t i c u l a r support from the young people. The movement 
supports the p o l i t i c a l p a r t y Koneito which i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
a moderate, middle of the road p a r t y . I t i s t h i s moderate 
r o l e , plus i t s emphasis on i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m and world peace 
which does not, i n s p i t e of i t s r a p i d growth, make i t a 
d i s t u r b i n g f e a t u r e of modern Japanese p o l i t i c a l l i f e . One 
cannot avoid the conclusion t h a t many young people give i t 
support because they have no great f a i t h i n e i t h e r of the 
two major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . 
SUMMARY 
Japan had many advantages over neighbouring countries 
S.E. Asia i n her attempts t o introduce democracy a f t e r the 
Second World War: f i r s t , she had a l i t e r a t e p o p u l a t i o n ; 
second, a large number of her people had had some experience 
of v o t i n g even i f i t had not been of a very e x c i t i n g nature 
and t h i r d , she had what was - i n s p i t e of the d i s l o c a t i o n of 
war - a good system of mass communication. The relative 
p r o s p e r i t y of post-war Japan has i n the eyes of many Japanese 
- 92 -
been associated w i t h the present e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l 
machinery and i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t they would w i l l i n g l y 
wish t o change i t . Perhaps only massive unemployment 
could cause a degree of i n s t a b i l i t y t h a t would lead t o the 
d e s t r u c t i o n of democracy^ and the development of economic 
t h i n k i n g , from Keynes onward, makes t h i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y . 
The only other major upset which could b r i n g extremist 
government i n t o power would be world war and there does 
not appear to be any s i g n i f i c a n t s e c t i o n of Japanese p u b l i c 
opinion t h a t would l i g h t l y support aggressive a c t i o n by 
the Japanese government. 
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7. AGRARIAN AND FISHING PROBLEMS 
This chapter w i l l be concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h the major 
post-war changes i n Japanese a g r i c u l t u r e . A g r i c u l t u r e s t i l l 
remains the most s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of the Japanese economy 
but i t has undergone some q u i t e r e v o l u t i o n a r y changes since 
the war. I n order to make i n t e l l i g i b l e any discussion of 
post-war reforms i t w i l l be necessary t o describe b r i e f l y 
the conditions which p r e v a i l e d before the war and t o give 
an account of the main a g r i c u l t u r a l regions and the p r i n c i p a l 
crops grown t h e r e i n . 
The M e i j i Restoration i n 1868 destroyed feudalism 
but there s t i l l remained a r i g i d , i n f l e x i b l e system of land 
tenure i n Japan. As a r e s u l t of the reforms at the time of 
the Restoration, the ownership of the land became vested i n 
those who had paid r i c e dues to the feudal l o r d s . I n place 
of t h i s t r i b u t e the new owners were obliged to pay a land tax 
i n cash t o the n a t i o n a l government. Many of these l a n d l o r d s , 
who also had tenants, received a r i c e payment from them. 
However, the steady i n f l a t i o n of the 1870's favoured the 
l a n d l o r d s , as t h e i r taxes to the government were f i x e d but 
the value of the r i c e payments which they received, increased 
r a p i d l y . There were s t i l l many working farmers who had 
become peasant p r o p r i e t o r s but the tendency during the modern 
era was f o r the number of these to d e c l i n e . G.C. A l l e n 
w r i t e s : "Throughout the modern era, and e s p e c i a l l y during 
periods of a g r i c u l t u r a l depression, the p r o p o r t i o n of the 
arable land held on tenancies increased. By 1936, k6 per cent 
of a l l farm households consisted of peasant p r o p r i e t o r s , k2 
per cent of farmers who leased some of t h e i r land from landlords 
and owned the r e s t , and 27 per cent of tenant farms pure and 
simple". (1) I t has been estimated t h a t i n pre-war days the 
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peasant paid on average two f i f t h s of the value of h i s 
produce to the l a n d l o r d . The whole system t h e r e f o r e was 
very much i n favour of the l a n d l o r d class and the l i f e of 
the peasant was onerous. Often the tenant rented land from 
a number of landlords and the d i f f i c u l t i e s caused by t h i s 
d i s p e r s i o n of holdings are obvious. 
The t y p i c a l Japanese l a n d l o r d was not a great land-
owner of the type t h a t existed i n Central and Eastern Europe 
before the war. There were i n the whole of. Japan only 
3,000 landlords who owned more than 50 chobu (120 acres) 
and the m a j o r i t y of these were i n Northern Japan. (2) 
Many landlords were absentees - nearly one m i l l i o n before 
the war - and many had i n t e r e s t s and occupations outside 
a g r i c u l t u r e . The holdings of the peasants were very small 
indeed, nearly h a l f were less than 1-J acres and yk per cent were 
under 7 acres and almost i n v a r i a b l y , these holdings were s p l i t 
up i n t o small parcels of land. 
The main crop was r i c e which occupied nearly 60 per cent 
of a l l c u l t i v a t e d land. There was l i t t l e double cropping of 
r i c e i n Japan and second crops of wheat, barley or roots were 
the general r u l e . I n some ways, Japanese a g r i c u l t u r e was 
h i g h l y e f f i c i e n t and the r i c e y i e l d per acre was the highest 
i n the world. However, the method of farming was labour 
i n t e n s i v e w i t h very l i t t l e use of machinery or d r a f t animals 
and the y i e l d per person was consequently low. The Japanese 
schools i n the twenties and t h i r t i e s taught improved methods 
of a g r i c u l t u r e and i n these years p r o d u c t i v i t y g r e a t l y increased. 
The use of f e r t i l i z e r s became much more widespread and apart 
from sources such as the South Sea i s l a n d s w i t h t h e i r phosphates, 
the production of a r t i f i c i a l f e r t i l i z e r s increased r a p i d l y i n 
Japan a f t e r World War I . Many of the Japanese peasants 
Note: 1 chobu equals 2 .4 acres. 
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engaged i n f i s h i n g and s i l k production and t h i s n a t u r a l l y 
augmented t h e i r incomes, but the f a c t remains t h a t they 
were badly o f f i n the pre-war years and r e l a t i v e l y much 
worse o f f than the average worker i n the urban areas. 
This was responsible f o r the d r i f t of population t o the 
towns but nevertheless there was s t i l l chronic r u r a l over-
population i n Japan. The oppressed peasants looked upon 
the i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t s as t h e i r main enemy. There had 
always been a close contact between the Army and the land -
i t i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i n view of the economic hardship 
which existed i n the country areas t h a t these areas were such 
good r e c r u i t i n g grounds. The peasants looked t o the 
m i l i t a r i s t s , who were opposed to the i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t s , 
t o rescue them from t h e i r p l i g h t . The basic problem of 
Japanese a g r i c u l t u r e was too great a farming population on 
too l i t t l e land and i n s p i t e of an energetic programme of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i t exi s t e d both before and a f t e r the Second 
World War. 
JAPANESE AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD 
With the gradual r e t u r n of her s o l d i e r s a f t e r the war 
and the f a i l u r e of her shattered i n d u s t r i e s t o absorb them, 
the over-population on the land was exacerbated. 
The Occupation a u t h o r i t i e s r i g h t l y took the view t h a t 
a major land reform was necessary i f Japan was to progress 
towards democracy. The old system, w i t h i t s long s u f f e r i n g 
tenants, would always be a source of i n s t a b i l i t y and r e v o l u t i o n . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t the reform may have been i n s t i g a t e d by a 
conquering power but i n the main, many Japanese (not ttae l e a s t 
the peasants) believed t h a t fundamental reform of land tenure 
was necessary and so the Occupation was g i v i n g impetus t o a 
long f e l t need f o r a c t i o n . I t i s r e a l l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the 
landlords remained so comparatively d o c i l e when they l o s t so 
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much. However, i t should be emphasised t h a t no matter 
how much the change i n land tenure was desirable p o l i t i c a l l y 
and s o c i a l l y , the f a c t remains th a t the root cause of Japan's 
problem on the land at th a t time - namely too many people 
w i t h too l i t t l e land - could not be solved. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , 
i t was i n d u s t r y , the t r a d i t i o n a l enemy of the r u r a l i n t e r e s t s , 
which was to provide a p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n t o t h i s p e r e n n i a l 
problem from the l a t e 1950's onwards. Before we discuss 
t h i s l e t us look at one of the best very simple d i v i s i o n s of 
Japan i n t o A g r i c u l t u r a l regions which w i l l make some of the 
decisions taken by Supreme Commander, A l l i e d Powers i n the 
Land Reform more i n t e l l i g i b l e . ( 3 ) 
AGRICULTURAL REGIONS 
( 1 ) Hokkaido 
Hokkaido d i f f e r s from the r e s t of Japan i n t h a t 
w i n t e r cropping i s impossible, because of her i n t e n s e l y 
cold w i n t e r s . Upland f i e l d s are more s i g n i f i c a n t and 
farmers are less dependent upon r i c e . The population i s 
r e l a t i v e l y sparse but i t i s i n c r e a s i n g , but i t remains 
e s s e n t i a l l y a pioneer zone w i t h l i m i t e d a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The Japanese governments both before and 
a f t e r the war have always been concerned about the s p a r s i t y 
of population of Hokkaido - more on grounds of the s t r a t e g i c 
dangers of a weak zone of contact w i t h the U.S.S.R. F.C. Jones 
i n h i s e x c e l l e n t work on Hokkaido w r i t e s : "The a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p o s s i b i l i t e s of Hokkaido have always been l i m i t e d . The 
r a t i o of c u l t i v a b l e land t o the t o t a l area i s small. The 
s o i l i s i n general of mediocre or poor q u a l i t y and needs 
p a r t i c u l a r l y l a r g e amounts of f e r t i l i z e r t o produce adequate 
crops. This, combined w i t h a short growing season, prescribes 
a l a r g e r area f o r p r o f i t a b l e - or even subsistence - farming 
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than i s necessary i n most of mainland Japan. That, i n t u r n , 
l i m i t s the number of farming f a m i l i e s the land can h o l d . 
Much of the land which o f f i c i a l estimates include as p o t e n t i a l l y 
c u l t i v a b l e , although as yet u n t i l l e d , i s so unfavourably 
s i t u a t e d and so poor i n f e r t i l i t y as t o o f f e r at best a hand-
to-mouth existence f o r the s e t t l e r " (*f) The idea 
t h a t m i l l i o n s of the e x i s t i n g surplus farm population could 
be r e - s e t t l e d on the land i n Hokkaido i s f a l l a c i o u s . The 
enormous increase i n demand f o r meat and d a i r y produce i n 
Japan i n recent years has g r e a t l y s t i m u l a t e d c a t t l e r e a r i n g 
i n Hokkaido i n the l a s t decade. 
( 2) Northern Honshu 
Northern Honshu i s a mountainous, t r a n s i t i o n zone. 
Here also dry f i e l d s are important and m i l l e t o f t e n takes 
the place of r i c e . The farms are r e l a t i v e l y large and d r a f t 
animals and small t r a c t o r s are f r e q u e n t l y used.. 
(3) The l i t t o r a l of the Inland Sea 
This area i s cut o f f by mountains and i s given over t o 
subsistence a g r i c u l t u r e . Rice i s the major crop but double 
cropping i s rare except i n the extreme South. I n recent 
decades the population of t h i s area has decreased. 
(4) The I n t e r i o r of Central Honshu 
The basins of the mountainous i n t e r i o r of Central Honshu 
are i s o l a t e d . A g r i c u l t u r e i s predominantly of the dry f i e l d 
type on the lower mountain slopes. The s i l k i n d u s t r y was 
r e l a t i v e l y important and s t i l l i s today, to a lesser extent. 
(5) The Kwanto P l a i n 
This p l a i n i s one of the most i n t e n s i v e l y c u l t i v a t e d 
i n Japan. Proximity to the urban market and the presence of 
a l l u v i a l terraces causes s p e c i a l i s a t i o n i n upland crops, 
e s p e c i a l l y cereals, potatoes and vegetables. 
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( 6) The P a c i f i c Coastlands s t r e t c h i n g westwards 
from Tokyo, to the Inland Sea. 
This area i s e s p e c i a l l y w e l l s u i t e d to a g r i c u l t u r e 
of the t y p i c a l Japanese v a r i e t y . The l e v e l basins along 
the coast are adapted t o r i c e c u l t i v a t i o n and can be e a s i l y 
drained f o r s u b s i d i a r y crops of barley and wheat during the 
m i l d w i n t e r . Vegetables, f r u i t and tea are grown i n s p e c i a l 
areas. 
( 7) The Margins of the I n l a n d Sea. 
This region i s even more favourable f o r a g r i c u l t u r e 
than the previous one. Mountains p r o t e c t the area from 
excessive r a i n f a l l and w i n t e r snow, while marine in f l u e n c e s 
prevent extreme changes i n temperature. Large i n d u s t r i a l 
c i t i e s provide markets to which products can be r e a d i l y 
transported by sea or canal. A l l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c Japanese 
crops can be e a s i l y c u l t i v a t e d . I n t h i s region and the 
previous one, l i v i n g conditions are most s a t i s f y i n g t o the 
Japanese. 
(8) Kyushu 
Kyushu s u f f e r s from i s o l a t i o n . Climatic d i f f e r e n c e s 
between n o r t h and south lead to a greater production of r i c e 
i n the north and of cereals and sweet potatoes i n the Upland 
f i e l d s of the volcanic southern p a r t . 
(9) The Shorelands of Kyushu and Shikoku. 
This i s the only p a r t of Japan where the double cropping 
of r i c e i s p o s s i b l e . Because of i s o l a t i o n and the small amount 
of f e r t i l e land, however, t h i s region lacks importance. 
THE MAIN CROPS ^ ) 
Rice i s s t i l l the paramount crop of Japan. I t s t i l l 
provides, according t o a recent n u t r i t i o n survey, 57 per cent 
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of the c a l o r i e s of an average Japanese d i e t . (5) Rice 
i s used by the Japanese i n a wide range of c u l i n a r y a r t s 
and the people are f a s t i d i o u s about i t s q u a l i t y . " I t ( r i c e ) 
has acquired a whole mystique of connoisseurship and given 
many metaphors to the language". (6) 
The growing of r i c e poses c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t problems. 
Japan has no word f o r f i e l d but there are two words, one t a 
means a flooded r i c e f i e l d and the other, hatake means a dry, 
upland f i e l d . About .55 per cent of the t o t a l c u l t i v a t e d 
land consists of flooded paddy f i e l d s , o f t e n fed by extensive 
i r r i g a t i o n works. Work i n the f i e l d s ranges from hand digging 
i n the smallest f i e l d s t o mechanical r o t o r c u l t i v a t o r s , which 
are becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y common. Weeding the crop i s done 
by hand-pushed hoes but hormone weed k i l l e r s are now i n wide-
spread use. Rice requires a great deal of c a r e f u l c u l t i v a t i o n 
as i t i s important to ensure an even l e v e l and a gradual change 
of water i n the r i c e f i e l d u n t i l , a f t e r the ears have formed, 
the f i e l d i s drained. Harvesting i s s t i l l done by hand but 
threshing i s u s u a l l y a mechanical process. An idea of the 
g r e a t l y improved e f f i c i e n c y of Japanese a g r i c u l t u r e can be 
gained from the f a c t t h a t Japan i s s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n r i c e 
production today i n s p i t e of losses of valuable r i c e producing 
p a r t s of her Empire, such as Korea and Formosa. 
Cereals are important i n Japanese a g r i c u l t u r e and 
wheat, barley and oats have a planted acreage of about h a l f 
t h a t of r i c e . Maize, sorghum and m i l l e t are less important 
than the previous crops but t h i s can be understood i n the 
l i g h t of Japan's r e l a t i v e l y small number of l i v e s t o c k . Among 
pulses, soya beans are most important and w i t h f i s h provide 
a high p r o p o r t i o n of p r o t e i n i n the t r a d i t i o n a l d i e t . Sweet 
potatoes, a crop capable of producing a high y i e l d of c a l o r i e s 
per acre, are grown i n the South but the normal type of potato, 
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of r a t h e r less importance, i s r e s t r i c t e d to the Northern 
p a r t s of Japan. 
Japan's i n d u s t r i a l crops, pyrethrum ( i n s e c t i c i d e ) , 
rape ( f o r o i l ) and tobacco have a combined acreage of about 
a te n t h of t h a t of r i c e . Mulberry has decreased i n importance 
since the advent of man-made f i b r e s . Tea growing i s important 
along the Southern coasts and so too i s the production of 
oranges i n t h i s region. 
THE LAND REFORM 
The land reform undoubtedly removed the worst e v i l s 
of land tenancy which we mentioned b r i e f l y i n the f i r s t h a l f 
of t h i s chapter. An outstanding change i n the country's 
a g r i c u l t u r a l l i f e was i n the r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n of farm income 
between tenant and l a n d l o r d ^ which was long overdue. The 
Staple Food A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Law of 19^2, enforced the s u b s t i t u t i o n 
of money rents f o r rents i n k i n d and i n a period of wartime 
i n f l a t i o n t h i s proved h e l p f u l t o the tenants. A f t e r the war 
when there was a chronic shortage of f o o d s t u f f s , many land l o r d s 
attempted to dispossess the tenants t o farm the land themselves. 
The Occupation A u t h o r i t i e s stopped t h i s and i n s i s t e d on a 
general change from tenant status t o peasant p r o p r i e t o r s h i p . 
Absentee landlords were completely dispossessed and landlords 
were only allowed to r e t a i n a small amount of c u l t i v a b l e land. 
"The vast and complicated t r a n s a c t i o n was almost completed by 
the end of 19^9. By June 1952 the government had acquired 
nearly 4 m i l l i o n acrea of c u l t i v a t e d land and 1 m i l l i o n acres 
of pasturage and had res o l d most of t h i s t o the former tenants. 
By t h i s process the p r o p o r t i o n of land farmed by tenants to 
the t o t a l c u l t i v a t e d area had been reduced from 46 t o about 
8 per cent. Japan had become a land of peasant p r o p r i e t o r s " . ( 7 ) 
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The Owner - Farmer Establishment Law of 19^6, which provided 
the main framework f o r the reform, provided compensation i n 
money f o r the landlords but t h i s d i d not amount t o much 
because of the e x i s t i n g i n f l a t i o n . 
The shortage of food i n the e a r l y post-war years 
brought high p r i c e s to the farmers and a g r i c u l t u r a l production 
continued to r i s e . When the Japanese i n d u s t r y began t o 
recover a f t e r the war, the problem of over-population i n 
r u r a l areas was eased by the demand f o r labour from the 
f a c t o r i e s . Japanese i n d u s t r y provided h i g h l y e f f i c i e n t 
machines f o r the farmers - f o r which there was an i n c r e a s i n g 
demand-and - provided p e s t i c i d e s and f e r t i l i z e r s . But more 
important s t i l l , i t provided a vast, l u c r a t i v e market i n the 
towns f o r farm products. Rural s o c i e t y i n Japan has been 
shaken by the post-war reforms and although the farmers are 
conservative i n outlook, they more r e a d i l y accept new ideas 
than they d i d before the war. 
The extravagant claims of the United States land 
reformers t h a t by vigour and sensible planning they had 
c a r e f u l l y remoulded a system of land tenure may be taken 
too f a r . R.P. Dore quotes one of the most capable United 
States o f f i c i a l s concerned w i t h the reform, Wolf I . Ladejinsky, 
who w r i t e s : "Without underestimating the d r i v e and s i n g l e -
mindedness of the Occupation, i t should be noted t h a t i t s 
p r i n c i p a l r o l e was t h a t of midwife to a healthy reform which 
had been i n i t s p r e - n a t a l stage. The reform idea was 
Japanese i n o r i g i n ; i t was not a p o l i c y imposed by a 
conqueror on the conquered". (8) Nevertheless the Occupation 
must be c r e d i t e d w i t h bold i n i t i a t i v e i n p u t t i n g the scheme 
through, although i t s success depended on the e f f e c t i v e 
co-operation of the Japanese bureaucracy. 
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I n s p i t e of the vast changes i n Japanese farming, 
there are s t i l l serious problems today: the size of farm 
holdings m i l i t a t e s against the e f f e c t i v e use of machinery 
and the d i v i d e d holdings hinder e f f i c i e n c y . A g r i c u l t u r e 
has been d i v e r s i f i e d and l i v e s t o c k farming i s r e l a t i v e l y 
more important today. The incomes of farm households have 
r i s e n , and although the farmer i s b e t t e r o f f , he s t i l l 
compares unfavourably w i t h the c i t y dweller i n h i s standard 
of l i v i n g . The terms of world trade have continued t o move 
i n favour of exporters of manufactured goods and against 
a g r i c u l t u r a l producers. The w r i t e r s of the book (Consider 
Japan 1) are of the opinion t h a t because of p o l i t i c a l motives, 
the Government of Japan has attempted t o keep too many farmers 
on the land. They w r i t e : "Some f o r e i g n observers i n Tokyo 
t o l d your correspondent t h a t Japan's greatest achievement i s 
th a t i t has made i t s e l f s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n r i c e , but i n f a c t 
t h i s has s u r e l y been one of the most obvious e r r o r s . It£ 
p o l i c y of a g r i c u l t u r a l support has been concentrated on 
encouraging an expanded c u l t i v a t i o n of r i c e and wheat, j u s t 
when the Japanese p u b l i c are s t a r t i n g t o eat less of the o l d 
staples and move over towards more meat and d a i r y products 
i n s t e a d . I t would be l o g i c a l f o r Japan to buy more of i t s 
r i c e from other Asian c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f i t wants 
these countries t o open t h e i r doors t o more exports of 
Japanese manufactured goods". (9) This argument i s sound 
economically but ignores p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s and perhaps, 
too, ignores the marked preference t h a t the Japanese have 
f o r home produced g r a i n over the s o f t e r r i c e from Indo-China 
and Burma. 
There are s t r i k i n g p a r a l l e l s between the problems 
fa c i n g both Japanese and B r i t i s h A g r i c u l t u r e . I n both 
c o u n t r i e s , s t r i c t l y from the p o i n t of view of economic 
\1 
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d o c t r i n e , (which i s o n l y p a r t o f the argument) fewer 
r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d be p u t i n t o a g r i c u l t u r e and more s h o u l d 
be p u t i n t o i n d u s t r y . The s t r a t e g i c problem o f p r e s e r v i n g 
a g r e a t home produced far m o u t p u t i s l e s s v i t a l i n t h e 'nuc l e a r 
age* b u t no d e m o c r a t i c a l l y e l e c t e d government, can i g n o r e t h e 
s o c i a l problems which would be caused by a d e l i b e r a t e n e g l e c t 
of a g r i c u l t u r e . The s o l u t i o n t o Japan's major problem - t o o 
many f a r m e r s on t o o l i t t l e l a n d - must come t h r o u g h t h e g r a d u a l 
t r a n s f e r o f man power t o i n d u s t r y . A g r i c u l t u r e must r e t a i n a 
r e a l f l e x i b i l i t y i n p r o v i d i n g t h e ty p e o f crop r e q u i r e d b o t h 
by i n d u s t r y and by t h e more a f f l u e n t c i t y d w e l l e r s . The 
s m a l l s i z e o f t h e farms i s uneconomic and t h i s problem i s 
even more acute t h a n i t i s i n Western Europe t o d a y , and t h i s 
no doubt, w i l l be t h e s u b j e c t f o r t h e nex t major r e f o r m i n 
a g r i c u l t u r e . 
NUMBER OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
(000^ . 
Year T o t a l F u l l Time 
P a r t 
Time 
I 
P a r t 
Time 
I I 
E s t i m a t e d number o f 
persons engaged i n 
a g r i c u l t u r e and 
f o r e s t r y . 
1935 5 ,661 4,164 1,447 14 , 1 6 0 
1940 5 , 4 8 0 3 , 7 7 1 1,709 13 ,650 
1946 5 ,698 3 ,056 1,667 974 -
1950 6 ,176 3 ,086 1,753 1,337 16 ,530 
1955 6,043 2 , 1 0 6 2 , 2 7 4 1,663 16,040 
1960 5 , 9 8 0 1,854 1,854 2 ,272 13 ,910 
1962 5 , 8 8 0 1,529 1,940 2 , 4 1 1 13 ,110 
Households c l a s s i f i e d as P a r t I are households i n which 
a g r i c u l t u r e i s th e main o c c u p a t i o n , whereas households 
C l a s s i f i e d P a r t I I are those f o r which a g r i c u l t u r e i s a 
s u b s i d i a r y o c c u p a t i o n . 
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The i n c r e a s e i n t h e number o f farm households 
( 2 1 9 , 0 0 0 ) between t h e yea r s 1935 and 1962 s h o u l d be seen 
i n t h e l i g h t o f a t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e o f 2 7 , 4 9 8 , 0 0 0 
Source: M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e and F o r e s t r y . 
A b s t r a c t o f S t a t i s t i c s . 196*)-. 
PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IN JAPAN 
Tn_ . , Soya Mandarxn „ Wheat B a r l e y „ J _ Eggs M i l k J Bean Orange 0 0 
Thous- Thous- Thous- Thous- Thous- M i l l i o n s Thousands 
ands o f ands o f ands o f ands ands o f o f t o n s 
t o n s t o n s t o n s o f to n s t o n s 
1953 8 ,239 1,374 2 , 0 9 1 429 315 5 , 1 5 0 712 
1956 10 ,899 1,375 2 , 3 ^ 0 455 427 6 ,638 1,154 
1960 12 ,858 1,531 2 , 3 0 1 418 894 9 ,559 1,887 
1963 12,812 1,716 758 318 974 15,302 2 , 7 6 9 
Source: M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e and F o r e s t r y . 
P u b l i s h e d i n S t a t i s t i c a l Survey o f Economy o f Japan, 
1964. 
Note: The g r e a t i n c r e a s e i n t h e consumption o f m i l k and 
eggs p r o b a b l y r e f l e c t s a c o m b i n a t i o n o f American i n f l u e n c e s 
on t a s t e and t h e g r e a t e r p r o s p e r i t y o f people i n t h e towns. 
There has been an i n c r e a s e i n t h e i m p o r t o f f e e d i n g s t u f f s 
( n o t shown h e r e ) and t h i s accounts f o r t h e f a l l i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n 
of b a r l e y . Rice p r o d u c t i o n shows a s l i g h t decrease, p r o b a b l y 
due t o a more v a r i e d d i e t eaten by an i n c r e a s i n g number o f 
Japanese. 
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Japan's Economic Expansion. 
G.C. A l l e n P.79 O.U.P. 1965 
I b i d . P.79 
Aspects o f Japanese A g r i c u l t u r e . N.York 1943^ 
Guy H. Smith & Dor o t h y Good based on t h e work 
o f Nasu. I n s t i t u t e o f P a c i f i c 
R e l a t i o n s 
Hokkaido: I t s Present S t a t e o f Development 
and F u t u r e P r o s p e c t s . 
F.C. Jones P.132 O.U.P. 1958 
Land Reform i n Japan. 
R.P. Dore 
I b i d 
Japan's Economic Expansion 
G.C. A l l e n . 
Land Reform i n Japan. 
R.P. Dore 
P.8 O.U.P. 1959 
P.8 
P.85 O.U.P. 1965 
P.147 O.U.P. 1959 
Consider Japan, ( c o r r e s p o n d e n t s o f t h e Economist) 
P. 78 Duckworth 1(^64 
Thousands o f 
Tons 
A g r i c u l t u r a l P r o d u c t i o n . 
106 £ 
3 , 0 0 0 
1 , 0 0 0 
Soo 
DAIRY CATTLE 
M i l k 
B a r l e y 
» thougands 
<rAP 
S l a u g h t e r e d C a t t l e 
587 
V. f 
1 • *• 
Thousands o f 
«, o o v , r T o n s 
7, (?oo 
U it>O0 
5",<?oo I — 
4 ) 0 0 0 
3, ot>o 
f,oe>o 
M S » l<K7 I9fc3 
Source: S t a t i s t i c a l Survey Of Japan 1964 
n « bo ».< «.x ts. 
Norway U.S.S.R. 
FISH CATCHES I N 1962 
China Peru Japan 
Source: Yearbook o f F i s h e r y S t a t i s t i c s 
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FISHING 
"Sh o r t on l a n d b u t l o n g on p e o p l e " , ( 1 ) i t was 
i n e v i t a b l e t h a t Japan s h o u l d . t u r n t o t h e sea t o supplement 
he r f o o d s u p p l i e s . C o n d i t i o n s o f b o t h p h y s i c a l and human 
geography f a v o u r e d t h e g r o w t h o f t h e g r e a t e s t f i s h i n g i n d u s t r y 
i n the w o r l d . 
The i s l a n d s o f Japan l i e i n t h e m i d s t o f one o f t h e 
r i c h e s t f i s h i n g areas i n t h e w o r l d . The seas around these 
i s l a n d s are areas o f convergence o f ocean c u r r e n t s o f d i f f e r e n t 
t e m p e r a t u r e s and s a l i n i t y , and t h e y are r i c h i n p l a n k t o n . 
These f a c t s , p l u s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f l a r g e areas o f t h e 
c o n t i n e n t a l s h e l f , a l l f a v o u r t h e b r e e d i n g o f f i s h . The 
Southern coast i s washed by t h e warm K u r o s h i o c u r r e n t which 
f l o w s n o r t h w a r d f r o m t h e t r o p i c s and t u r n s n o r t h eastward 
j u s t n o r t h of t h e Chiba P r e f e c t u r e t o t a k e a course a c r o s s 
t h e N o r t h P a c i f i c . The n o r t h e r n , P a c i f i c c o a s t i s under 
t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e c o l d , southward f l o w i n g Oyoshio 
("Mother C u r r e n t " ) and t h e e n t i r e west co a s t i s washed by 
t h e warm Tsushima C u r r e n t , a branch o f t h e K u r o s h i o , which 
f l o w s n o r t h o f t h e Ryuku I s l a n d s and passes t h r o u g h t h e 
Tsushima S t r a i t . I n t h e Sea o f Japan, t h e c o l d Liman 
c u r r e n t f l o w s a l o n g t h e coast o f t h e S o v i e t Union and Korea. 
Japan has t h e r e f o r e an i n c r e d i b l e v a r i e t y o f marine h a b i t a t s 
f o r f i s h , and i t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t more t h a n f o u r 
hundred k i n d s o f f i s h are caught and eaten by t h e Japanese. 
Her c o a s t l i n e , d e e p l y i n d e n t e d w i t h many bays, g i v e s p r o t e c t i o n 
t o h e r f i s h e r m e n and t h e r e l a t i v e l y s h a l l o w bays s u p p o r t 
hundreds o f s p e c i e s o f e d i b l e m o l l u s c s . Moreover t h e g r e a t 
p r e s s u r e o f r e s o u r c e s b r o u g h t about by t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f 
p o p u l a t i o n o f s m a l l c o a s t a l p l a i n s , p l u s a n a t u r a l p r e d i l e c t i o n 
f o r f i s h on t h e p a r t o f the people has made f i s h i n g an 
i m p o r t a n t i n d u s t r y . I n s p i t e o f a f i v e f o l d i n c r e a s e i n t h e 
number o f d a i r y c a t t l e between t h e y e a r s 1950 and 1963, ( 2 ) 
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t h e f a c t remains t h a t most o f t h e p r o t e i n i n t h e d i e t o f 
t h e average Japanese i s p r o v i d e d by f i s h . 
T r e w artha w r o t e b e f o r e t h e war: "Japan's f i s h i n g 
i n d u s t r y today i s a c u r i o u s c o m b i n a t i o n o f o l d t i m e i n d i g e n o u s 
methods and some o f t h e most modern methods and equipment i n 
use anywhere". ( 3 ) T h i s i s s t i l l t r u e today b u t t h e r e has 
been an i n c r e d i b l e advance i n t h e use o f t h e powered f i s h i n g 
boat i n o f f - s h o r e and d i s t a n t w a t e r s . S t a t i s t i c s about t h e 
number o f men and women engaged i n o f f - s h o r e f i s h i n g i n 
Japan a r e u n r e l i a b l e because so many v i l l a g e r s combine b o t h 
f i s h i n g and f a r m i n g , b u t i t i s p r o b a b l y t r u e t o say t h a t t h e 
number o f people engaged i n f i s h i n g has decreased c o n s i d e r a b l y 
i n t h e l a s t decade. The reasons f o r t h i s , p u t as s u c c i n c t l y 
as p o s s i b l e , a r e ( a ) t h e r i s i n g demands f o r l a b o u r i n i n d u s t r y , 
( b ) improved e f f i c i e n c y i n t h e f i s h i n g methods, ( c ) t h e use o f 
o t h e r f o o d s . 
Japan's f i s h i n g i n d u s t r y s u f f e r e d i n t h e post-war p e r i o d 
from t h e d i s l o c a t i o n and damage o f t h e war and by t h e t e r r i t o r i a l 
l o s s e s imposed upon h e r , which meant t h e l o s s o f v a l u a b l e 
f i s h i n g grounds. Her i n d u s t r y q u i c k l y r e c o v e r e d and i t s 
p r o d u c t i v i t y h e l p e d Japan t o a v e r t famine a t t h a t t i m e . Her 
main emphasis i s s t i l l on f i s h i n g h er c o a s t a l w a t e r s - almost 
80 p e r cen t o f t h e t o t a l c a t c h comes from these - b u t she has 
a s i g n i f i c a n t f l e e t which f i s h e s as f a r away as t h e South Sea. 
The a c c i d e n t which b e f e l l t h e f i s h e r m e n i n t h e r e g i o n o f t h e 
• B i k i n i ' atomic t e s t was a reminde r o f t h i s . A c o n s i d e r a b l e 
p a r t o f Japanese o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e t e s t i n g o f n u c l e a r d e v i c e s 
i n marine areas stems from t h e f e a r o f c o n t a m i n a t i n g f i s h w i t h 
r a d i o - a c t i v e f a l l o u t . The l o s s o f the r i c h f i s h i n g areas o f f 
Formosa, Korea and S a k h a l i n , c o m p l i c a t e d by i n c r e a s e d c l a i m s o f 
t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s by b o t h South Korea and t h e S o v i e t Union, 
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have been tremendous handicaps t o t h e deep-sea f i s h i n g 
i n d u s t r y . 
The b a s i c p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e Japanese as r e g a r d s f i s h i n g 
i s summed up by t h e phrase, " I f i t i s a l i v e , c a t c h i t , i f you 
c a t c h i t , eat i t ; i f you can't e at i t , use i t f o r f e r t i l i z e r . " 
T h i s b a s i c a l l y r u t h l e s s approach ?sometimes n o t u n d e r s t o o d by 
n a t i o n s who are b e t t e r o f f e c o n o m i c a l l y , has l e d t o o v e r - f i s h i n g 
i n some are a s . F i s h catches i n 1962 t o t a l l e d over s i x and a 
h a l f m i l l i o n t o n s , and now t h e Japanese government has begun 
t o a p p l y i t s e l f s e r i o u s l y t o t h e problem o f o v e r - f i s h i n g i n 
b r e e d i n g a r e a s . T h i s more reas o n a b l e a t t i t u d e may be seen 
t h i s y e a r (1965) i n t h e f a c t t h a t Japan has, f o r t h e f i r s t 
t i m e , s u b s c r i b e d t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements over whale 
f i s h i n g . Many c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g B r i t a i n and Norway have 
been s e r i o u s l y concerned a t t h e i n c r e a s i n g s l a u g h t e r o f whales 
i n t h e A n t a r c t i c and t h e main c u l p r i t s have been the S o v i e t 
Union and Japan. Japan bought a number o f w h a l i n g v e s s e l s , 
i n c l u d i n g f a c t o r y s h i p s from B r i t a i n and Norway and between 
the y e a r s 1953 and 1963 her p r o d u c t i o n o f whale o i l i n c r e a s e d 
from 5 3 , 0 0 0 t o n s t o 165 ,000 t o n s . ( 4 ) The d i s r e g a r d which 
Japan had f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement on c a t c h i n g whales 
smacked o f t h e o l d I m p e r i a l Japan, and a l t h o u g h one has t o 
remember h e r comparative s h o r t a g e o f a n i m a l and v e g e t a b l e 
o i l s and t h e f a c t t h a t she had i n v e s t e d h e a v i l y i n c a p i t a l 
equipment, t h i s t y p e o f i n t r a n s i g e n c e d i d h e r l i t t l e good i n 
w o r l d o p i n i o n . 
The c u l t i v a t i o n o f f i s h and o t h e r . a q u a t i c p r o d u c t s i s 
a v e r y o l d a c t i v i t y i n Japan. The numbers o f Japanese 
i n v o l v e d i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f clams, o y s t e r s , sea cucumbers 
and seaweed i s perhaps i n t h e r e g i o n o f 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 . The r e a r i n g 
o f carp i n r i c e f i e l d s and r e s e r v o i r s has p r o v i d e d u s e f u l f o o d 
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s u p p l i e s b u t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how these c o u l d be 
g r e a t l y expanded. F i s h i n g i s l i k e l y t o c o n t i n u e as t h e 
main source of p r o t e i n i n Japan i n t h e f o r s e e a b l e f u t u r e . 
Her man power i n v o l v e d i n f i s h i n g i s l i k e l y t o decrease 
s t i l l f u r t h e r because o f t h e demands f o r l a b o u r i n i n d u s t r y 
b u t h e r t o t a l catches need n o t n e c e s s a r i l y f a l l o f f because 
of the use o f improved t e c h n i q u e s . However, o f f shore 
f i s h i n g i s h i g h l y s p e c i a l i s e d and t h e v e r y s c a l e o f o p e r a t i o n s 
make i t heavy i n i t s demands f o r l a b o u r and t h i s may w e l l 
see a r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e . 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Japanese e x p o r t s o f t i n n e d f i s h 
and f i s h p r o d u c t s s h o u l d n o t be i g n o r e d . I n 1963, f i s h 
p r o d u c t s t o t h e v a l u e o f 3 . 7 p e r cent o f t h e t o t a l volume 
of e x p o r t s exceeded t h e v a l u e o f r a d i o s e t s which were 
e x p o r t e d . ( 3 . 5 p e r c e n t ) . ( 5 ) 
Japan, i n common w i t h most c o u n t r i e s w i t h l a r g e 
f i s h i n g f l e e t s , w i l l i n t h e f u t u r e have t o s u p p o r t more 
a c t i v e l y marine r e s e a r c h and come t o s e n s i b l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
agreements on f i s h i n g t e c h n i q u e s and quotas. Her government 
i s a c t i v e l y s u p p o r t i n g experiments i n a q u a c u l t u r e and t h i s 
c o u l d become a p r o f i t a b l e development. 
From a s t r a t e g i c p o i n t o f view, any massive p o l l u t i o n 
of f i s h i n g grounds i n a n u c l e a r war would make Japan 
v u l n e r a b l e , depending as she does so much on f i s h as a 
source o f f o o d b u t t h i s does n o t seem a r e a l source o f 
a n z i e t y t o the w r i t e r , f o r such p o l l u t i o n would o n l y be 
i n c i d e n t a l t o t h e massive d e v a s t a t i o n of her i s l a n d s , a 
much more v i t a l p r o b l e m ] 
F i s h i n g i n Japan. Case S t u d i e s i n World Geography 
Ed. R.M. H i g h s m i t h P.95 P r e n t i c e & H a l l 196' 
S t a t i s t i c a l Survey o f Economy o f Japan 1964 . 
P.12 Min. o f F o r e i g n 
A f f a i r s . 
Japan. T r e w a r t h a P.247 Methuen 1945. 
S t a t i s t i c a l Survey o f Economy of Japan. 
M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e and F i s h i n g . 
P.15 
S t a t i s t i c a l Survey o f Japan. 
E x t e r n a l Trade F i g u r e s . P.52 M i n i s t r y o f Finance 
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8 . INDUSTRIAL GEOGRAPHY 
I n economic gr o w t h Japan has o u t s t r i p p e d a l l t h e 
o t h e r major i n d u s t r i a l n a t i o n s o f t h e w o r l d . T h i s has 
been s t r e s s e d o f t e n i n t h i s work b u t so g r e a t has been 
he r p r o g r e s s , t h a t she has i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n s t o t e a c h t h e 
r e s t o f t h e w o r l d . 
Japan i s now t h e w o r l d ' s l a r g e s t s h i p b u i l d i n g n a t i o n , 
t h e l a r g e s t p r o d u c e r o f cameras and o p t i c a l goods and i s a 
l e a d i n g producer o f s t e e l , machine t o o l s , motor c a r s , 
e l e c t r o n i c s and t e x t i l e s . Her g r o s s f i x e d c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n 
reached t h e a s t o n i s h i n g l e v e l o f 3^ .7 per cent o f t h e gr o s s 
n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t i n 1 9 6 1 , or r o u g h l y t w i c e t h e l e v e l o b t a i n e d 
i n B r i t a i n . ( 1 ) Since 1959, p r o d u c t i v i t y per worker has 
r i s e n each year by an average o f 10 per c e n t . We come 
r e p e a t e d l y t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f how does she manage t o achieve 
a r a t e o f economic gr o w t h which i s more th a n t h r e e t i m e s t h a t 
o f t h i s c o u n t r y ? T h i s i s , o f course, a complex problem b u t 
u n d o u b t e d l y t h e h i g h l e v e l of e d u c a t i o n and t r a i n i n g possessed 
by t h e t o p e x e c u t i v e s i n i n d u s t r y and commerce has had an 
i m p o r t a n t p a r t t o p l a y i n t h i s . These e x e c u t i v e s are h i g h l y 
r e c e p t i v e t o new i d e a s and t h e i r h i g h l e v e l o f e d u c a t i o n , which 
more o f t e n t h a n n o t i n c l u d e s a sound t r a i n i n g i n mathematics 
and s t a t i s t i c s , h e l p s them t o und e r s t a n d i n d u s t r i a l t e c h n i q u e s 
more r a p i d l y t h a n t h e i r B r i t i s h c o u n t e r p a r t s . Japanese 
e d u c a t i o n i s h i g h l y c o m p e t i t i v e and t h e cream o f her young 
men go i n t o i n d u s t r y . I t has been e s t i m a t e d t h a t c l o s e on 
80 per cent o f her t o p i n d u s t r i a l management have had a 
u n i v e r s i t y t r a i n i n g whereas t h e f i g u r e f o r B r i t a i n has been 
e s t i m a t e d a t 35 per c e n t . 
Another v i t a l f a c t o r has been t h e comparative freedom 
from l a b o u r problems. T h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t she has been 
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completely free from them - the c o a l miners have fought 
a s p i r i t e d rear-guard a c t i o n to defend t h e i r i n d u s t r y 
from the inroads made by cheap, imported o i l - but i t i s 
true to say that the Japanese worker does not oppose 
t e c h n i c a l change and r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n . I n many ways the 
Japanese worker does not s u f f e r the f e a r s of redundancy 
which b e d e v i l s the B r i t i s h worker - c l o s e on 35 V e r cent of 
a l l Japanese workers with the l a r g e r combines are assured of 
jobs f o r l i f e . T h i s element of p a t e r n a l care has always 
been strong i n Japanese i n d u s t r y . A l l the big companies 
follow the p o l i c y of ' l i f e - t i m e commitment 1, and r e c r u i t 
90 per cent of t h e i r labour on t h i s b a s i s . I t i s unusual 
for a worker to t r a n s f e r to another firm making a s i m i l a r 
product to the one he has been helping to make, but w i t h i n 
the f i r m , t r a n s f e r i s common and r e - t r a i n i n g schemes are 
e x c e l l e n t . The long drawn out a p p r e n t i c e s h i p which 
evolved i n a l e i s u r e l y age when long s k i l l t r a i n i n g was 
e s s e n t i a l has no counterpart i n Japan. T h i s power to t r a n s f e r 
and r e - t r a i n workers i s of i n e s t i m a b l e b e n e f i t today when there 
i s such r a p i d t e c h n o l o g i c a l change i n most i n d u s t r i e s . The 
s t r u c t u r e of the Japanese trades unions i s a help r a t h e r than 
a hindrance i n t h i s as the union o r g a n i s a t i o n i s u s u a l l y 
based on the fir m and not the i n d u s t r y . 
The unions have been i n the f o r e f r o n t of p o l i t i c a l 
controversy but they do not attempt to i n t e r f e r e i n disputes 
i n p a r t i c u l a r f i r m s . Before the end of the war the Japanese 
worker was never permitted to organize f r e e l y ; the government 
and the Zaibatsu were a f r a i d of p o s s i b l e subversion and, although 
they permitted some innocuous u n i o n s , . i t i s f a i r to say that 
union a c t i v i t i e s were c a r e f u l l y c o n t r o l l e d and often suppressed. 
The Occupation poxvers i n s i s t e d that the new Japanese government 
should remove any r e s t r i c t i o n s on unions and indeed, i n s i s t e d 
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t h a t unions should be encouraged. There are two l a r g e 
f e d e r a t i o n s i n Japan, the General Council of Japanese Trade 
Unions (Sohyo) and the Japan Trade Union Congress (Zenro). 
The former i s the l a r g e r and i s m i l i t a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with 
the S o c i a l i s t P a r t y . Zenro, formed i n 1954 to p a r t l y 
counterbalance the extremism of Sohyo, i s s m a l l e r and tends 
to be more moderate i n i t s a c t i v i t i e s . 
The average Japanese worker tends to i d e n t i f y h i m s e l f 
with the fir m - and on balance, he r e c e i v e s l e s s s u p e r v i s i o n 
than h i s counterpart i n B r i t a i n , probably f o r the simple reason 
that he does not r e q u i r e i t . T h i s s i t u a t i o n i s achieved by 
the important elements of p a t e r n a l i s m and group consciousness 
that e x i s t i n the c u l t u r a l p a t t e r n of Japan. The Japanese 
wage s t r u c t u r e makes f o r a f l e x i b l e use of labour. The 
workers are not paid according to t h e i r occupations nor are 
wages based on the work output of the i n d i v i d u a l . The workers 
are paid roughly the same r a t e , no matter what job they are doing 
but, of course, t h e i r r a t e of pay, negotiated with the f i r m , 
depends upon the p r o f i t achieved by the f i r m . The worker 
r e c e i v e s y e a r l y increments and t h i s induces firms to favour 
the recruitment of the young. Rural over-population has 
always provided a source of labour but so great i s the economic 
expansion of Japan, th a t she even s u f f e r s temporary shortages 
of labour i n some i n d u s t r i e s . 
I n Japan, wages are i n c r e a s e d annually f o l l o w i n g 
n e g o t i a t i o n s between union and management i n each e n t e r p r i s e 
and once s e t t l e d , wages remain unaltered u n t i l the next round 
of n e g o t i a t i o n s . This absence of piece r a t e s avoids much 
acrimonious dispute and a l s o obviates the tendency, where-
ever piece r a t e s are used, f o r wage earnings to creep up 
between agreements on r a t e s of pay. The p r o f i t bonus and 
many f r i n g e b e n e f i t s , such as h o s t e l accommodation for the 
- 11$ -
s i n g l e , cheap canteen meals, m a r r i a g e and f u n e r a l g r a n t s , 
a l s o add g r e a t l y t o t h e r e a l wages o f t h e Japanese wo r k e r . 
The Japanese worker has b e n e f i t e d by t h i s p r o d u c t i v e upsurge 
i n i n d u s t r y b u t t h e r e are s i g n s t h a t t h e economy i s b e g i n n i n g 
t o ' o v e r - h e a t ' . N e v e r t h e l e s s i t s h o u l d be s t a t e d a t t h e 
o u t s e t t h a t w e s t e r n economists have been s a y i n g f o r t h e l a s t 
decade t h a t t h e bubble would b u r s t b u t t h e y have n o t proved 
t o be r i g h t . Japanese p r i c e s f o r her e x p o r t s have remained 
re m a r k a b l y s t a b l e b u t i n c r e a s e s i n t h e c o s t o f raw m a t e r i a l s , 
wages and l a b o u r s h o r t a g e s c o u l d w e l l b r i n g about s u b s t a n t i a l 
i n c r e a s e s i n p r i c e s . The Government o f Japan and t h e Japan 
C e n t r a l Employers F e d e r a t i o n , N i k k e r e n , have p r e s s e d f o r a 
n a t i o n a l incomes p o l i c y b u t these have u n d e r s t a n d a b l y been 
opposed by t h e unions who p o i n t out t h a t p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y , 
wage i n c r e a s e s have been a good d e a l l e s s t h a n company p r o f i t s . 
N o t h i n g s h o r t o f a balance o f payments c r i s i s (which a t l e a s t 
had some e f f e c t i n B r i t a i n ) w i l l b r i n g t h e employers and uni o n s 
i n t o some form o f agreement on t h i s . 
Japan seems t o have b e n e f i t e d from t h e f a c t t h a t u n i o n s 
have been a c t i v e o n l y f o r a c o m p a r a t i v e l y s h o r t t i m e . I n 
B r i t a i n t h e r e has been a b i g l e g a c y o f m i s t r u s t between u n i o n s 
and management which u n f o r t u n a t e l y h i n d e r s a t t e m p t s t o reach 
h i g h e r p r o d u c t i v i t y . Japanese un i o n s do have t h e i r reasons 
t o m i s t r u s t the employers b u t demarcation d i s p u t e s and m o b i l i t y 
o f l a b o u r w i t h i n t h e f i r m have n o t been $ major problems. I t 
i s g r e a t l y t o t h e c r e d i t o f t h e Japanese t h a t t h i s p r o g r e s s 
has been made i n a c o u n t r y which i s h i g h l y t r a d i t i o n a l and 
c u l t u r a l l y c o n s e r v a t i v e : t h e Japanese, t h e humble p u p i l s 
o f t h e West i n t h e e a r l y y e a r s o f t h i s c e n t u r y , have much t o 
te a c h us. 
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No s t u d y o f Japanese i n d u s t r y can a f f o r d t o i g n o r e 
t h e problems connected w i t h h e r sources o f raw m a t e r i a l s . 
A major j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r h e r e n t e r i n g a war i n 1 9 ^ 1 , and 
i n d e e d as e a r l y as 1931» w i t h t h e so c a l l e d Manchurian 
I n c i d e n t , was t h e need f o r two t h i n g s : raw m a t e r i a l s and 
m a r k e t s . I n t h e pre-war p e r i o d she was f a c e d w i t h t h e 
problem o f d w i n d l i n g m a r k e t s , o f t e n b r o u g h t about by t h e 
Western powers w i t h s t r o n g i n t e r e s t s i n A s i a and A f r i c a and 
by r i s i n g c o s t s o f raw m a t e r i a l s and p r o d u c t i o n . I n e f f e c t , 
she t r i e d t o c o n t r o l h e r d e s t i n y i n those y e a r s ; b u t she i s 
now no l o n g e r a f i r s t c l a s s power, and t o a much l a r g e r degree, 
h e r p o l i t i c a l and economic d e s t i n y l i e s beyond h e r c o n t r o l . 
Her c o m p e t i t i v e power i n i n d u s t r y , e s p e c i a l l y how t h a t she 
has p l a c e d more emphasis i n her economy on heavy i n d u s t r y 
seems t o be r e l a t i v e l y b e t t e r t h a n i t was b e f o r e t h e war. 
The dependence on t h e U.S.A. b o t h as a source o f raw m a t e r i a l s 
and as a market f o r her goods means t h a t she i s t o o s u b j e c t 
t o p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e from the U.S. b u t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
envisage a s a f e f u t u r e f o r Japan w i t h o u t e f f e c t i v e l i n k s 
w i t h t h a t c o u n t r y . The l o g i c a l s t e p would seem t o be f o r 
h e r t o o b t a i n more o f her raw m a t e r i a l s f r o m South East A s i a 
and i n r e t u r n , e x p o r t machinery, machine t o o l s and t e c h n i c a l 
'know-how* t o these c o u n t r i e s . G i n s b u r g w r i t e s : " G e o g r a p h i c a l l y 
Japan p r o v i d e s an i d e a l complement f o r t h e p r i m a r i l y a g r i c u l t u r a l 
and s l o w l y i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g c o u n t r i e s o f A s i a . For example, 
i n exchange f o r f o o d from t h e t h r e e r i c e e x p o r t i n g n a t i o n s 
o f South East A s i a - Burma, T h a i l a n d and t h e f o r m e r Indo-China 
- and i n r e t u r n f o r raw c o t t o n , r u b b e r , o r e s , v e g e t a b l e o i l s , 
and t r o p i c a l hardwoods from o t h e r t r o p i c a l Asian n a t i o n s , 
Japan can s u p p l y t h e necessary manufactured goods b o t h f o r 
immediate consumption and f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . A l s o , 
w i t h t h e independence o f these c o u n t r i e s from Western d o m i n a t i o n , 
Japan may w e l l be a b l e t o p r o v i d e many more o f those i n v i s i b l e 
account i t e m s - s h i p p i n g s e r v i c e s , b a n k i n g s e r v i c e s , i n s u r a n c e -
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t h a t were t a k e n almost c o m p l e t e l y out o f h e r hands a t t h e 
end o f t h e war. I n s h o r t , Japan can be conceived o f as 
a r e g i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l and commercial c e n t r e f o r t h e o t h e r 
A s i a n c o u n t r i e s , p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s p e r m i t t i n g " . G i h s b u r g 
goes on t o p o i n t out what Japanese i n d u s t r y c o u l d do t o h e l p 
th e development o f t h e Chinese economy and contends t h a t u n t i l 
such t i m e t h a t she has r e - e s t a b l i s h e d normal p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h Communist China she w i l l be unable t o p e r f o r m " t h e f u n c t i o n s 
t h a t h e r g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n and stage o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
d e f i n e f o r her i n East Asia." ( 2 ) These are i d e a l s t h a t 
b o t h t h e geographer and t h e economist s t r i v e f o r , b u t t h e i r 
a t t a i n a b i l i t y , i n a w o r l d s p l i t up i n t o r i g i d l y d e f i n e d 
power b l o o k s , i s i m p o s s i b l e now t h a t ' f r e e t r a d e ' i s an 
a r c h a i s m . Japanese i n d u s t r y has done i n c r e d i b l y w e l l i n 
t h e p o s t war y e a r s ; i t has shown t h a t i t has v i t a l powers 
o f c r e a t i v i t y and a d a p t a b i l i t y and t h a t t h ese key q u a l i t i e s 
w i l l ensure f u t u r e success., i I t i s n o t so much i n t h e 
i m p r e s s i v e i n c r e a s e s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y t h a t we can l e a r n f r o m 
Japanese i n d u s t r y but r a t h e r i n i t s superb a d a p t a b i l i t y t o 
changing market demands. 
Japan's changing i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e , h e r new t r a d e 
and o t h e r f a c t o r s overseas have r e s u l t e d i n a d i s t i n c t s h i f t 
b o t h i n t h e substance and d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s f o r e i g n 
t r a d e . B efore t h e war, t e x t i l e raw m a t e r i a l s accounted f o r 
32 per cent o f t o t a l i m p o r t s , and t e x t i l e s made up more th a n 
h a l f o f t h e t o t a l e x p o r t s . By 1 9 6 1 , t e x t i l e raw m a t e r i a l s 
accounted f o r o n l y 1 6 . 9 per c e n t o f t h e t o t a l i m p o r t s , w h i l e 
t e x t i l e i m p o r t s had f a l l e n t o 2 7 . 3 0 per c e n t o f t h e t o t a l 
e x p o r t t r a d e . Raw m a t e r i a l s and f u e l s s t i l l account f o r t h e 
b u l k o f Japanese i m p o r t s b u t Japan now i m p o r t s more manufactured 
goods, p a r t i c u l a r l y from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h a n she d i d b e f o r e 
th e war. There has been a sharp i n c r e a s e i n t h e i m p o r t s o f o i l , 
s c r a p i r o n and i r o n o r e , r e f l e c t i n g the i m p o r t a n c e o f Japanese 
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heavy i n d u s t r y . 
Exports of metal products, machinery and chemicals, 
which before the war amounted to an average of 16 oer cent 
of the t o t a l exports, had r i s e n by 1961 to hh per cent. ( 3 ) 
P a r t i c u l a r l y s t r i k i n g advances have been made i n the export 
of sewing machines, s h i p s , r a d i o s , cameras and t r a n s i s t o r 
r a d i o s . These goods represent good value on the world 
market and are not c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the shoddiness which 
used to marr many Japanese goods i n pre-war y e a r s . 
I n terms of d i s t r i b u t i o n , the post-war years have seen 
the d e c l i n e of A s i a as a market and the s u b s t i t u t i o n of the 
United S t a t e s f o r t h i s market. Japan's biggest s i n g l e t r a d i n g 
p a r t n e r today i s the United S t a t e s , which takes about 25 per 
cent of Japan's t o t a l exports. Japan i n turn i s the United 
S t a t e s ' second biggest customer, a f t e r Canada. I n 1 9 6 1 , 
North America accounted f o r 2 7 . 6 per cent of Japan's exports 
and hi per cent of i t s imports. A s i a took 37 per cent of 
Japan's t o t a l exports and supplied 2 5 . ^ per cent of i t s 
imports. 
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , i n view of the s i m i l a r i t y of t h e i r 
trade s t r u c t u r e , Japan's exports to European c o u n t r i e s 
accounted f o r a mere 12.5 V e r cent of her t o t a l exports. 
I n 1962 the Japanese government eased i t s very r e s t r i c t i v e 
import c o n t r o l s but i t s t i l l remains a d i f f i c u l t market f o r 
European businessmen. 
The Japanese economy has not been plagued with the 
'stop-go' phases which have been so much a featu r e of B r i t i s h 
economic development. There have been mild c r i s e s - such as 
happened i n 1961 when Japan's fo r e i g n exchange and gold r e s e r v e s 
f e l l from the £ 7 0 0 m i l l i o n l e v e l i n A p r i l to £ 5 0 0 m i l l i o n i n 
November of the same year but the t i g h t e n i n g of c r e d i t by the 
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government was e f f e c t i v e , without d r a s t i c a l l y slowing down 
economic growth. The obvious f a c t o r i n Japan, compared 
with B r i t a i n , was the ^staggering i n c r e a s e i n the p r o d u c t i v i t y 
of labour and c a p i t a l . 
Before we examine some of Japan's key i n d u s t r i e s i n 
d e t a i l we may summarise some of the main f a c t o r s i n her 
economic r e - b i r t h . They are as f o l l o w s : 
( 1 ) The s p e c i a l procurements of the United S t a t e s i n 
the Korean War, which s t i m u l a t e d i n d u s t r y and commerce. 
( 2 ) A programme of heavy c a p i t a l investment. 
( 3 ) The i n t e l l i g e n t f i s c a l p o l i c y c a r r i e d out by the 
C e n t r a l Government. 
( 4 ) The abundance of hard working and adaptable labour. 
(Between 1950 and 1963» the number of persons engaged 
i n manufacturing i n d u s t r y rose from 6 , 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 to 
1 1 , 2 9 0 , 0 0 0 ) . (k) 
( 5 ) A high standard of t e c h n i c a l education i n schools and 
u n i v e r s i t i e s . 
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IRON AND STEEL 
Japan's i r o n and S t e e l I n d u s t r y may be regarded as 
a barometer of her economic s t r e n g t h . Her post-war 
expansion i n the output of i r o n and s t e e l has been remarkable, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n view of her poverty i n the raw m a t e r i a l s of 
t h i s i n d u s t r y . Japan's output of s t e e l has now exceeded 
that of Western Germany and she ranks t h i r d i n the world, 
being exceeded by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The s u c c e s s 
of the Japanese S t e e l i n d u s t r y i s not found simply i n i t s 
massive output but i s found a l s o i n i t s t e c h n i c a l i n v e n t i v e n e s s 
and o v e r a l l e f f i c i e n c y . 
H i s t o r i c a l Background. 
I n 1887 the f i r s t b l a s t furnace i n Japan began to 
f u n c t i o n i n Kamaishi i n Northern Japan and t h i s was followed 
by the b u i l d i n g of an open hearth furnace at Yokasura Naval 
yard i n 189O. The f i r s t i n t e g r a t e d i r o n and s t e e l p l a n t was 
brought i n t o operation, under government management, i n 1 9 0 1 . 
S h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s , i m p r e s s i v e developments came i n the i n d u s t r y 
l a r g e l y because of p r i v a t e investment and these i n c r e a s e d 
g r e a t l y i n World War I . Despite the i n t e r - w a r slump, the 
Japanese s t e e l i n d u s t r y continued to expand up to the Second 
World War when the p h y s i c a l war damage to p l a n t and the 
d e s t r u c t i o n of shipping cut off s u p p l i e s of raw m a t e r i a l s 
and g r e a t l y reduced output. I n 193^ the government operated 
s t e e l p l a n t merged with s i x s t e e l makers to become the Japan 
I r o n and S t e e l Company. This company dominated Japan's 
i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y f o r the f o l l o w i n g s i x t e e n years u n t i l 
1950 when i t s p l i t i n t o two companies, the Yawata I r o n and 
S t e e l Company and the F u j i I r o n and S t e e l Company. These 
two g i a n t s with four other major companies are c a l l e d the 
"Big S i x " with a combined c a p i t a l which amounts to over 
£ 5 ? 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . I r o n and s t e e l works are widely d i s t r i b u t e d 
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throughout Japan but the huge complexes are s i t u a t e d i n 
four main a r e a s : ( 1 ) Yawata on Kuishu, ( 2 ) Kamaishi and 
Muroram i n Hokkaido ( 3 ) Tokyo-Yokohama and (k) Osaka-Kobe 
area i n C e n t r a l Japan. 
Japan has a chronic d e f i c i e n c y of i r o n ore; her 
estimated r e s e r v e s of workable ore were put a t *f0 m i l l i o n 
tons i n 1931 with an a d d i t i o n a l 40 m i l l i o n tons of low grade 
magnetite, not commercially p r o f i t a b l e to work. ( 1 ) These 
deposits are not only s m a l l but they are a l s o widely d i s t r i b u t e d 
i n h i l l y and mountainous re g i o n s . A l a r g e proportion of her 
i r o n deposits c o n s i s t s of i r o n sands, a s s o c i a t e d with former 
beach l i n e s and found now near the c o a s t s and these were 
widely e x p l o i t e d i n the l a s t war when Japan was handicapped 
by a shortage of shipping. 
Japan's f u e l resources are a l s o poor. Coal d e p o s i t s 
i n Japan are often d i f f i c u l t to work because of f a u l t i n g and 
being T e r t i a r y i n age, they contain a high percentage of ash 
and v o l a t i l e matter. The s u p p l i e d of good coking c o a l are 
inadequate and her i n d u s t r y imports 60% of i t s present day 
needs, l a r g e l y from the U.S. Her s t e e l i n d u s t r y has long 
used considerable q u a n t i t i e s of scrap s t e e l , again much of 
t h i s coming from the United S t a t e s . I n 1 9 6 1 , the i n d u s t r y 
consumed 1 7 « ^ m i l l i o n tons of scrap i r o n , of which 6 m i l l i o n 
tons came from the U.S.A. But to reduce the consumption of 
scrap i r o n , which has become s c a r c e , Japanese m i l l s are l a y i n g 
g r e a t e r emphasis on the use of oxygen top blowing converters 
which were f i r s t developed i n A u s t r i a . 
Geographers have often s t r e s s e d the f a c t t h a t the 
Japanese s t e e l i n d u s t r y was based on i n c r e d i b l y s l e n d e r r e s o u r c e s . 
I t i s no s u r p r i s e that the Japanese p o l i t i c i a n s and m i l i t a r i s t s 
were obsessed with 1he i d e a s of a s s u r i n g Japan of s u p p l i e s of 
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coking c o a l and i r o n ore from areas under her p o l i t i c a l 
c o n t r o l . The pre-war conquest of Manchuria and the war 
time occupation of the P h i l i p p i n e s and Malaya were 
considered necessary f o r any development of her i r o n and 
s t e e l i n d u s t r y . Even when we take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
the desperate p l i g h t of B r i t a i n during the f i r s t h a l f of 
the Second World War and the obvious m i l i t a r y advantages 
of s u r p r i s e a t t a c k when Japan s t r u c k the U.S.A., one i s 
staggered a t the e f f r o n t e r y of her s t r a t e g i s t s i n t a k i n g 
her i n t o an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t with a t o t a l s t e e l 
production of only seven m i l l i o n tons (plus 4 m. tons of • 
pig i r o n ) i n 194-1. 
Japan's i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y was slow i n r e c o v e r i n g 
from the s c a r s of the l a s t war. The Korean War i n 1951 
g r e a t l y a c c e l e r a t e d the growth of the i n d u s t r y and the world 
wide economic r e c e s s i o n a f t e r t h a t war had l i t t l e adverse 
e f f e c t . I n 1 9 6 1 , the i n d u s t r y r e g i s t e r e d an a l l time record; 
producing 28 .3 m« tons of crude s t e e l , 15 .8 m. tons of pig 
i r o n , 2 0 . 4 m. tons of ordinary r o l l e d s t e e l and 1.5 m. tons of 
hot r o l l e d s t e e l . Of her t o t a l s t e e l production, 60% of her 
1961 output was produced i n open hearth furnaces, 20% by 
e l e c t r i c furnaces - a s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e here - and the 
remaining 20% by converter. By 1963 Japan's crude s t e e l 
output had r i s e n to 31 »5 m. tons. ( 2 ) The l a r g e s c a l e 
production of good q u a l i t y s t e e l - e n t i r e l y competitive by 
world standards - has played a l a r g e part i n the s u c c e s s f u l 
development of Japanese s h i p b u i l d i n g and engineering. The 
success i s even more remarkable i n view of the f a c t t h a t 
Japan has such long hauls both f o r her raw m a t e r i a l s and for 
her f i n i s h e d products. The development of bulk c a r r i e r s has 
decreased the economic disadvantage of the long haul of bulky 
raw m a t e r i a l s - a three or four thousand m i l e s haul f o r i r o n 
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ore i s a commonplace i n the world today. One important 
advantage which minimizes the economic disadvantages of the 
long haul from her sources of i r o n ore i s the " l o c a t i o n a l 
advantage of having a l l of i t s l a r g e i n t e g r a t e d s t e e l m i l l s 
s i t u a t e d on the coast so t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o s t s are minimized. 
At each l a r g e i n t e g r a t e d p l a n t s h i p s of 10,000 ton c a p a c i t y 
can dock d i r e c t l y a t the b e r t h s . " (3) The post-war e r a has 
l i k e w i s e seen a g r e a t e r proportionate expansion i n s t e e l output 
i n the great engineering and s h i p b u i l d i n g areas which emphasises 
the r o l e of the l a r g e markets i n the conomics of i r o n and s t e e l . 
Japan, i s , of course, vulnerable i n her dependence on 
f o r e i g n sources f o r her i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y but, i n some 
ways, t h i s i s l e s s of a problem i n a n u c l e a r age. I t seems 
l i k e l y t h a t the huge d e s t r u c t i v e c a p a c i t y of the major world 
powers w i l l l e s s e n the l i k e l i h o o d of a world c o n f l i c t and 
t h i s i n e v i t a b l y means g r e a t e r economic s t a b i l i t y . Japan 
needs a s t a b l e economic world order. Her business-fmen have 
been n e g o t i a t i n g long term c o n t r a c t s f o r the s u p p l i e s of i r o n 
ore, e s p e c i a l l y i n p o l i t i c a l l y s t a b l e c o u n t r i e s . A u s t r a l i a 
(Consolidated Zinc and Consolidated G o l d f i e l d s ) has contracted 
to supply 82 m. tons or i r o n ore to Japan f o r £A355 m i l l i o n 
over the next 17 y e a r s . Both groups - the A u s t r a l i a n and 
the Japanese - a n t i c i p a t e an even g r e a t e r volume of t r a d e : 
Hammersley Mining Co. i n A u s t r a l i a plans to spend £30 m i l l i o n 
on developing i t s deposit ( i n c l u d i n g a 180 mile standard 
gauge r a i l w a y to the c o a s t ) and a n t i c i p a t e s an annual demand 
of 15 m i l l i o n tons of ore from Japan. Quite c l e a r l y these 
long term c o n t r a c t s i n p o l i t i c a l l y s t a b l e c o u n t r i e s are 
advantageous to Japan. 
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Summary of the I r o n and S t e e l I n d u s t r y i n Post War 
Japan 
1 . Japan was compelled to f i n d other sources f o r her raw 
m a t e r i a l s a f t e r the war and as a r e s u l t , she has applied 
h e r s e l f i n t e l l i g e n t l y to c u t t i n g t r a n s p o r t c o s t s to the 
minimum both by the use of huge ore c a r r i e r s and by high 
speed unloading at the b l a s t furnaces. 
2. By improved techniques and e x c e l l e n t o r g a n i s a t i o n she 
has emerged as one of the world's great low cost producers 
of s t e e l . 
3 . Her i n d u s t r y has shown an i n t e l l i g e n t combination of 
s t a t e planning and the f l e x i b i l i t y of p r i v a t e l y owned s t e e l 
combines. 
4 . The v a s t expansion of Japanese engineering and s h i p 
b u i l d i n g provided a s t a b l e home demand fo r s t e e l . 
The f a c t that Japan has achieved t h i s i n c r e d i b l y 
strong p o s i t i o n as a s t e e l producer i n s p i t e of tremendous 
disadvantages i s a l e s s o n to orthodox economic geographers. 
Not long ago " i t was a commonplace to a s s e r t that her l a c k of 
the e s s e n t i a l raw m a t e r i a l s and high cost of f u e l would 
i n e v i t a b l y put narrow l i m i t s on her accomplishments i n t h i s 
i n d u s t r y " ( 4 ) but she has shown the world how c l e v e r changes 
i n technique and o r g a n i s a t i o n can overcome great n a t u r a l 
disadvantages. 
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( 1 ) Economic Trade Notes No. 232(MS) dated 
May 2 1 s t 1 9 3 1 . 
William S. Dov/d. (U.S. Bureau of Foreign and 
Domestic Commerce) 
( 2 ) Japan. Trewartha. P.285 Methuen 1965 
( 3 ) I b i d . P.285 
( 4 ) Japan's Economic Expansion,. 
A l l e n . P.158 o.u.p. 1965 
126a 
JAPAN'S STEEL INDUSTRY. 
New and i n t e g r a t e d steelworks 
a f t e r 1950. 
•>>u (S 
0 
A Operating i n 1 9 6 3 
• Under c o n s t r u c t i o n 1^63 
• Planned 1963 
OKYOl 




Q INTEGRATED STEELWORKS 
STEELWORKS 
- 1 2 7 -
SHIPBUILDING 
The success of the Japanese s h i p b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y 
has been one of the outstanding f e a t u r e s of her post-war economic 
development. The period dating from 1955 has seen an i n c r e d i b l e 
expansion of the s h i p b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y whereas i n B r i t a i n , t h i s 
period has been one of depressing d e c l i n e . These completely 
contrary trends make a c l o s e examination of the Japanese 
formula for success an i n t e r e s t i n g one because the old 
p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t Japanese 'cheap labour' cannot p o s s i b l y 
account f o r t h i s s u c c e s s . Both c o u n t r i e s have sound economic 
bases f o r the development of a s h i p b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y and yet 
t h e i r development i s very d i s s i m i l a r . 
Japan was a comparative l a t e comer as a s h i p b u i l d i n g 
nation i n the modern world; i t was not u n t i l 1890 t h a t her 
f i r s t s t e e l ship was launched. Wars, e s p e c i a l l y those i n 
which she has not been too a c t i v e a p a r t i c i p a n t - such as the 
F i r s t World War and the Korean War - have acted as a great 
stimulus to Japanese i n d u s t r y . During the F i r s t World War 
when A l l i e d shipping l o s s e s were heavy, tremendous progress 
was made i n s h i p b u i l d i n g i n Japan. Her s h i p b u i l d i n g techniques 
continued to progress a f t e r the war and her yards were capable 
of b u i l d i n g s h i p s which ranged from the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
modern warship to simple f i s h i n g v e s s e l s . 
During World War I I Japanese shipyards were badly 
damaged but g e n e r a l l y speaking, the damage was p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y 
l e s s than that s u f f e r e d by other branches of her engineering 
i n d u s t r y . The Japanese merchant marine had been s h a t t e r e d 
i n the war and i n the e a r l y s t a g e s , S.C.A.P. was not i n c l i n e d 
to l e t the Japanese do much to remedy t h i s s i t u a t i o n . There 
were f o r the A l l i e d powers some d i s t u r b i n g aspects of Japanese 
pre-war marine development. I t w i l l be remembered that 
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Japanese I m p e r i a l i s m , i n s p i t e of the power of the army, 
depended on a n a v a l hegemony i n the P a c i f i c and to t h i s 
end, Japan entered the war with a most powerful navy and 
a l a r g e merchant marine. These had been the main instruments 
of her aggression and the l o s s of n a v a l supremacy i n the war 
very q u i c k l y i s o l a t e d her c o l o n i a l conquests and l e d to her 
defeat. The A l l i e d Control Government was d i s t u r b e d by 
the extreme monopolistic p o s i t i o n of heavy i n d u s t r y i n Japan 
which was epitomised by the s h i p b u i l d i n g combines and so the 
A l l i e s were ha r d l y l i k e l y to be e n t h u s i a s t i c about g i v i n g 
immediate support to t h i s i n d u s t r y . 
However, the r e a l i s a t i o n that the U.S. was going to 
need a dependable a l l y i n the P a c i f i c , e s p e c i a l l y one i n a 
p e r i p h e r a l p o s i t i o n to the Asian land mass, brought about a 
r e v e r s a l of U.S. P o l i c y . As e a r l y as 19^-8, S.C.A.P. gave 
the Japanese permission to r e b u i l d t h e i r merchant navy and 
a steady expansion of s h i p b u i l d i n g followed only to be 
s t i m u l a t e d even more by the Korean War. Japanese shipyards 
are now b u i l d i n g and s e l l i n g v e s s e l s f o r at l e a s t 10 per cent, 
and sometimes 20 per cent, l e s s than t h e i r B r i t i s h and 
European competitors. No other s h i p b u i l d i n g nation i n the 
world can compete properly with Japan and w i l d a c c u s a t i o n s 
tha t Japanese s h i p b u i l d e r s r e c e i v e massive s u b s i d i e s from the 
government or that her labour i s r i d i c u l o u s l y cheap can soon 
be disproved. The reasons f o r the s u c c e s s of Japanese 
s h i p b u i l d i n g are w e l l worth a c l o s e examination f o r not only 
do they i l l u s t r a t e some of the unique f e a t u r e s of a combination 
of competitive c a p i t a l i s m with r i g i d s t a t e planning, but they 
show p r i n c i p l e s that could be a p p l i e d to other i n d u s t r i e s with 
equal s u c c e s s . 
I t i s w e l l to remember that s h i p b u i l d e r s are e s s e n t i a l l y 
assemblers and are consequently dependent on a number of s u p p l i e r s 
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and t h i s i s the general p a t t e r n throughout the world but 
not, i t must be emphasised, i n Japan. The major s h i p b u i l d e r s 
i n Japan such as the M i t s u i and M i t s u b i s h i are g i a n t combines 
capable of producing the whole range of components i n 
s h i p b u i l d i n g . I n a s e r i e s of a r t i c l e s i n the Guardian, ( 1 ) 
Kim Willenson, Tokyo correspondent of the B r i t i s h United 
P r e s s , claimed that Japanese s h i p s were cheaper than Western 
s h i p s because of the f o l l o w i n g reasons: 
( 1 ) They are b u i l t f a s t e r * and the c a p i t a l c o s t s per ton 
are t h e r e f o r e correspondingly lower. ( 2 ) They are b u i l t 
i n volume, which means lower p r i c e s f o r m a t e r i a l s and p a r t s . 
( 3 ) They are standardised, bringing f u r t h e r savings i n f i t t i n g s 
and other a c c e s s o r i e s . ( 4 ) They are - the Japanese claim -
b e t t e r designed. T h i s , i t i s claimed, enables s h i p s to be 
b u i l t with l e s s s t e e l and s m a l l e r engines but without 
s a c r i f i c i n g speed or c a p a c i t y . ( 5 ) They are b u i l t by a 
labour force so e f f i c i e n t l y organised t h a t although i t s wages 
are on a par with those i n Europe, the labour cost i s lower 
on a per ton b a s i s . ( 6 ) T h i s labour force i s not troubled 
by i n t e r - u n i o n problems that sometimes hold up work i n B r i t i s h 
and European yards. ( 7 ) The s h i p s are b u i l t under a Government 
programme that provides no s u b s i d i e s , but maintains orders at 
a l e v e l high enough to keep the yards working e f f i c i e n t l y . 
( 8 ) They are financed at i n t e r e s t r a t e s that compare with 
those th a t European b u i l d e r s must pay, but which are between 
3 and 5 per cent cheaper than ordinary commercial borrowing 
i n Japan. He a l s o contended that t h i s i n c r e d i b l y e f f i c i e n t 
o r g a n i s a t i o n was l i k e l y to be a p p l i e d to other f i e l d s of 
i n d u s t r i a l endeavour such as s t e e l , t e x t i l e s and e l e c t r o n i c s 
with an e q u a l l y strong impact on the Western c o u n t r i e s . I n 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n of s h i p s , the Japanese were not the f i r s t to 
develop "block c o n s t r u c t i o n " but i t has now advanced to such 
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a degree i n Japan that a l a r g e yard can b u i l d a 5 0 , 0 0 0 ton 
sh i p i n three months. 
The Japanese admit that i n general her climate 
favours c o n s t r u c t i o n a l work i n the sh i p y a r d s . A second 
f a c t o r i s the development of advanced metal c u t t i n g and 
welding techniques. The Japanese s h i p b u i l d e r s have 
encouraged the s t e e l companies to develop high t e n s i l e s t e e l s 
that lend themselves to thinner c o n s t r u c t i o n and which makes 
p o s s i b l e the one-sided welding of j o i n t s . They have a l s o 
developed automatic welders which cut down manpower needs and 
have developed o p t i c a l techniques f o r p r o j e c t i n g designs 
d i r e c t l y on to metal p l a t e s awaiting f a b r i c a t i o n , thus 
e l i m i n a t i n g the cost of producing f u l l - s c a l e paper master shapes 
for p l a t e s . Recently they have begun to couple the o p t i c a l 
images through e l e c t r o n v a l v e s to computer-directed c u t t i n g 
machine torches, making p o s s i b l e v i r t u a l l y automatic production 
of p l a t e s and shapes. Another saving l i e s i n the f i e l d of 
s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n which has been most b e n e f i c i a l i n an i n d u s t r y 
which has s p e c i a l i s e d i n the b u i l d i n g of bulk c a r r i e r s and 
ta n k e r s . Japanese s h i p b u i l d e r s do undoubtedly pay l e s s f o r 
t h e i r s t e e l than t h e i r European counterparts. However, the 
s t e e l makers do not s e l l s t e e l at a l o s s f o r they are among 
the most e f f i c i e n t and cheapest producers of s t e e l i n the 
world today. This i s quite remarkable i n a country which 
has to import i r o n ore with a considerable haul and which 
l a c k s r e a l l y good coking c o a l . The Japanese s h i p b u i l d e r s 
have experimented with ship design and use con s i d e r a b l y l e s s 
s t e e l i n ship c o n s t r u c t i o n than European b u i l d e r s . Willenson 
claimed that the new p r i n c i p l e s a p p l i e d to c a r g o - v e s s e l s i n 
the 10 ,000 ton - 15 ,000 ton range have made i t p o s s i b l e to 
b u i l d s h i p s that c r u i s e a t 20 knots on the same amount of 
power required f o r an ordinary s h i p to s a i l a t 14 . T h i s 
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c l a i m does seem a l i t t l e extravagant and I am r e l i a b l y -
assured by a B r i t i s h ship designer that t h i s i s quite 
impossible J 
An e q u a l l y potent f a c t o r which has l e d to the success 
of the Japanese s h i p b u i l d e r s has been the f a c t t h a t j u s t as 
much e f f o r t has been put i n t o shipyard a r c h i t e c t u r e as has 
been put i n t o ship design. M i t s u i has under c o n s t r u c t i o n 
a yard outside Tokyo i n which m a t e r i a l w i l l move i n a s t r a i g h t 
l i n e from a r e c e i v i n g dock through f a b r i c a t i n g sheds and 
assembly shops, d i r e c t l y to two b u i l d i n g docks, each capable 
of berthing a 150 ,000 ton v e s s e l . The company says t h a t 
the yard e v e n t u a l l y w i l l be used to b u i l d l a r g e tankers i n 
s e l f contained h a l v e s that can be joined i n the water a f t e r 
launching, thus reducing s t i l l f u r t h e r the time such v e s s e l s 
w i l l spend on the s l i p w a y s . 
The Japanese say the average shipyard worker earns 
about £ 1 7 - 1 0 s . a week but he a l s o obtains valuable f r i n g e 
b e n e f i t s i n most yards. A bachelor u s u a l l y l i v e s i n a 
company dormitory where he pays a rent of about 5 s . a week. 
The worker might be provided with a f l a t at a low r e n t a l and 
he - and h i s family - can r e l y on f r e e medical treatment from 
the company. The sma l l yards do not provide the same 
extensive f r i n g e b e n e f i t s and g e n e r a l l y speaking, the l a r g e r 
the company the wider range of b e n e f i t s . The Japanese c l a i m 
that t h e i r workers are l e s s c o n servative than European and are 
quite ready to accept new methods and procedures. The unions 
i n the i n d u s t r y are i n d u s t r i a l i n o r g a n i s a t i o n and t h i s r e a l l y 
i s a great advantage. Modern unions developed i n Japan a f t e r 
the Second World War and there was no previous background of 
c r a f t s e p a r a t i o n or g u i l d o r g a n i s a t i o n ; consequently Japan 
has not been troubled by the demarcation disputes which have 
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been a fea t u r e of B r i t i s h s h i p b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
Japan, too, has l o s t l e s s time from s t r i k e s i n her s h i p b u i l d i n g 
i n d u s t r y than any other s h i p b u i l d i n g n a t i o n . I n f a c t , 
Willenson gi v e s such an i m p r e s s i v e record of success on a l l 
f r o n t s t h a t i t makes depressing reading f o r us i n B r i t a i n . 
I t may w e l l be however, that the w r i t e r i s a l i t t l e too 
laudatory i n h i s p r a i s e s of Japanese s h i p b u i l d i n g . I t i s 
a mistake to assume that the p a t e r n a l i s m of Japanese management, 
which seems to stem from the humane q u a l i t i e s of a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l 
p a s t , n e c e s s a r i l y brings about harmonious r e l a t i o n s between 
management and labour. Reifthauer has pointed out : " I n d u s t r i a l 
labour and management a l s o view each other with a degree of 
s u s p i c i o n and h o s t i l i t y that i s almost unknown i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d West today, although i t was common there a 
few decades ago". (2) Government departments and the 
l e a d i n g businessmen have, however, achieved a very f r u i t f u l 
form of co-operation. Japan has married the v i r t u e s of 
long range government planning with those which come from 
the e f f i c i e n c y of c a p i t a l i s m . 
The Japanese have pioneered the most recent developments 
i n s h i p b u i l d i n g , ranging from the b u i l d i n g of huge tankers to 
a c l e v e r l y devised system of ship surgery which i n c r e a s e s the 
cargo c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y of e x i s t i n g s h i p s . But s e v e r a l of 
the nineteen l e a d i n g s h i p b u i l d e r s , which account f o r 90% of 
the s h i p s b u i l t i n Japan, have entered new f i e l d s of a l l i e d 
i n d u s t r y i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of a p o s s i b l e d e c l i n e i n demand f o r 
s h i p s . Japanese experience i n world trade has been b i t t e r 
and she can expect r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n by Western Governments 
to help t h e i r own s h i p b u i l d e r s . The Japanese s h i p b u i l d e r s 
have s t a r t e d a widely d i v e r s i f i e d i n d u s t r i a l expansion; these 
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s h i p b u i l d e r s ©ow produce b u l l d o z e r s , motor c a r s and l o r r i e s , 
a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery and p r e f a b r i c a t e d b u i l d i n g s . T h i s 
planning g i v e s some i d e a of the r a r e dynamism of Japanese 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . 
Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e i n the Japanese 
s h i p b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y has been the s u c c e s s f u l estimate of the 
type of s h i p s i . e . the huge b u l k . c a r r i e r s and tankers which 
would be required by world commerce and then the planning on 
t h e i r c o n s t r u c t i o n with r a r e e x p e r t i s e . They appear to have 
had a b e t t e r sense of o v e r a l l planning than many Western 
s h i p b u i l d e r s and the present s t a t e of t h e i r order books i s 
proof of t h i s . 
Apart from the lower c o s t s of c o n s t r u c t i o n of s h i p s 
and a c c u r a t e l y f u l f i l l e d d e l i v e r y dates, the Japanese have 
app l i e d themselves to reducing the manning of t h e i r new s h i p s . 
David F a i r h a l l , the Shipping Correspondent of the Guardian, 
somewhat a c i d l y pointed out i n the midst of the B r i t i s h Seaman's 
s t r i k e that Japan's f i r s t 200 ,000 ton tanker would have a crew 
of twenty-nine compared with the crew of f o r t y - t h r e e on 
B r i t a i n ' s f i r s t 100 ,000 ton tanker. ( 3)The message f o r our 
s h i p b u i l d e r s i s c l e a r : We must study Japanese innovations 
and methods and i n p a r t i c u l a r , we must shake o f f conservatism 
and attempt to c r e a t e a more dynamic i n d u s t r y . At l e a s t the 
B r i t i s h Government i s now beginning to accept i t s r o l e i n the 
i n d u s t r y and as a r e s u l t of a recent: 'Government i n s p i r e d 
report - the Geddes Report - considerable mergers have begun 
to take p l a c e , which, i t i s a n t i c i p a t e d , w i l l give g r e a t e r 
economies of s c a l e . 
- -
Guardian. January 1 5 t h 19&5* 
Japan: Past and Present. 
Edwin Reischauer. P.250 Duckworth 1964. 
Guardian, Tuesday, 3 1 s t May 1966. 
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THE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES 
The very mention of Japanese t e x t i l e s evokes f e e l i n g s 
of resentment among the older generation i n B r i t a i n today. 
There are memories of c u t - t h r o a t Japanese competition i n the 
A f r i c a n and Asian markets i n the twenties and t h i r t i e s i n 
which the Japanese, with t h e i r low labour c o s t s , were a t a 
great advantage. There are accounts, some of them apocryphal, 
of the brazen copying of B r i t i s h p a t t e r n s by Japanese t e x t i l e 
d e s i g n e r s . A l l these conspired to deepen the economic malaise 
of the B r i t i s h t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y . However, the s t o r y i s anything 
but one of u n p a r a l l e l e d expansion i n the production of 
Japanese t e x t i l e s . The Japanese had experience of a b i t t e r , 
widespread d i s t r e s s both i n r u r a l and urban areas as a r e s u l t 
of the c o l l a p s e of the s i l k market i n the United S t a t e s and 
the C o l o n i a l powers did not h e s i t a t e to use the t a r i f f and the 
quota to p r o t e c t t h e i r markets a g a i n s t Japanese imports i n 
the t e r r i t o r i e s which they c o n t r o l l e d . 
Within the Japanese economy, the g r e a t e s t emphasis i n 
the post war period - as i n the t h i r t i e s - has been on heavy 
i n d u s t r y a t the expense of l i g h t . But i t should not be assumed 
that the t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y i s r e l a t i v e l y unimportant i n Japan. 
T e x t i l e production s t i l l employs more workers than any other 
i n d u s t r y . ( 1 ) Although the production of rayon i n c r e a s e d 
i n the decade a f t e r the war, f a r more than cotton or wool, 
pride of pl a c e from 1955 onwards must be given to the 
s y n t h e t i c t e x t i l e s . A major change i n a l l branches of the 
t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y has been the change i n markets; the main 
Japanese market today i s the home market. 
The S i l k I n d u s t r y 
The s i l k i n d u s t r y , although i t i s a much more e f f i c i e n t 
i n d u s t r y than i t was before the war, has s u f f e r e d permanently 
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from the competition of man-made f i b r e s . S i l k production 
i n 1963 was l e s s than h a l f t h a t of 1937. During the l a s t 
war, the production of s i l k f e l l d r a s t i c a l l y as a r e s u l t of 
a p o l i c y of uprooting mulberry t r e e s to provide space f o r 
food crops and to a l e s s e r extent, from the d e s t r u c t i o n of 
plant which ad v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d the r e e l i n g branch of the 
i n d u s t r y . I n view of the v i r t u a l c o l l a p s e of the U.S. market 
f o r s i l k i t i s perhaps s u r p r i s i n g to f i n d a post-war production 
as high as i t i s , e s p e c i a l l y as the s i l k i n d u s t r y was very 
much an 'export' i n d u s t r y i n pre-war y e a r s . * The answer to 
t h i s question l i e s i n the high home consumption of s i l k and 
i n a g r e a t e r t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y of the i n d u s t r y . A f u r t h e r 
f a c t o r m i l i t a t i n g a g a i n s t Japan's success i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
trade i n s i l k has been the e f f e c t i v e entry of Communist China 
i n t o the world market. I n more recent years the competition 
fo r land f o r a l t e r n a t i v e uses has i n e v i t a b l y i n c r e a s e d the 
co s t s of the cocoon producers. Labour c o s t s have a l s o 
i n c r e a s e d because the a g r i c u l t u r a l labour supply has moved 
from a condition of s u r p l u s to one of s c a r c i t y . Both the 
cocoon production s i d e of the i n d u s t r y and the r e e l i n g s i d e 
have experienced the use of new techniques. I n the case of 
the l a t t e r , automatic r e e l i n g machines have brought improvements 
both q u a n t i t a t i v e l y and q u a l i t a t i v e l y i n the s i l k produced. 
P r o f e s s o r A l l e n , i n h i s recent work on the post-
war Japanese economy, points out that apart from the t e c h n i c a l 
changes i n the i n d u s t r y , there have a l s o been important 
s t r u c t u r a l changes i n the i n d u s t r y . Before the war the 
optimum s i z e d f i l a t u r e was one with 150 to 300 b a s i n s " f o r 
t h i s type of establishment was able to secure economies of 
s c a l e and a l s o to e x e r c i s e s u f f i c i e n t s u p e r v i s i o n over cocoon 
s u p p l i e r s to ensure uniformity i n m a t e r i a l s . ( 2 ) 
* I n 1955 home consumption of s i l k equalled the pre- i irar l e v e l . 
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There were very few l a r g e firms owning a number of m i l l s 
i n the pre-war period but there was a consid e r a b l e number 
of hand r e e l e r s who could always concentrate on food 
production i n hard times. The medium s i z e d f i r m of pre-
war days has been the main c a s u a l t y i n the post-war e r a . 
The hand r e e l e r who perhaps h i r e d a few part-time workers 
was not a f f e c t e d by the p r o v i s i o n s of the Labour Standards 
Law but i n time, even he has had to give way to the l a r g e 
s c a l e producers. The medium producer has been unable to 
use the h i g h l y expensive machinery to e f f e c t i v e l y combat 
i n c r e a s e d labour c o s t s and so has gone to the w a l l . I n 
1960, over four f i f t h s of a l l raw s i l k was produced by 
220 f u l l y mechanized m i l l s , most of them owned by l a r g e 
concerns. 
The Cotton I n d u s t r y 
Before the war, the main markets f o r Japan's cotton 
goods were i n A s i a . Even then, the t h r e a t of e f f e c t i v e 
competition from Indian m i l l s was growing and t h e i r p o s i t i o n 
was strengthened i n the war y e a r s . Besides the l o s s of 
most of the market i n I n d i a , the former market i n China -
which had been quite s i g n i f i c a n t - was completely l o s t i n 
the post-war period. I n Japan today the home market i s 
e a s i l y the most important, which i s har d l y s u r p r i s i n g i n 
view of Japan's v a s t population and her r e l a t i v e l y high 
standard of l i v i n g . 
As i n the case of the s i l k i n d u s t r y there have been 
important changes i n the s t r u c t u r e of both the cotton and 
the s y n t h e t i c f i b r e i n d u s t r i e s . The pre-war cotton i n d u s t r y 
was c o n t r o l l e d by a few i n t e g r a t e d m i l l s which combined both 
the spinning and weaving processes and by s p e c i a l i s t spinning 
and weaving firms which were quite s e p a r a t e . T h i s very 
complex o r g a n i s a t i o n was f l e x i b l e and w e l l s u i t e d to the 
pre-war markets. During the war, the Japanese Government 
i n s i s t e d on amalgamation of f i r m s , and although t h i s did 
not mean there was any r e a l i n c r e a s e i n i n t e g r a t e d firms 
i t did mean that both spinning and weaving firms became 
much bigger, i n an e f f o r t to capture economies of s c a l e . 
The S.C.A.P. Control, favoured the l a r g e u n i t s i n the 
i n d u s t r y , (not of the s i z e of the M i t s u i combines) 
presumably because of convenience i n d e a l i n g with fewer 
u n i t s , but a f t e r the Korean war when Japanese i n d u s t r y 
g e n e r a l l y was beginning to recover, there emerged a s i t u a t i o n 
a l i t t l e more i n keeping with the pre-war p a t t e r n . i n cotton 
t e x t i l e s . There were now more s p e c i a l i s t spinning and 
weaving firms than there had been. T h i s d i d not mean 
that the l a r g e firms disappeared - i n f a c t these firms 
often entered the man-made f i b r e i n d u s t r y i n an impre s s i v e 
s c a l e , besides continuing to produce cotton goods. For 
i n s t a n c e , "The Tokyo Spinning Company i n 19^2 was one of 
three l e a d i n g firms i n the spinning and weaving s e c t i o n of 
the cotton i n d u s t r y . Apart from i t s output of cotton yarn 
and f a b r i c s , i t was one of the l a r g e s t producers of woollen 
and worsted yarn woollen f a b r i c s , rayon filament, s t a p l e 
f i b r e , and spun-rayon yarn, and i t has l a r g e l y taken up 
the manufacture of s y n t h e t i c goods." ( 3 ) 
S y n t h e t i c F i b r e s 
The major producers of s y n t h e t i c f i b r e s have t e c h n i c a l 
agreements with overseas firms engaged i n the production of 
these f i b r e s , f o r i n s t a n c e I . C . I . L t d . , have an agreement 
with T e i j i n . The l a t t e r combine concentrated on rayon 
production before the war but now i s concerned almost 
e x c l u s i v e l y with the production of s y n t h e t i c f i b r e s . Since 
the war, s y n t h e t i c t e x t i l e s have grown i n importance and next 
to the U.S., Japan leads the world i n chemical f i b r e output, 
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accounting f or one s i x t h of t o t a l world's production i n 1 9 6 1 . 
Her production of chemical f i b r e s i n 1961 amounted to 
599iOOO tons while the production of cotton yarn was 551 ,000 
tons. ( 4 ) 
Woollen and Worsted I n d u s t r y 
The output of wool yarn i n 1963 was more than double 
that of the peak pre-war years but exports of woollen c l o t h 
today are l i t t l e more than they were before the war. The 
more a f f l u e n t Japanese, who have been c o n s i s t e n t l y f o llowing 
Western s t y l e s of d r e s s , have g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d the home 
consumption of wool i n the post-war y e a r s . As i n the West, 
there has been an i n c r e a s i n g use of s y n t h e t i c f i b r e s i n 
combination with wool. 
Summary 
Although, the t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y i s assuming a 
pr o p o r t i o n a t e l y d e c l i n i n g r o l e i n the economy, as the 
emphasis s h i f t s from a l i g h t to a heavy i n d u s t r i a l base, 
the general p i c t u r e i s one of a health y , f l e x i b l e i n d u s t r y . 
With i t s dependence on a more a f f l u e n t home market, the 
i n d u s t r y i s not as vulnerable to a trade r e c e s s i o n as i t 
was before the war. Much of the equipment i n Japanese m i l l s 
was destroyed i n the war and consequently there has not been 
the e f f o r t to st r u g g l e on with i n e f f i c i e n t machinery. The 
main sources of raw m a t e r i a l s , wool from A u s t r a l i a , cotton 
from the U.S. and o i l from the Middle E a s t , are - apart from 
the l a s t - r e l a t i v e l y r e l i a b l e . The great tragedy i s that 
so many m i l l i o n s of people i n A s i a could b e n e f i t from the 
products of Japanese m i l l s but they are debarred from doing 
so because of the i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s which e x i s t between 
n a t i o n s . 
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1 ,168 ,090 people were employed i n the 
t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y i n 1 9 6 1 . 
( M i n i s t r y of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade and In d u s t r y 196^) 
Japan's Economic Expansion 
G.C. A l l e n P.119 O.U.P. 1965 
Japan's Economic Expansion. 
G.C. A l l e n P.128 O.U.P. 1965 
I b i d . P.128 
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FUEL AND ENERGY RESOURCES 
Although Japan i s r e l a t i v e l y worse o f f than most of 
the other major i n d u s t r i a l nations of the world with regard 
to energy resources, her p o s i t i o n i n t h i s r e s p e c t i s by no 
means as depressing as many geographers would suggest. Her 
c o a l deposits are mainly of T e r t i a r y o r i g i n , of a low bituminous 
q u a l i t y and are often found i n t h i n , broken seams but neverthe-
l e s s , they are quite considerable i n extent. Japan's 
u t i l i z a t i o n of h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power i s considerable and i s 
exceeded by only two n a t i o n s , the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. 
Her o i l resources are s l e n d e r but so indeed are those of 
B r i t a i n , West Germany and France a l l of which are major 
i n d u s t r i a l powers. Before we go on to examine her energy 
resources i n d e t a i l we may elaborate on the guarded optimism 
contained i n t h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y paragraph. 
At the present time there i s on the world market a 
r e l a t i v e abundance of cheap o i l and the g e o l o g i s t s maintain 
t h a t world r e s o u r c e s , pre-supposing a continued i n c r e a s e i n 
world consumption of o i l , seem to be adequate f o r the next 
f i f t y years or so. I f there i s no war i n the major o i l 
producing a r e a s , which are admittedly none too s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l l y , 
i t would seem that the future prospects of a widespread use of 
n u c l e a r power and n a t u r a l gas i n t h i s century are s u f f i c i e n t 
to ensure that adequate q u a n t i t i e s of o i l w i l l appear on the 
world market f o r some time to come. Japanese i n d u s t r y has 
a v a i l e d i t s e l f of these s u p p l i e s of cheap o i l i n f u l l measure. 
Her l e a d i n g economists and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s have looked at the 
problem with a r u t h l e s s c l a r i t y , a q u a l i t y which has c h a r a c t e r i z e d 
a good deal of her post-war economic t h i n k i n g , and have committed 
Japan to a massive use of o i l i n her economy. The use of the 
super tanker, which was l a r g e l y her i n v e n t i o n and f u r t h e r 
emphasis on c o a s t a l l o c a t i o n of i n d u s t r y are a l l evidence of t h i s . 
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She has d e l i b e r a t e l y grappled with the problem of running down 
her high cost c o a l production i n a vigorous way and yet t h i s 
deep economic and s o c i a l problem has s t i l l to be faced i n the 
major Western c o u n t r i e s . 
The c u t t i n g back of her c o a l production has caused much 
b i t t e r n e s s and i n d u s t r i a l unrest but she has f a i r l y and 
squarely faced the problem tha t a country, forced to s e l l 
her products i n a very competitive world market, must use the 
cheapest forms of power. Her c o a l production reached a post-
war peack of 6 5 . 7 m i l l i o n tons i n 1961 but has d e c l i n e d by an ' 
annual average of 2 m i l l i o n tons s i n c e that y e ar. ( 1 ) I n 
B r i t a i n , where there are much more a c c e s s i b l e high q u a l i t y c o a l s , 
the r e l a t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y of the use of cheap o i l i n many 
i n d u s t r i e s i s not as great as i t i s i n Japan but n e v e r t h e l e s s 
the use of o i l , not burdened by any form of tax, as opposed to 
c o a l , would represent a net economic gain f o r thos i n d u s t r i e s . 
The problem i n B r i t a i n c o n s t i t u t e s a much wider s o c i a l problem 
than i t does i n Japan but a l l the same the use of c o a l i n 
B r i t i s h I n d u s t r y has cuased much cloudy t h i n k i n g . 
An e n e r g e t i c Chairman of the N a t i o n a l Coal Board has 
not been an unmixed b l e s s i n g B r i t a i n . A l e a d i n g newspaper 
quoted Lord Eobens as saying th a t a j o i n t crusade of the 
National Coal Board and the Atomic Energy Authority could lead 
to the v i r t u a l e l i m i n a t i o n of o i l as a major source of energy 
f o r B r i t a i n ' s i n d u s t r y . ( 2 ) The l o g i c and purpose of t h i s 
a l l i a n c e i s d i f f i c u l t to see because at the same time he 
admitted that the most advanced c o a l - f i r e d power s t a t i o n could 
produce a u n i t of e l e c t r i c i t y f or 0 .5^d while the new, second 
generation, advanced gas-cooled r e a c t o r could produce the same 
f o r 0 . 4 9 d . O i l r e p r e s e n t s a reasonably cheap f u e l which can 
be e a s i l y transported and has c l e a r economic advantages over 
c o a l as a f u e l . When B r i t a i n ' s competitors i n world markets 
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are making an i n c r e a s e d use of o i l i t would seem unwise f o r 
B r i t a i n to be over-dependent on c o a l . 
G e o - p o l i t i c i a n s are very much aware of Japan's vulnerable 
p o s i t i o n i n world trade and r e a d i l y point out th a t Japan's 
i n a b i l i t y to c o n t r o l the P a c i f i c Ocean was a major f a c t o r i n 
her downfall i n the l a s t war. Geographers have often s t r e s s e d 
the weakness i n the economy which stems from Japan's l a c k of 
home based raw m a t e r i a l s and f u e l . But i n t h i s r e s p e c t 
Japan i s l i t t l e i n f e r i o r to B r i t a i n and indeed other s i g n i f i c a n t 
European i n d u s t r i a l powers. By v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t Japan 
l a c k s huge t e r r i t o r i e s and a l a r g e measure of economic s e l f 
s u f f i c i e n c y she f i n d s h e r s e l f out of the 'league, of the super 
powers' but few nations have the p o t e n t i a l to a s p i r e to member-
ship of t h i s e x c l u s i v e league. Japan can import f u e l and raw 
m a t e r i a l s r e l a t i v e l y cheaply and her weaknesses are probably 
great viewed only i n pre-war s t r a t e g i c terms. The advent of r 
n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y must reduce the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of world c o n f l i c t 
but i f a c o n f l i c t did occur i t would be a t e r r i b l e prospect 
f o r n ations which import such huge s u p p l i e s of raw m a t e r i a l s . 
However, i f there should be a n u c l e a r war then the prospect f o r 
nations such as B r i t a i n and Japan with tremendous d e n s i t i e s of 
population and concentration of i n d u s t r y would be w e l l nigh 
hopeless. 
O i l Production 
The domestic output of petroleum i n Japan i s l e s s than 
two per cent of her t o t a l annual consumption. Her known 
deposits are concentrated p r i m a r i l y i n North Western Honshu 
i n N i i g a t a , Yamagata and A k i t a Ken. Japan has been subjected 
to an i n t e n s i v e g e o l o g i c a l survey and there would seem to be 
l i t t l e prospect of a major f i n d ' i n e i t h e r n a t u r a l gas or o i l . 
Perhaps i t i s l e s s p o s s i b l e to be dogmatic about the former 
as has been seen i n Holland, where the extent of her n a t u r a l 
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gas f i e l d i n GrBnigen s u r p r i s e d many people, but there seem 
to be few grounds f o r optimism i n Japan. Japan has w i s e l y 
b u i l t most of her o i l r e f i n e r i e s i n Japan Proper which 
obviously g i v e s her more freedom i n choosing the source of 
her o i l imports but any move by the major o i l producing 
c o u n t r i e s to i n s i s t on o i l r e f i n i n g i n t h e i r own t e r r i t o r i e s 
would present her with an awkward problem. A good deal of 
Japanese a a p i t a l has been i n v e s t e d i n the P e r s i a n G u l f area 
and to a much s m a l l e r extent i n Sumatra i n Indonesia. 
Wood 
Wood i s one of Japan's major energy sources. The 
c h a r c o a l stove p l a y s an important p a r t i n the Japanese way 
of l i f e and Japan i s w e l l endowed with timber, most of her 
f o r e s t s being extremely w e l l run. "About 21 per cent of the 
t o t a l energy i n thermal e q u i v a l e n t s , produced i n Japan, i s 
derived from wood. Almost every v i l l a g e i n Japan has i t s 
l o c a l source of fuelwood. Thousands of c h a r c o a l k i l n s are 
found throughout the country and even i n the markets of the 
l a r g e s t c i t i e s bundles of faggots or of c h a r c o a l are a 
conspicuous a r t i c l e of commerce." ( 3 ) Most of the f u e l 
i s derived from coppice stands which are not s u i t a b l e f o r 
timber production. These coppice stands, which account f o r 
about 35 per cent of a l l productive f o r e s t s , are i n c r e a s i n g 
at the expense of t a l l timber as the demands for coppice wood 
are exceeding t h e i r n a t u r a l reproduction r a t e . I n the towns, 
however, the e l e c t r i c stove i s becoming more common i n the 
Japanese home and i t seems l i k e l y that the use of c h a r c o a l 
w i l l decrease i n the f u t u r e . 
Coal and L i g n i t e 
Coal i s s t i l l an important source of energy i n Japan 
and i t i s s t i l l second i n importance to o i l . Before the Second 
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World War the annual production of c o a l was more than 
50 m i l l i o n tons, but there was a marked decrease i n 
production i n the immediate post-war period, p a r t l y 
because of general i n d u s t r i a l d i s l o c a t i o n and p a r t l y 
because of the repatriation of Chinese and Korean miners 
which has r e s u l t e d i n a diminished labour f o r c e . The 
pre-war l e v e l of production was a t t a i n e d i n the l a t e 1950's 
but c o a l production has always been d i f f i c u l t because of t h i n , 
crooked seams and the problem of water i n the p i t s . She has 
a marked shortage of good coking c o a l and s t i l l imports much 
of t h i s . 
The two major regions of c o a l production are northern 
Kyushu and western Hokkaido. The northern part of Kyushu 
produces about 55 per cent of the t o t a l n a t i o n a l production, 
much of which i s consumed i n that a r e a or i s transported by 
c o a s t e r s to the eastern end of the I n l a n d Sea. Hokkaido 
contains considerable r e s e r v e s of c o a l and at the present 
time accounts f o r about one t h i r d of the t o t a l n a t i o n a l 
production. The main Hokkaido mines are i n West C e n t r a l 
p a r t s of the i s l a n d at I s h i k a n but there are workable 
deposits of c o a l i n the east near the port of Kushiro. Most 
of the c o a l produced i n Hokkaido i s sent to the towns of 
Northern Honshu and the i n d u s t r i a l areas of Kanto, the Nobi 
p l a i n and as f a r as the E a s t e r n Sea. 
A t h i r d f i e l d , the Joban F i e l d i n north e a s t e r n Honshu 
provides most of the c o a l which i s consumed i n Tokyo. Shikoku, 
however, l a c k s c o a l d e p o s i t s . The l o s s of S a k h a l i n (Karafuto) 
was a major l o s s to Japan as t h i s produced almost 14 per cent of 
her t o t a l c o a l production before World War I I . About one and a 
h a l f m i l l i o n tons of l i g n i t e are mined i n Japan and t h i s i s 
e i t h e r used f o r domestic f u e l or i s used i n the thermal power 
s t a t i o n s . The deposits of l i g n i t e are widely s c a t t e r e d through-
out Japan. 
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Japan made the mistake i n the post-war years of an 
attempted autarky; f o r some time she spent v a s t sums 
inducing her i n d u s t r i e s to use Japanese c o a l i n s t e a d of 
switching to more modern e f f i c i e n t forms of energy. But 
the Government has a l t e r e d t h i s p o l i c y i n r e c e n t y e a r s , 
a l b e i t at the cost of v i o l e n t s t r i f e and s t r i k e s i n the c o a l 
mining a r e a s . "Japan's planners now appear to recognise that 
c o a l mining i s one of the primary i n d u s t r i e s t h a t should be 
run down p r e t t y r u t h l e s s l y as r e s e r v e s switch more and more 
i n t o manufacturing i n d u s t r y " ( k ) 
E l e c t r i c Power 
The combined output of e l e c t r i c i t y , both thermal and 
h y d r o - e l e c t r i c , has t r e b l e d s i n c e the beginning of World War 
I I (See Table 2 ) . This i s due p a r t l y to an i n c r e a s e i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l use of e l e c t r i c i t y but, i n common with other c o u n t r i e s 
with a reasonably high standard of l i v i n g , the extensive use of 
domestic appliances has brought about a g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d 
consumption. 
Japan i s w e l l s u i t e d for the generation of h y d r o - e l e c t r i c 
power; she has abundant r a i n f a l l , although the s e a s o n a l 
v a r i a t i o n i n r a i n f a l l p resents problems, and her t e r r a i n i s 
mountainous. I n g e n e r a l , she l a c k s n a t u r a l water storage 
f a c i l i t i e s and i n areas which l a c k winter r a i n f a l l , t h i s 
seasonal v a r i a t i o n presents a great problem. The t y p i c a l 
Japanese i n s t a l l a t i o n c o n s i s t s of a low dam that d e f l e c t s 
water i n t o twin penstocks. These penstocks c a r r y water down 
the mountain s l o p e s , sometimes through s i z e a b l e t u n n e l s , and 
thence i n t o the p l a n t i t s e l f . "Such i n s t a l l a t i o n s are known 
are known as "run of stream" p l a n t s and are r e l a t i v e l y uncommon 
i n the U.S.A. , f o r example, where storage f a c i l i t i e s are planned 
f o r and constructed." ( 5 ) Most of the Japanese h y d r o - e l e c t r i c 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s are s m a l l . Of some 1,^50 h y d r o - e l e c t r i c s t a t i o n s 
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i n the country, 88 per cent have an i n s t a l l e d c a p a c i t y of 
l e s s than 1,000 k i l o w a t t s . There are few r e a l l y great 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s and these are s i t u a t e d i n C e n t r a l Honshu. 
A good point which emerges from t h i s widespread d i s p e r s a l 
of hydro e l e c t r i c p l a n t throughout the country i s that few 
p a r t s of Japan are without e l e c t r i c i t y , indeed a l but O .36 
per cent of her houses have e l e c t r i c i t y which giv e s her the 
highest r a t e of household e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n i n the world. ( 6 ) 
From a s t r a t e g i c point of view, the agglomeration of small 
s t a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t s an advantage over her having fewer l a r g e 
s t a t i o n s . The l a t t e r provided comparatively easy t a r g e t s 
( f o r a e r i a l bombardment) towards the end of World War I I . 
The l a c k of huge power dams i s not because the 
Japanese are unable to c o n s t r u c t these - she had p l e n t y of 
experience i n c o n s t r u c t i n g these i n Manchuria and Korea before 
the war - but r a t h e r i s i t i n response to her p e c u l i a r c o n d i t i o n s . 
A number of huge dams have been b u i l t i n the l a s t decade but 
the l o s s of f e r t i l e land i n the v a l l e y s and the i n a b i l i t y to 
use these v a l l e y s f o r communications, has to be balanced 
a g a i n s t the advantages acc r u i n g from the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 
these dams. Another r e a l problem of dam c o n s t r u c t i o n has 
been caused by r a p i d s i l t i n g of r e s e r v o i r s as most of the 
r i v e r s and streams c a r r y a heavy load of s i l t . 
A c o n s e r v a t i v e estimate of Japan's h y d r o - e l e c t r i c 
p o t e n t i a l , on the b a s i s of a s i x month minimum flow, i s 
12 m i l l i o n K i l o w a t t s . The Japanese have a l r e a d y developed 
75 per cent of t h i s p o t e n t i a l and the main sphere of expansion 
has been i n the thermal p l a n t . I n the thermal p l a n t , i n c r e a s i n g 
use of o i l and g r e a t e r thermal e f f i c i e n c y i n the use of c o a l , 
has given the most r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n the generation of e l e c t r i c i t y . 
I n 1955i 70 per cent of the country's e l e c t r i c power was derived 
from h y d r o - e l e c t r i c generation but by 1960, the generation of 
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e l e c t r i c power from thermal pl a n t had equalled t h i s and 
now e a s i l y exceeds i t . I n 1961 Japan had 2 , 058 power 
p l a n t s , of which 1,539 were h y d r o - e l e c t r i c and 519 were 
thermal, with a combined generation c a p a c i t y of 2 5 , 9 5 ^1 0 0 0 kw. 
The s m a l l e r thermal power s t a t i o n s are often used as 
a standby or a u x i l i a r y p l a n t s f o r t h e _ h y d r o - e l e c t r i c system . 
but the r e a l l y l a r g e p l a n t s are i n areas where the demand i s 
gr e a t e s t and where h y d r o - e l e c t r i c s t a t i o n s are unable to meet 
the demand f o r power. Northern Kyushu and the K i n k i region, 
which i n c l u d e s Osaka and Kobe, are major centres f o r thermal 
e l e c t r i c power generation and so too are Kanto(Tokyo) and 
Nobi (Nagoya). The g r e a t e s t b u i l d i n g programmes of thermal 
power s t a t i o n s have been i n Kanto and Nobi i n the l a s t decade. 
Atomic Energy Development 
Development i n the sphere of Atomic Energy i n Japan' 
has not been overly ambitious. This i s r a t h e r s u r p r i s i n g i n 
a country which l a c k s home based sources of power and which 
posses an i n d u s t r i a l p o t e n t i a l exceeded only by the U.S.A. and 
the U.S.S.R. This may be explained i n two ways: the f i r s t 
i s the r e a l l y traumatic e f f e c t which n u c l e a r power, even i n i t s 
pea c e f u l guise, has had on Japanese l i f e and the second, has 
been the a v a i l a b i l i t y of r e l a t i v e l y cheap s u p p l i e s of o i l on 
the world market. This i s not to say Japan has t r u l y neglected 
the development of nu c l e a r power f o r her present day developments 
are almost comparable with the major advanced powers of Europe 
but r a t h e r t h a t the development has not been as s e n s a t i o n a l as 
has her development i n other spheres of her economy. 
Her atomic energy development programme began i n December 
1955» when the National Diet passed l e g i s l a t i o n l a y i n g the b a s i s 
fo r r e s e a r c h and development. An Atomic Energy Commission was 
e s t a b l i s h e d as the supreme organ to undertake the o v e r a l l planning 
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and t h e e x e c u t i o n o f these p l a n s was t o be un d e r t a k e n by 
t h e Atomic Energy Bureau. No c o u n t r y has been a b l e t o 
le a v e development o f atomic energy t o t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r o f 
i n d u s t r y as t h e t a s k i s a l t o g e t h e r t o o b i g and perhaps t o o 
v i t a l a p a r t o f n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . Japan has ac h i e v e d a 
f a m i l i a r balance o f government and p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l development 
which has worked e f f e c t i v e l y i n , f o r i n s t a n c e , h er s t e e l i n d u s t r y . 
I n June, 1956 t h e Japan Atomic Energy Research I n s t i t u t e 
was s e t up w i t h a ^95 m i l l i o n Yen f u n d , as a c e n t r e f o r 
development and r e s e a r c h and h a l f o f t h i s c a p i t a l was 
p r o v i d e d by t h e government. The main c e n t r e i s a t T a k a i , 
some 100 m i l e s N o r t h east o f Tokyo. She now has two r e a c t o r s 
w o r k i n g t h e r e and i n a d d i t i o n , a t l e a s t f o u r of her major 
u n i v e r s i t i e s have i n s t a l l e d r e s e a r c h r e a c t o r s . Japan gave 
a g r e a t d e a l o f th o u g h t t o t h e type o f r e a c t o r she would use 
f o r h er f i r s t r e a c t o r f o r p r a c t i c a l use and she decided t o i n s t a l 
an improved Calder H a l l t y p e from Great B r i t a i n , and t h i s i s 
now i n use. I n March, 1963 i t was e s t i m a t e d t h a t Japan had 
5 , 0 0 0 w e l l t r a i n e d n u c l e a r e n g i n e e r s , a f i g u r e which t h e 
P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n and C u l t u r a l O f f i c e r s Bureau a d m i t t e d was 
too low. ( 7 ) Japan has i m p o r t e d uranium from b o t h Canada 
and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b u t r e c e n t l y , a s m a l l d e p o s i t o f uranium 
was d i s c o v e r e d i n Western Honshu, The e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e 
ore i s i n t h e hands o f the Atomic F u e l C o r p o r a t i o n , a s t a t e 
sponsored agency. 
Japan, as th e l e a d i n g s h i p b u i l d i n g n a t i o n , has made 
c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o g r e s s i n t h e development o f atomic powered 
v e s s e l s b u t i t s h o u l d be remembered t h a t b o t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
and t h e S o v i e t Union have a l r e a d y s a i l e d these s h i p s f o r some 
y e a r s . Her f i r s t atomic powered s h i p , b u i l t a t a c o s t o f 
6 ,000 m i l l i o n yen i s due t o be launched i n 1966 and w i l l make 
i t s maiden voyage i n 1969. The s h i p w i l l be o f 6 ,300 t o n s gross 
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and w i l l have a c r u i s i n g speed o f 17 k n o t s . The e n t i r e 
c o s t o f t h e p r o j e c t has been u n d e r t a k e n by t h e Government 
and t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r o f i n d u s t r y has n o t been d i r e c t l y 
i n v o l v e d i n i t . 
The o v e r a l l p i c t u r e o f n u c l e a r development i n Japan 
i s n o t a s e n s a t i o n a l one. Her p r e s e n t p l a n s are t o b u i l d 
atomic power s t a t i o n s capable o f g e n e r a t i n g 100 ,000 kw. by t h e 
end o f 1970 and between 7 m i l l i o n and 9^ m i l l i o n kw. by 1980. 
The p l a n s are almost comparable w i t h those of Western Germany 
and B r i t a i n b u t t h e y would u n d o u b t e d l y be r a d i c a l l y r e v i s e d i f 
atomic power became a good d e a l more economical because o f 
subsequent t e c h n i c a l developments and any t h r e a t t o her o i l 
s u p p l i e s would o b v i o u s l y a c c e l e r a t e t h e expansion o f t h e 
p r o d u c t i o n o f n u c l e a r power. 
SUMMARY 
Japan i s u n l i k e l y t o e x p e r i e n c e any major development o f 
h e r h y d r o - e l e c t r i c r e s o u r c e s . H y d r o - e l e c t r i c power s u p p l i e s 
r o u g h l y one q u a r t e r o f a l l power consumed i n Japan today b u t 
t h i s p r o p o r t i o n i s l i k e l y t o f a l l i n t h e f u t u r e (see t a b l e 1 ) . 
The d e c l i n i n g r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e o f w a t e r power f o r g e n e r a t i n g 
e l e c t r i c i t y and t h e g r o w i n g i m p o r t a n c e o f o i l has meant t h a t 
over one t h i r d o f t h e t o t a l energy consumed i n Japan has been 
d e r i v e d from i m p o r t e d f u e l , and i t i s l i k e l y t o i n c r e a s e t o 
something l i k e two f i f t h s by 1970. Perhaps i n t h e d i s t a n t 
f u t u r e , atomic energy may become a s e r i o u s economic p r o p o s i t i o n 
b u t i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t o i l w i l l be t h e main p i l l a r o f s u p p o r t 
o f h e r i n d u s t r y f o r t h e n e x t decade. 
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TABLE I 
SOURCES OF ENERGY AS PROPORTION OF TOTAL SUPPLY 
( i n p e r c e n t a g e s ) 
1959 1970 e s t i m a t e 
Water Power 2 7 . 6 19 .5 
Coal 3 7 . 8 2 8 . 7 
O i l 2 9 . 8 4 9 . 6 
Wood 4 . 0 1.3 
N a t u r a l Gas, L i g n i t e e t c . 1.1 . 9 
100 .0 1 0 0 . 0 
Note: T h i s t a b l e i g n o r e s t h e o u t p u t o f atomic energy 
Source; F u j i Bank B., June 1 9 6 1 , P . 21 Quoted by G.C.Allen 
Japan's Economic Expansion 
p.172. o.u.p. 1965. 
TABLE 2 
CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY BY SOURCE I N JAPAN 
Coal P e t r o l e u m F u e l wood 
T o t a l and E l e c t r i c i t y and• and 
L i g n i t e Nat. Gas Charcoal 
1938 79 ,127 4 9 , 3 8 6 14 ,237 9,015 6 ,489 
1952 83 ,061 43 ,435 2 3 , 8 5 1 9 ,471 6 ,304 
1959 133,912 5 1 , 3 5 9 37 ,025 4 0 , 2 3 8 5 ,290 
1963 213 ,083 61 ,977 4 1 , 4 9 8 104,906 4 ,702 
Source: M i n i s t r y o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade and I n d u s t r y . 
S t a t i s t i c a l Survey o f Economy o f Japan 
M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s 1964. 
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S t a t i s t i c a l Survey o f t h e Economy o f Japan. 1964 
p.29 M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n 
A f f a i r s . 
The Guardian. Thursday, May 2 7 t h 1965 
The P a t t e r n o f A s i a , 
ed. G insburg 
Consider Japan. 
Economist Research 
The P a t t e r n o f A s i a . 
Ginsburg 
P.70 
U n i t . P.80 
Constable & Co. 1958 
Duckworth 1964 
P.82 
The Japan o f Today. 
P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n and C u l t u r a l A f f a i r s Bureau 
P.59 Min. o f F o r e i g n 
A f f a i r s . 1963 
F a c t s about Japan. 
P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n and C u l t u r a l A f f a i r s Bureau. 
No. 15-C3« Min. o f F o r e i g n 
A f f a i r s . ( M a r c h 1963) 
152a 
COAL AND OIL FIELDS OF JAPAN 
Rum ox 
Kushxro 






SOURCE: U n i v e r s i t y o f Wisconsin Catographic 
L a b o r a t o r y . 
ENERGY. 152b 
Per Capita Consumption of Energy i n Japan 
1951-62. 
Tons c o a l 
E q u i v a l e n t 
Per Capita 
Consumption of Energy 




1 1 1 I ' • ' 1 _J : 1 : : — 
t ^ i * Z S i Sw *° 6 7 « b o W f e i . , 
Consumption o f Energy by Source 
i n Japan,1965 
Wood and Charcoal 
O i l and 
N a t u r a l Gas Coal and 
% L i g n i t e 
UJ 
l e c t r i c i t y 
2 ^ to ^ 
U 0 
^ 3 
Source: S t a t i s t i c a l Survey o f Japan 1964 
- 153 -
9: EDUCATION I N JAPAN 
The s t u d y o f a n a t i o n ' s system o f e d u c a t i o n i s a 
p r o f i t a b l e one f o r any s t u d e n t o f p o l i t i c a l geography. 
A d e t a i l e d s t u d y o f t h e system can n o t o n l y g i v e some 
i n d i c a t i o n whether n r n o t t h a t c o u n t r y can p l a y a p a r t 
i n modern t e c h n o l o g i c a l expansion b u t can a l s o be a good 
guide t o i t s p o l i t i c a l h e a l t h . 
Even a b r i e f s t u d y of t h e development o f e d u c a t i o n 
i n Japan shows a p a t t e r n t h a t f i t s i n w i t h h e r f o r t u n e s . 
We see a system which a d m i r a b l y served t h e purpose o f 
a c h i e v i n g widespread l i t e r a c y b u t which f a i l e d t o develop 
i n t o a n y t h i n g more th a n a r e a s o n a b l y e f f i c i e n t m i r r o r t o 
o f f i c i a l i d e o l o g y . There i s no cause f o r us i n t h e West 
t o assume a p a t r o n i s i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h i s c ourse, f o r 
we have seen i n Germany how w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d freedoms i n 
e d u c a t i o n can be u t t e r l y d e s t r o y e d by an a u t h o r i t a r i a n 
government. Japan needed s t r o n g c e n t r a l c o n t r o l over h e r 
e d u c a t i o n system i f she was t o develop q u i c k l y i n t o a s t r o n g 
i n d u s t r i a l n a t i o n , b u t t h i s system became t h e t o o l of 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . T h i s problem i s n o t a new one. China 
has had t o c r e a t e a r i g i d , n a t i o n a l programme f o r t h e d e v e l o p -
ment o f h e r s c h o o l s . The r e l e a s e f r o m d e g r a d i n g p o v e r t y 
must be t h e f i r s t s t e p , b u t t h e n we have the problem o f how 
can freedom emerge from a l o n g c o n d i t i o n e d a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m ? 
Japan i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g because she has had a l o n g 
p e r i o d o f c e n t r a l i s e d c o n t r o l , broken by t h e upheaval o f war 
and t h e n t w e n t y post-war y e a r s ' e f f o r t a t a c h i e v i n g a d e m o c r a t i c 
s o c i e t y . 
A modern system o f p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
Japan by the Government Order o f E d u c a t i o n i n 1872. Under 
t h i s system, e d u c a t i o n was o r g a n i s e d i n t o t h r e e p r o g r e s s i v e 
stages - p r i m a r y , m i d d l e s c h o o l and u n i v e r s i t y - and by 1886 
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t h r e e or f o u r y e a r s o f elementary e d u c a t i o n had been 
made compulsory. T h i s system was c l e a r l y based upon 
those o f t h e West b u t as M i c h a e l and T a y l o r p o i n t o u t , 
•the dominant p a t t e r n of Japanese l i f e was t h e o f f i c i a l 
o r t h o d o x y c r e a t e d by the M e i j i R e s t o r a t i o n and t h e government 
t o o k g r e a t p a i n s t o d i s c o u r a g e i d e a s which m i g h t p r e s e n t 
people w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h i s o f f i c i a l i d e o l o g y * . ( 1 ) 
The I m p e r i a l R e s c r i p t on E d u c a t i o n o f October, 1890 was 
designed t o make e d u c a t i o n a s e r v a n t of t h e S t a t e and t o 
p r e v e n t i d e o l o g i c a l i n v a s i o n from t h e West. The R e s c r i p t 
l a i d down t h a t m o r a l e d u c a t i o n was t h e r e a l aim o f e d u c a t i o n 
and t h a t the i n c u l c a t i o n o f ' n a t i o n a l v i r t u e s ' was t h e f i r s t 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e e d u c a t i o n a l system. The d e f i n i t i o n 
o f what i s a m o r a l e d u c a t i o n p r e s e n t s problems: e d u c a t i o n i s t s 
i n B r i t a i n have g l o w i n g l y p r a i s e d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n t h e 
n i n e t i e s o f t h e l a s t c e n t u r y who s t r e s s e d ' c h a r a c t e r b u i l d i n g ' 
as b e i n g t h e r e a l aim of e d u c a t i o n i n t h i s c o u n t r y and perhaps 
t h i s was n o t so v e r y d i f f e r e n t from 'moral e d u c a t i o n 1 i n Japan 
b u t t h e ' i n c u l c a t i o n o f n a t i o n a l v i r t u e s ' meant v i r t u e s o f 
obedience and d i s c i p l i n e which were much s t r o n g e r meat t h a n 
was g i v e n t o t h e B r i t i s h . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e , t o o , 
t h a t t h e Japanese M i n i s t r y o f E d u c a t i o n was so w o r r i e d about 
d i s c i p l i n e and i r r e v e r a n c e t o a u t h o r i t y t h a t i n 1958, i t 
r e - i n t r o d u c e d ' e t h i c a l t e a c h i n g ' i n t o s c h o o l s . However, t h i s 
has n o t become a method o f p o l i t i c a l i n d o c t r i n a t i o n as i n 
pre-war days b u t i t i s an aspect o f s c h o o l l i f e t h a t w i l l 
r e q u i r e c a r e f u l o b s e r v a t i o n . I n pre-war y e a r s g r e a t emphasis 
was l a i d upon the t e a c h i n g o f l o y a l t y and f i l i a l p i e t y t o 
Japanese y o u t h . The c u r r i c u l u m was r i g i d l y e n f o r c e d and 
t e x t books were p r e p a r e d under s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e M i n i s t r y 
o f E d u c a t i o n . The t r a i n i n g o f t e a c h e r s was c o m p l e t e l y 
dominated by t h e M i n i s t r y and here a l s o , t h e v i r t u e s o f obedience 
and d i s c i p l i n e were s t r e s s e d . 
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John Embree, t h e American s o c i o l o g i s t who l i v e d i n 
a Japanese v i l l a g e f o r a number o f ye a r s b e f o r e t h e SVcbnd 
World War, g i v e s us an i n t e r e s t i n g d e s c r i p t i o n of a v i l l a g e 
s c h o o l which must have been t y p i c a l o f r u r a l Japan. ( 2 ) 
The v i l l a g e s c h o o l was p a i d f o r p a r t l y by v i l l a g e t a x e s and 
p a r t l y by p r e f e c t u r a l and c e n t r a l government f u n d s . The 
schoolmaster was a p p o i n t e d by t h e P r e f e c t u r a l E d u c a t i o n 
Bureau, and a l t h o u g h t h e main p a r t o f h i s s a l a r y came from 
v i l l a g e t a x e s , t h e v i l l a g e r s had no c o n t r o l over h i s appoi n t m e n t . 
Emree w r i t e s : "The schoolmaster o f t h e P r i m a r y s c h o o l s e t s as 
h i s aims the Rules f o r p r i m a r y E d u c a t i o n o f t h e Department o f 
Ed u c a t i o n i n Tokyo, t h e schoolmaster o f t h e M i d d l e School s e t s 
as h i s aim t h e r u l e s o f M i d d l e School E d u c a t i o n o f the De p a r t -
ment, and so a l s o f o r the a g r i c u l t u r a l s c h o o l , g i r l s ' h i g h 
s c h o o l and so on The schoolmasters v a r y from t h e 
sacred word of the Department o n l y on t h e s i d e o f g r e a t e r 
n a t i o n a l i s m " . The e d u c a t i o n he d e s c r i b e s i s r i g i d l y 
u t i l i t a r i a n , i n t e r s p e r s e d w i t h s p e c i a l days - such as t h e 
Emperor M e i j i ' s Death Day, 'when t h e r e i s a g e n e r a l assembly 
w i t h a solemn r e a d i n g o f the I m p e r i a l R e s c r i p t on E d u c a t i o n 
w h i l e a l l p r e s e n t bow t h e i r heads, f o l l o w e d by an u p l i f t i n g 
l e c t u r e by t h e schoolmaster and by s i n g i n g o f t h e N a t i o n a l 
Anthem 1. The s c h o o l was c l e a r l y a g r e a t u n i f y i n g f o r c e i n 
the community. P a r e n t s ' days when p a r e n t s c o u l d v i s i t t h e 
s c h o o l when i t was w o r k i n g were common and even m i l i t a r y 
parades o f t h e ' r e s e r v i s t s ' were h e l d i n t h e s c h o o l p l a y g r o u n d . 
I t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the b u l k o f the Japanese 
s o l d i e r y , who were l a r g e l y r e c r u i t e d from the c o u n t r y s i d e 
showed such s t u b b o r n l o y a l t y t o t h e Emperor i n t h e l a s t war. 
The c h i l d was o b l i g e d t o bow towards a n i c h e i n t h e 
main a u d i t o r i u m which housed t h e Emperor's p o r t r a i t when he 
e n t e r e d t h e s c h o o l grounds and h i s classroom was f e s t o o n e d 
w i t h maps and c h a r t s showing how s m a l l Japan was, compared 
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w i t h t h e s u r r o u n d i n g n a t i o n s o f A s i a , and how e m i n e n t l y 
reasonable i t was f o r h e r t o expand. However, I suppose 
on these grounds we s h o u l d n o t be t o o c r i t i c a l f o r we had 
our share o f 'Mercator' maps w i t h t h e B r i t i s h Empire splashed 
i n red across t h e g l o b e . 
A s u p e r f i c i a l comparison o f t h e development o f t h e 
e d u c a t i o n a l systems o f Japan and B r i t a i n would show B r i t a i n ' s 
t o be one of s t e a d y growth o f c e n t r a l i s a t i o n whereas t h i s 
p r o c e s s , more s t r o n g l y marked i n Japan, was a b r u p t l y a l t e r e d 
by the post-war p o l i t i c a l changes. The tremendous process o f 
d e v o l u t i o n i n e d u c a t i o n a l ' m a t t e r s , i n s p i r e d by American 
e d u c a t i o n a l i s t s , went t o o f a r i n t h e eyes o f many Japanese. 
One o f t h e i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e s o f t h e Japanese e d u c a t i o n a l 
scene i n the l a s t few y e a r s has been t h e a t t e m p t s a t r e - a s s e r t i o n 
o f m i n i s t e r i a l c o n t r o l , w i t h the i n e v i t a b l e o p p o s i t i o n t o t h i s 
process fr o m t h e L e f t Wing p a r t i e s , much o f t h i s o p p o s i t i o n 
c e n t e r i n g on t h e Japanese Teachers' Union, Nikkyoso, and t h e 
e q u a l l y extreme S t u d e n t s * Union, Zengakuren. 
The p o l i t i c a l geographer i s concerned w i t h two main 
p o i n t s i n a s t u d y o f Japanese e d u c a t i o n : t h e f i r s t i s the 
degree t o which a system o f e d u c a t i o n has been developed which 
i s t r u l y d e m o c r a t i c and t h e second, i s t h e l e v e l o f e f f i c i e n c y 
which has been reached i n t h e whole system, w i t h t h e u l t i m a t e 
emphasis on t h e U n i v e r s i t i e s and s c h o o l s o f t e c h n o l o g y , which 
w i l l a s s i s t t h e i n d u s t r i a l advance o f Japan. Our main problem 
t h e r e f o r e i s m a i n l y w i t h post-war Japan, b u t b e f o r e we pass on 
t o t h i s , i t i s w o r t h q u o t i n g 'John Maki's summary o f Japanese 
e d u c a t i o n b e f o r e t h e war: "The E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t r y p l a y e d a 
major r o l e i n t h e g r o w t h o f a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . I t c r e a t e d t h e 
n a t i o n a l , g o v e r n m e n t - c o n t r o l l e d system o f u n i v e r s a l e d u c a t i o n , 
which l e d t o mass l i t e r a c y b u t was a l s o used as a p o w e r f u l and 
e f f e c t i v e i n s t r u m e n t o f mass i n d o c t r i n a t i o n . Reverence toward 
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t h e Emperor, t h e supremacy o f the s t a t e , the s u b o r d i n a t i o n 
o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s n o t o n l y o f t h e s t a t e 
b u t of t h e f a m i l y , t h e g l o r i f i c a t i o n o f m i l i t a r y t r a d i t i o n , 
c h auvinism and the acceptance o f a g g r e s s i o n were some o f t h e 
themes o f t h e s i n g u l a r l y s u c c e s s f u l i n d o c t r i n a t i o n programme 
c a r r i e d out t h r o u g h t h e s c h o o l s " . (3) 
The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e 'new e d u c a t i o n ' are found 
i n b o t h t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e Fundamental Law o f E d u c a t i o n , 
19^7. The C o n s t i t u t i o n ( A r t i c l e 26) s t a t e s : " A l l people 
s h a l l have the r i g h t t o r e c e i v e an equa l e d u c a t i o n c o r r e s p o n d e n t 
t o t h e i r a b i l i t y , as p r o v i d e d by law. The people s h a l l be 
o b l i g e d t o have a l l boys and g i r l s under t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n 
r e c e i v e o r d i n a r y e d u c a t i o n as p r o v i d e d f o r by law. Such 
compulsory e d u c a t i o n s h a l l be f r e e " . The Fundamental Law 
o f E d u c a t i o n s e t s f o r t h i n more d e t a i l t h e aims and p r i n c i p l e s 
o f e d u c a t i o n i n accordance w i t h t h e s p i r i t o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The preamble o f t h e Fundamental Law s t a t e s : "We s h a l l esteem 
i n d i v i d u a l d i g n i t y and endeavour t o b r i n g up people who l o v e 
t r u t h and peace, w h i l e e d u c a t i o n which aims a t t h e c r e a t i o n o f 
u n i v e r s a l y e t h i g h l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c c u l t u r e s h a l l be spread 
f a r and wide". A b a s i c p r i n c i p l e e n u n c i a t e d i n t h e Law i s 
e q u a l i t y i n e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a l l , i n k e e p i n g w i t h 
t h e i r a b i l i t i e s . The Law p r o h i b i t s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n based on 
r a c e , c r e e d , sex, s o c i a l s t a t u s , economic p o s i t i o n o r f a m i l y 
background. The Law a l s o emphasises t h e im p o r t a n c e o f 
p o l i t i c a l knowledge and o f r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n i n t h e dev e l o p -
ment o f sound c i t i z e n s b ut i t s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o h i b i t s any l i n k 
between p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o r r e l i g i o n s and e d u c a t i o n . I t 
would be n a i v e t o suggest t h a t c l a i m s o f fundamental freedoms 
embodied i n C o n s t i t u t i o n s and Laws always l e a d t o freedoms f o r 
th e c i t i z e n s o f those s t a t e s - some o f t h e most savage a u t o c r a c i e s 
have had a c a d e m i c a l l y i n s p i r i n g w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n s , b u t 
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n e v e r t h e l e s s many o f these b a s i c i d e a s i n the Japanese 
C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e Law o f E d u c a t i o n have been a c h i e v e d . 
The bare bones o f t h e Japanese system o f p u b l i c 
e d u c a t i o n are as f o l l o w s : P r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n b e g i n s a t t h e 
age o f s i x and c o n t i n u e s f o r s i x ye a r s t o be f o l l o w e d by 
t h r e e y e a r s o f secondary e d u c a t i o n . The High School course, 
which i s n o t compulsory, l a s t s f o r t h r e e years and most 
u n i v e r s i t y f i r s t degree courses l a s t f o r f o u r y e a r s . The 
1961 f i g u r e s o f the M i n i s t r y o f E d u c a t i o n show t h a t 63.8 per cent 
o f t h e boys and 60.7 per cent o f the g i r l s who l e f t secondary 
s c h o o l s c o n t i n u e d w i t h f u r t h e r e d u c a t i o n . (4) T h i s f i g u r e 
seems i n c r e d i b l y h i g h b u t may be e x p l a i n e d by t h e f a c t t h a t 
High School e d u c a t i o n i n Japan c o n s i s t s b o t h o f f u l l - t i m e 
and p a r t t i m e e d u c a t i o n . P a r t - t i m e e d u c a t i o n a t t h e secondary 
l e v e l was a f e a t u r e o f pre-war Japan and seems t o work e f f e c t i v e l y 
w i t h b o t h g e n e r a l and v o c a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n . I n comparing t h e 
Japanese and B r i t i s h systems, t h e Japanese success i n d e v e l o p i n g 
p a r t - t i m e e d u c a t i o n marks out t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e B r i t i s h t o 
develop t h e i r Young People's C o l l e g e s which were a u t h o r i s e d 
by t h e 1944 E d u c a t i o n A c t . The B r i t i s h might w e l l emulate t h e 
Japanese M i n i s t r y o f E d u c a t i o n i n d e v e l o p i n g correspondence 
courses. 
H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n 
Japanese h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n has p l a y e d a v i t a l r o l e i n 
t h e development of an e f f i c i e n t b u r e a u c r a c y and i n t h e t r a i n i n g 
o f capable t e c h n o l o g i s t s . J u n i o r C o l l e g e s and T e c h n i c a l 
C o l l e g e s o f f e r i n g courses l a s t i n g two or t h r e e y e a r s have had 
an i m p o r t a n t p a r t t o p l a y i n t h i s , w h i l s t t h e U n i v e r s i t i e s , 
f r e e d from t h e pre-war p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s , have e f f e c t i v e l y 
educated an e l i t e . Japanese U n i v e r s i t i e s have n o t been 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e massive enrolment which e x i s t s i n America, 
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presumably because of l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by her economy, 
and i n consequence, t h e r e has been f i e r c e c o m p e t i t i o n f o r 
U n i v e r s i t y p l a c e s . The e x a m i n a t i o n system i s c o n s i d e r e d by 
many e d u c a t i o n a l i s t s t o be t h e g r e a t e s t s i n g l e problem t h r o u g h -
out t h e e n t i r e e d u c a t i o n system o f Japan. A good performance 
i n an e x a m i n a t i o n determines whether or n o t a Japanese w i l l 
pass on t o a good secondary High School o r U n i v e r s i t y . For 
years i t has been charged t h a t t h i s system undermines t h e 
h e a l t h o f t h e s t u d e n t , produces t o o much s t r a i n on b o t h him 
and h i s f a m i l y , s t r e s s e s mere memory work, c r e a t e s t o o i n t e n s e 
c o m p e t i t i o n n o t o n l y i n t h e classroom b u t among s c h o o l s , and 
p l a c e s an undue premium on e n t r y i n t o t h e ' r i g h t ' s c h o o l s . 
T h i s academic c o m p e t i t i o n i s i n essence West European and, 
i n s p i t e o f i t s i m p e r f e c t i o n s , has t r a i n e d a corps o f s p e c i a l i s t s 
w h ich are necessary i n such a complex s o c i e t y as Japan's. 
Many American e d u c a t i o n a l i s t s are n o t so v o c i f e r o u s i n t h e i r 
condemnation o f t h i s system as they were b e f o r e Russia's 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l g r e a t n e s s was e p i t o m i s e d i n i t s ' S p u t n i k ' 
achievement J No doubt t h e y are concerned about the l a c k o f 
academic r i g o u r i n many o f t h e U.S. High Schools and S t a t e 
U n i v e r s i t i e s and a l t h o u g h t h e y would eschew the l u d i c r o u s 
excesses o f c o m p e t i t i o n which appear i n Japan, n e v e r t h e l e s s 
would l i k e t o see more c o m p e t i t i t i o n i n t h e i r own system. 
S t a t i s t i c a l evidence o f t h e Japanese p u b l i c system o f 
e d u c a t i o n i s i m p r e s s i v e , (1962 f i g u r e s are g i v e n a t t h e end 
of t h i s c h a p t e r ) but what i s i m p o r t a n t i s t h a t t h e b u l k o f t h e 
c h i l d r e n i n these f i g u r e s have r e c e i v e d t h e i r e d u c a t i o n i n a 
l i b e r a l , r e - o r g a n i z e d e d u c a t i o n a l system. The problem i n 
th e o c c u p a t i o n p e r i o d was n o t t o i n t r o d u c e u n i v e r s a l e d u c a t i o n , 
because t h i s a l r e a d y e x i s t e d ^ b u t t o r e - o r g a n i z e i t and t o change 
i t s c o n t e n t . Much o f t h i s change was e f f e c t e d by Japanese who, 
d e m o r a l i z e d by t h e war, had t o conform t o t h e demands o f S.C.A.P. 
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b u t who l a t e r saw the e s s e n t i a l v i r t u e s o f the new system. 
Text books i n sc h o o l s had t o be r e - w r i t t e n and a l l r e f e r e n c e s 
t o t h e unique q u a l i t y o f Japan and ' i t s m i s s i o n ' and t o 
sub s e r v i e n c e t o a u t h o r i t y were removed. The main t h e s i s 
here i s t h a t - i n s p i t e o f i t s many mi s t a k e s - t h e work o f 
S.C.A.P. i n e d u c a t i o n was h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l . The success can 
o n l y be measured by t h e way the Japanese themselves n o t o n l y 
accepted, b u t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n b u i l d i n g a dem o c r a t i c system o f 
e d u c a t i o n . 
One can see a c e r t a i n r i g i d i t y i n t h e t h i n k i n g o f some 
o f these a d v i s e r s i n t h a t t h e y p e r c e i v e d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f 
a system, b a s i c a l l y American, w i t h e l e c t e d l o c a l School Boards, 
e t c . , would s o l v e t h e problem even when t h e y were w o r k i n g on 
a h i g h l y complex s o c i e t y w i t h v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s from 
t h e i r own. Some o f these measures have been s u b s e q u e n t l y 
changed by the Japanese; School Boards are now a p p o i n t e d by 
P r e f e c t o r a l A d m i n i s t r a t o r s (1958) and e t h i c a l t e a c h i n g was 
a l s o r e - i n t r o d u c e d i n sc h o o l s i n the same ye a r . When we 
at t e m p t t o decide whether or not these new measures are m a i n l y 
because o f r i g h t wing p r e s s u r e s o r are due t o the f a c t t h a t 
t h e y were u n c o n g e n i a l t o Japanese s o c i e t y , we e n t e r a v e r y 
complex and confused problem. Since t h e end o f the o c c u p a t i o n , 
many Japanese p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s and government o f f i c i a l s have 
been a t t e m p t i n g t o r e v e r t t o a system more l i k e t h e o l d one. 
They have been concerned i n a t t e m p t s t o have a more c h a u v i n i s t i c 
l i n e t a k e n i n t e x t books and t o curb t h e i n d i s c i p l i n e o f many 
Japanese t e a c h e r s . The l e a d e r s of t h i s movement c l a i m t h a t 
t h e i r g o a l i s t o r e - i n t r o d u c e t r u e Japanese c u l t u r e , condemning 
- by i n f e r e n c e - American i n f l u e n c e i n e d u c a t i o n ? and many of 
them are w o r r i e d by new s o c i a l freedoms, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e 
sphere o f the f a m i l y . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o assess t h e impact 
o f the new e d u c a t i o n a l system on the young people o f Japan: • 
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t h e S t udent's Union, Zengakuren, has s t r o n g l e f t wing 
t e n d e n c i e s and i t s a c t i v e communist element i s e x t r e m e l y 
v o c i f e r o u s , b u t as has been p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d i n t h i s 
paper, t h e i r y o u t h p r e c l u d e s any f i r s t hand knowledge o f 
the p r e v i o u s regime. P r o f e s s o r Kawashima Tokeyoshi o f 
Tokyo U n i v e r s i t y summed up t h e p o s i t i o n when he s a i d -
"We are a l l e x t r e m e l y s e n s i t i v e t o t h i s problem o f 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n , because we l i v e d under t h e o l d 
system and we know what i t i s n o t t o have t h e freedoms 
t h a t we now e n j o y under t h e new c o n s t i t u t i o n . But a l l 
young people have r e a l l y known n o t h i n g b ut freedom. They 
accept i t merely as a m a t t e r o f course, and how can you 
expect them t o g e t e x c i t e d about i t " . ( 5 ) However, t h e 
f a c t remains t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f Japanese s t u d e n t s a r e 
p o l i t i c a l l y c onscious and t h e w r i t e r sees t h i s n o t as a 
m a t t e r f o r d e s p a i r , as some American w r i t e r s have done, b u t 
f o r hope - n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e extreme l e f t wing t e n d e n c i e s 
o f t h e s t u d e n t s . A U n i t e d S t a t e s p o i n t o f view i s expressed 
by J . Cary i n Japan Today, who r a t h e r t a r t l y suggests a t t h e 
end of a c h a p t e r i n h i s book which he devotes t o Zengakuren, 
t h a t Government, p a r e n t s and p u b l i c would be w e l l and a d v i s e d 
t o r e g a r d t h e l e a d e r s o f Zengakuren as t h e " u n r u l y , f o o l i s h 
c h i l d r e n t h e y a r e " . ( 6 ) The b i t t e r n e s s o f some American 
w r i t e r s r e s u l t s from the a c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e s t u d e n t 
body t o t h e U.S.-Japanese S e c u r i t y T r e a t y , which l e d t o t h e 
famous c a n c e l l a t i o n o f P r e s i d e n t Eisenhowers * v i s i t t o Japan. 
Japan s u f f e r e d g r e a t l y i n t h e l a s t war and h e r r e a l l y p r o f o u n d 
abhorrence o f n u c l e a r weapons i s o f t e n u n d e r - e s t i m a t e d i n t h e 
West. There i s a good d e a l o f f e e l i n g amongst Japanese s t u d e n t s , 
who a t t r i b u t e t h e good r e l a t i o n s which t h e U.S.A. r e q u i r e s w i t h 
Japan p u r e l y t o the' .U.S.A.'s need f o r an e f f e c t i v e ' a i r c r a f t 
c a r r i e r * i n the Far East. A p a r t from p o l i t i c a l problems, 
the l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e Japanese s t u d e n t s - which a r e , 
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however, i m p r o v i n g y e a r l y - are u n i f o r m l y poor. A h i g h 
percentage have t o work t o s u p p o r t t h e i r f a m i l i e s and t h e i r 
l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s are i n a d e q u a t e . They are s u b j e c t t o a 
f i e r c e l y c o m p e t i t i v e e x a m i n a t i o n system where f a i l u r e w i l l 
mean t h a t t h e y w i l l p r o b a b l y be r e l e g a t e d t o poor, wage 
e a r n i n g j o b s f o r t h e r e s t o f t h e i r l i v e s . I t i s h a r d l y 
s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e Japanese s t u d e n t s are r a d i c a l under 
these c o n d i t i o n s . The desperate i n v o l v e m e n t o f Japanese 
s t u d e n t s i n Japanese p o l i t i c s i s a f a i r g u i de t o t h e r o b u s t 
h e a l t h o f t h e p o l i t i c a l system. Japan's s t u d e n t movement 
dates m a i n l y from t h e f i r s t World War when Western l i b e r a l 
t h o u g h t began t o permeate t h e c o u n t r y b u t i t has always had 
a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r a d i c a l q u a l i t y which l e d t o i t s s u p p r e s s i o n 
by t h e m i l i t a r i s t s i n the 1930's. I t s d i s t u r b i n g f e a t u r e s 
today are i t s v i o l e n c e and t h e i n f l u e n c e o f Communism i n t h e 
movement, b u t these w i l l n o t be cured by r e p r e s s i v e measures^ 
and g r e a t l y improved l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s , p l u s t h e quandary t h a t 
many Japanese found themselves now i n as a r e s u l t o f t h e r i f t 
between Russia and China^have done much t o q u i e t e n t h e extreme 
l e f t wing element o f Zengakuren. The a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e 
Atom bomb by China has a l s o tended t o l e s s e n a g i t a t i o n a g a i n s t 
the S e c u r i t y Pact w i t h the U.S.A. 
The same l e f t wing c r i t i c i s m s which have been l e v e l l e d 
a t the s t u d e n t s have a l s o been made a g a i n s t t h e t e a c h e r s i n 
the s c h o o l s and U n i v e r s i t i e s . The t e a c h e r s ' U n i o n , K i k k o y o s o , 
i s n u m e r i c a l l y s t r o n g - i t has 6,000,000 members - and has 
shown g r e a t v i g o u r i n post-war Japan. I n pre-war Japan, t h e 
t e a c h e r was b a s i c a l l y an agent f o r government propaganda b u t 
t h i s r o l e has been r a d i c a l l y changed a f t e r t h e war. The 
spread o f communist and ' f e l l o w t r a v e l l e r ' i n f l u e n c e i n t h e 
t e a c h e r '• s' u n i o n has caused Japanese governments a g r e a t d e a l 
o f concern. Undoubtedly t h e r e have been many cases o f p o l i t i c a l 
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advantage taken by t e a c h e r s , who are i n a p e c u l i a r l y 
i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n i n the community - but some of the 
a t t a c k s on the t e a c h e r s by the r i g h t wing are simply an e f f o r t 
to r e - a s s e r t c e n t r a l i s e d c o n t r o l . I n 195^ a law was passed 
which p r o h i b i t e d teachers from taking part i n p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t i e s but t h i s has not been e n t i r e l y s u c c e s s f u l because 
many Japanese assume t h i s i s an e f f o r t by the r i g h t wing to 
gag pr o g r e s s i v e elements. The resentment f e l t over the 
p r o s c r i p t i o n of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y on the p a r t of the teacher 
was nothing compared with that which was caused by a Government 
attempt to e s t a b l i s h e f f i c i e n c y r a t i n g s f o r t e a c h e r s . The 
teacher's union maintained that t h i s was a b a r e l y d i s g u i s e d 
method of p e n a l i s i n g the ' p o l i t i c a l l y awkward' teachers by 
passing them over i n promotion. So great was the furore 
that t h i s caused, th a t the government was compelled to with-
draw the measure. 
Many w r i t e r s about post-war Japanese education are 
most concerned about the communist i n f l u e n c e among teachers 
and students. Americans sometimes see the massive t e a c h e r s ' 
and students' unions as the spearhead of the a t t a c k on the v i t a l 
t r e a t y between Japan and the U.S. and are p e s s i m i s t i c about so 
c a l l e d subversion of most forms of p u b l i c education i n Japan 
Other European w r i t e r s who are - r i g h t l y or wrongly - not so 
perturbed about communist i n f l u e n c e , see the dynamic r o l e of 
the teachers and students as a valuable counterbalance to the 
old a u t o c r a t i c tendencies i n Japan. At a l l events, the 
s i t u a t i o n today i s i n f i n i t e l y more hopeful than i t was i n 
pre-war days, f o r although p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s by t e a c h e r s , 
when they become methods of u n f a i r i n f l u e n c e over the immature, 
are wholly wrong, an i n d i f f e r e n t approach to p o l i t i c a l l i f e 
by teachers i s dangerous. When so much of edu c a t i o n a l p o l i c y 
i s determined by c e n t r a l government i t i s nonsense to suggest 
that teachers should become p o l i t i c a l eunuchs. 
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The next problem we have to examine i s the degree to 
which Japan i s succeeding i n her higher education to f u r t h e r 
her expansion i n commerce and i n d u s t r y . I n common with most 
powerful c o u n t r i e s , Japan i s short of s c i e n t i s t s and t e c h n i c i a n s . 
Her government estimates that i n order to maintain the present 
growth of the economy she w i l l r e q u i r e an a d d i t i o n a l number of 
170,000 engineers and M+0,000 t e c h n i c i a n s i n 1970. A plan 
drafted by the M i n i s t r y of Education i n 196O c a l l e d f o r a 
16 ,000 i n c r e a s e i n the number of students i n engineering 
departments i n the U n i v e r s i t i e s and f o r an i n c r e a s e i n 85 ,000 
students i n the t e c h n i c a l high s c h o o l s . T h i s t a r g e t has 
already been reached. The h i g h l y competitive system i n 
Japanese education ensures that a t r a i n e d e l i t e i s coming from 
the u n i v e r s i t i e s but her government has been e q u a l l y aware of 
the need f o r t r a i n i n g her s k i l l e d workers to as high a l e v e l 
as p o s s i b l e . To these ends the M i n i s t r y of Education Revised 
C u r r i c u l a f o r High Schools i n 196j5» placed more emphasis on 
p r o f e s s i o n a l and t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g and more t e c h n i c a l high 
schools were e s t a b l i s h e d . I n the confused s o c i a l p a t t e r n , 
women are emerging with r a r e new freedoms : they have invaded 
higher education and although the percentage of women i n the 
U n i v e r s i t i e s and Colleges i s s t i l l w e l l below that of men, 
i t i s c e r t a i n l y a most s i g n i f i c a n t i n c u r s i o n . 
The White Paper on Education (1963) shows that 70% of 
the c h i l d r e n who have completed t h e i r compulsory education a t 
the age of 1 * continue t h e i r education i n High Schools and 
n e a r l y 16% of the High School graduates continue t h e i r education 
at Higher i n s t i t u t e s of l e a r n i n g such as U n i v e r s i t i e s , J u n i o r 
Colleges and p r o f e s s i o n a l schools (semmon gakko). These 
f i g u r e s are s u r p r i s i n g l y high and the l a t t e r f i g u r e of 16%, 
compares very favourably with a f i g u r e of f o r B r i t a i n . 
There i s , however, a d i s t u r b i n g d i s p a r i t y between the percentage 
of c h i l d r e n who continue t h e i r education i n Senior High 
Schools between urban and r u r a l areas - f o r example, the f i g u r e 
k7.B% i n Miyazaki P r e f e c t u r e i n Southern Kyushu i s considerably 
below the f i g u r e of 8k.3% i n Tokyo. This o v e r a l l p a t c h i n e s s 
i n the s u c c e s s of a c h i e v i n g and developing s a t i s f a c t o r y 
'further education' i s not p e c u l i a r to Japan and we i n B r i t a i n 
have s i g n i f i c a n t r e g i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n the numbers of c h i l d r e n 
who are continuing t h e i r education beyond the l e g a l minimum 
school l e a v i n g age. 
The l a r g e firms have developed t h e i r own t r a i n i n g 
schemes and provide adequate day r e l e a s e f o r t h e i r young 
workers. These schemes are i n the true t r a d i t i o n of 
paternalism, which has always e x i s t e d i n Japanese i n d u s t r y . 
A f a i r measure of the success of the Japanese s h i p b u i l d i n g 
i n d u s t r y i s due to t h i s t r a i n i n g of labour i n centres owned 
and run by the firms concerned. The enormous economic strength 
of the s h i p b u i l d i n g combines has enabled Japan to do f a r more 
i n t h i s r e s p e c t than the B r i t i s h s h i p b u i l d e r s have done, who 
have not the resources of the former. 
I n s p i t e of the t r a g i c confusion of p o l i t i c s with 
education i n Japan which has been the biggest problem, there 
has been tremendous progress i n a l l aspects of Japanese 
Education. The Economist correspondents who v i s i t e d Japan 
i n 1962 were g r e a t l y impressed by what they saw of Japanese 
education but they were worried by the b e l l i c o s i t y of students 
and t e a c h e r s . ( 7 ) They wrote: " S e v e r a l bold and f a r - s e e i n g 
education m i n i s t e r s have combined Japanese energy with the 
Japanese t a l e n t f o r s k i l f u l adaptation. I n a recent survey 
of Japanese education over the past f i v e y e a r s , the claim was 
made that recommendations contained i n the Crowther Report i n 
B r i t a i n and Dr. James Conant's report on U.S. high schools had 
been incorporated, along with Russian and French p r a c t i c e s , 
i n Japanese education p o l i c y . As part of the overhaul of 
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the educational system, a cabinet economic c o u n c i l i s 
d r a f t i n g long-range t r a i n i n g plans f o r engineers and 
t e c h n i c i a n s . The government's plan f a r again doubling 
the n a t i o n a l income w i t h i n ten years w i l l demand constant 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l progress and a mounting supply of t e c h n i c i a n s . 
I n c r e a s e d enrolments w i l l be encouraged i n s c i e n c e and 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l f a c u l t i e s at u n i v e r s i t i e s . More s c h o l a r s h i p s 
w i l l be off e r e d and t r a i n i n g centres have already been 
e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n s t r u c t i o n i n nine famous 
u n i v e r s i t i e s . " 
When one makes the comparison with some of the problems 
that have faced the B r i t i s h i n the post-war e ra and attempts 
at t h e i r s o l u t i o n some h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s emerge. 
The cataclysm of the war shocked the Japanese i n t o r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
and dynamic t h i n k i n g f a r more than the B r i t i s h . The Japanese 
were quicker to r e a l i s e the f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the needs 
for t e c h n o l o g i s t s i n q u a l i t y and quantity i n an expanding 
economy. They were f a r quicker than the B r i t i s h to adopt 
ideas from other n a t i o n s , which may have been due to a long 
t r a d i t i o n of i n c o r p o r a t i o n of f o r e i g n i d e a s and techniques. 
B r i t i s h complacency and t r a d i t i o n have been i n many ways a 
s t r a i t - j a c k e t to much of our th i n k i n g i n education. On the 
other hand, one has the f e e l i n g that some of the almost 
f r e n z i e d e f f o r t s to achieve t e c h n o l o g i c a l expansion i n Japan 
may not give the s t a b i l i t y i n some of the more b a s i c , e t h i c a l 
values i n s o c i e t y which the B r i t i s h are l e s s l i k e l y to lo s e 
i n t h e i r s t e a d i e r , more t r a d i t i o n a l approach. This can 
only be opinion and i t w i l l take many years to judge i t s 
v a l i d i t y . 
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SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES 1962 
Kind Schools Teachers Students 
(1 i ,000) ( 1 , 0 0 0 ) 
T o t a l National P u b l i c P r i v a t e Male Female 
ools' 7 2 6 ' 6 1 5 7 5 2 6 > 3 7 9 161 343 5 ,646 5 , ^ 1 1 
J u n i o r 12,6V? 
High Schools 
79 11 ,951 617 258 3 ,739 3 ,589 
Senior 4 , 6 3 7 
High Schools 
24 3 , 5 3 4 1,079 163 1,756 1,525 
J u n i o r 305 
Colleges 
28 40 237 15 33 75 
Colleges & 260 
U n i v e r s i t i e s 
72 34 154 67 618 109 
Source: M i n i s t r y of Education quoted i n S t a t i s t i c a l Handbook 
of Japan 1964. 
Note: 'P u b l i c ' has the U.S. i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of State Schools. 
Elementary Education i s f o r 6 - 1 2 years 
J u n i o r High School i s from 12 - 15 years 
Senior High School i s from 15 - 18 years 
Most U n i v e r s i t y Courses are f o r four y e a r s . 
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10. DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS 
I n any study of Japan the unsolved problem of 
population pressure i s of paramount concern to the p o l i t i c a l 
geographer. 
I n h i s paper 'The Prospect f o r Japan 1 P r o f e s s o r F i s h e r 
gave the major part of h i s a t t e n t i o n to demographic problems 
and h i s conclusions were p e s s i m i s t i c . ( 1 ) Perhaps there 
are g r e a t e r grounds f o r optimism i n the s i x t i e s i n view of 
Japan's s h a r p l y d e c l i n i n g b i r t h r a t e ( 1 7 . 1 per thousand i n 
1963 as opposed to 3 4 . 3 per thousand i n 1947) ( 2 ) and i n the 
i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r labour by her i n d u s t r y which possesses 
the highest growth r a t e i n the world. 
But the b a s i c f a c t s of Japan's geography speak f o r 
themselves: with a population d e n s i t y of 253 people to the 
square kilometre (1960 Census) i n a land of which no more than 
16 per cent of i t s t o t a l area i s s u i t a b l e f o r h a b i t a t i o n or 
c u l t i v a t i o n , which c h r o n i c a l l y l a c k s raw m a t e r i a l s , and 
occupying a p o s i t i o n near the Asian land mass which i s 
dominated by two h o s t i l e 'super' powers, the prospect does 
look bleak. Moreover, the decreasing b i r t h r a t e does not 
mean by any means that the t o t a l population of Japan i s not 
i n c r e a s i n g a t a f a i r l y r a p i d r a t e - her population i n c r e a s e d 
from 89 .3 m i l l i o n (1955 Census) to 9 3 . 4 m i l l i o n (196O f i g u r e s ) -
and shows a growth r a t e i n c r e a s e of 1.1 per cent. 
Geographers w r i t i n g i n the immediate post-war period 
were concerned about the l o s s of t e r r i t o r i e s outside the main 
i s l a n d s of Japan, which had been so v i t a l to her economy, and 
with the complete d i s l o c a t i o n of both her i n d u s t r y and of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade as a r e s u l t of the war. 
The population problem of Japan i s a complicated one 
and i t i s proposed to de a l with i t under the fol l o w i n g headings: 
(a) Population S t a t i s t i c s , (b) Density and d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
( c ) Emigration (d) Summary. 
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(a) Population S t a t i s t i c s 
The population of Japan before the M e i j i R e s t o r a t i o n 
has been estimated to have been about t h i r t y m i l l i o n s and to 
have been f a i r l y s t a t i c at t h i s f i g u r e f o r many yea r s p r i o r 
to the R e s t o r a t i o n . We have no r e a l l y accurate f i g u r e s before 
1920 when a proper census s t a r t e d but the fo l l o w i n g f i g u r e s 
show a remarkable annual i n c r e a s e of one m i l l i o n over a period 
of twenty y e a r s : 1920 - 55*96 m., 1930 - Gk.k^ m., and 
19^0 - 73*11 m i l l i o n s . During t h i s period of twenty y e a r s , 
the crude b i r t h r a t e was between 30 and 36 per thousand 
population but there was a d e f i n i t e d e c l i n e i n b i r t h r a t e i n 
the t h i r t i e s . 
The general p a t t e r n of d e c l i n e has continued i n post 
war years but as the fo l l o w i n g f i g u r e s show, the year or two 
immediately a f t e r the war was a period of high b i r t h r a t e 
when the servicemen were demobilised and returned home. 
Crude B i r t h Rate Death Rate(per 1 ,000) 
1935 3 1 . 6 16 .8 
19^7 3 4 . 3 14 . 6 
1960 17 .2 7 . 6 
1963 17 7 .5 
The d e c l i n e i n death r a t e was due to improved medical 
s e r v i c e s and s a n i t a t i o n . Japan's death r a t e i s more i n 
l i n e with a western country than with a t y p i c a l A s i a t i c 
country. A d i s t i n g u i s h i n g feature about the Japanese 
population i s i t s r e l a t i v e youthfulness compared with that 
of B r i t a i n . Japan, l i k e B r i t a i n had a 'baby boom' a f t e r 
the war and t h i s could have presented a r e a l problem had not 
Japan been undergoing a period of r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l expansion 
i n the s i x t i e s . I t has been estimated that as a r e s u l t of 
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t h i s i n c r e a s e d post war b i r t h r a t e , 1.6 m i l l i o n boys 
and g i r l s r e q uired work or entry i n t o higher education 
i n the years 1961-196* . The following t a b l e i l l u s t r a t e s 
the e s s e n t i a l l y y outhful nature of the Japanese Population. 
Population by Age 
1,000 person and percentages 
Under 1* 15-59 60 and over T o t a l 
1935 2 5 , 3 0 9 ( 3 6 . 8 ) 3 8 , 2 5 * ( 5 5 . 8 ) 5,100 ( 7 . * ) 68 ,662 
1960 28,024 ( 2 9 . 2 ) 5 7 , 5 8 2 ( 6 1 . 3 ) 8 ,290 ( 8 . 8 ) 93 ,900 
( 3 ) 
T h i s means, i n e f f e c t , that Japan w i l l not f e e l the 
f u l l e f f e c t s of d e c l i n i n g f e r t i l i t y f o r many y e a r s . There 
has been more widespread use of contraception i n Japan and 
t h i s , with the emancipation of women, which i s more e f f e c t i v e 
i n the towns than the country, has helped to reduce b i r t h r a t e . 
The extremely high post-war b i r t h r a t e l e d to the p a s s i n g of 
the Eugenics P r o t e c t i o n Law i n September, 19*8 which l e g a l i z e d 
a bortion. A l l these f a c t o r s are important i n bringing about 
a d e c l i n e i n the b i r t h r a t e but i t would be a dangerous thing 
to assume a f u r t h e r d e c l i n e . 
P r o f e s s o r F i s h e r mentions the estimates of Shimojo and 
other Japanese demographers which suggested that the s t a t i s t i c s 
showed that Japan was repeating the p a t t e r n of West Europe, 
with a time l a g of between t h i r t y and f i f t y y e a r s . Shimojo 
discerned the d e c l i n e of b i r t h r a t e , mainly as a r e s u l t of 
l a t e r marriage i n the towns, and he estimated that the Japanese 
population would reach a maximum of 8 5 , 5 * 2 , 1 0 0 by 1970. ( * ) 
T h i s i s c l e a r l y an underestimate as i t seems most l i k e l y t h a t 
the population w i l l reach the 100 m i l l i o n mark i n the next two 
or three y e a r s . However, Shimojo's main point about there 
being a d e c l i n e i n b i r t h r a t e over the next t h i r t y y ears was 
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s u b s t a n t i a l l y true - with the odd exception, such as the 
immediate post-war period. But the general b e l i e f that 
there would be a continuation of the low b i r t h r a t e which 
obtained i n the t h i r t i e s i n most of Western Europe and, 
to a l e s s e r extent the U.S.A., i s not a c c u r a t e . The 
assumption was that the m a t e r i a l conditions of l i f e would 
improve slowly and that parents would l i m i t t h e i r f a m i l i e s 
i n order both to preserve a high standard of l i v i n g and 
provide a good education f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n . I t would 
appear, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t p a r t l y because of the major break 
through i n achieving high i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p r o d u c t i v i t y , which has c h a r a c t e r i s e d the Western World 
s i n c e the war - and Japan s i n c e the Korean war - and then 
the imponderables, such as the general d e s i r e to have l a r g e r 
f a m i l i e s , the pa t t e r n of d e c l i n i n g b i r t h r a t e s i s not a featur e 
of Western Europe today. Indeed, the American r a t e of i n c r e a s e 
i n t o t a l population 1.7 V e r cent compares with a r a t e of 
i n c r e a s e of 1.1 per cent i n Japan and although t h i s i s w e l l 
below the f i g u r e s of most of the populous lands of South E a s t 
A s i a , the f i g u r e i s a high one. ( 5 ) The i n c r e a s i n g p r o s p e r i t y 
of Japan could w e l l be a f a c t o r i n causing the i n c r e a s e i n 
b i r t h r a t e and t h i s p r o s p e r i t y may w e l l lead to an a t t i t u d e 
of government, which can be important i n demographic matters, 
where the i n c r e a s e i n population i s regarded with to l e r a n c e 
or even encouraged. The f o r e c a s t i n g of trends i n population 
i s n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t and there are no grounds f o r assuming 
that Japan's b i r t h r a t e w i l l f a l l . 
Density and D i s t r i b u t i o n 
I n 1963 Japan had a population d e n s i t y of 280 per square 
ki l o m e t r e . This i s a de n s i t y of population which i s roughly 
equal to B r i t a i n ' s but i t i s a l l the more remarkable because so 
much of Japan c o n s i s t s of uninhabitable t e r r a i n . When we 
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examine the d e n s i t y of population on the a l l u v i a l lowlands 
we f i n d a f a n t a s t i c a l l y high f i g u r e - 581 per square k i l o m e t r e . 
This f i g u r e i n c l u d e s a l l u v i a l lands over the whole of Japan 
and would c e r t a i n l y exceed t h i s f i g u r e i f we r e s t r i c t e d the 
area to the Southern h a l f of Japan, south of l a t i t u d e 37°N. 
Trewatha estimated that the population of these lands would 
reach the f i g u r e of 1,200 per square k i l o m e t r e . (6) 
A g r i c u l t u r e remains Japan's most important s i n g l e 
i n d u s t r y and employs 37% of the working population compared 
with about *2% before the war. The r a t i o of farming population 
to land under c u l t i v a t i o n i s 32* to the square kilometre, which 
i s the highest i n the world. The fol l o w i n g t a b l e shows the 
population based on landforms. 
Area Population Density 
1,000 1 m i l l i o n per 
sq. km. sq. km. 
A l l u v i a l lands *6.*(13%) 26.9(*5%) 581 
Uplands *0.*(11%) 11.7(20?O 290 
H i l l land *1.6(11%) 7.*(12%) 179 
Piedmont Area 13.0( *%) 1.*( 2%) 102 
Mountain 20.3(55%) 12.3(20%) 61 
Volcano 23.7(6% ) 8 ( 1%) 3* 
(7) 
The i n c r e a s e i n urban population has been remarkable i n 
recent y e a r s . "Dwellers i n towns with more than 10,000 
i n h a b i t a n t s , i n 1920, numbered 18 m i l l i o n s ; i n 19*0, more 
than 36 m i l l i o n s . " This f i g u r e would be nearer *5 m i l l i o n s 
today and the continued p r o s p e r i t y of i n d u s t r y i n Japan means 
that there i s s t i l l a marked tendency f o r population to move 
to the towns, from the over-populated countryside. The 
population has i n c r e a s e d i n twenty p r e f e c u r e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
a b e l t centred i n the 35th p a r a l l e l ; but there has been a drop 
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i n the population of the other p r e f e c t u r e s because of t h i s 
constant migration to urban a r e a s . This move to the towns 
has been encouraged by the government, s i n c e the Land Reform 
Law of 1946, to combat r u r a l poverty. 
Wot only are there great d i f f e r e n c e s i n the d e n s i t i e s 
of population based l a r g e l y on topography but so too are there 
great d i f f e r e n c e s between the i s l a n d s . Hokkaido, which now 
has a population i n the region of 4-g- m i l l i o n s , was not adequately 
s e t t l e d u n t i l t h i s century. Her t o t a l population was only 
about 60,000 i n 1868. The colde r c l i m a t e i n h i b i t e d settlement, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a land where s e t t l e r s t r a d i t i o n a l l y p r e f e r r e d 
to grow r i c e , although v a r i e t i e s of r i c e can now be grown 
s u c c e s s f u l l y i n Hokkaido. The population of Hokkaido 
averages 61 to the square kilometre which i s e a s i l y the lowest 
of a l l the i s l a n d s . 
With the l o s s of overseas possessions Hokkaido became 
a v i t a l p a r t of the n a t i o n a l plan to develop resources and 
there has been marked u r b a n i s a t i o n . Sopporo, the c a p i t a l , 
now has a population of h a l f a m i l l i o n and Hakodate now has 
300,000 people. Shikoku i s much more densely populated 
than Hokkaido but i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a r u r a l population on the 
i s l a n d . The t o t a l population i s 4.2 m i l l i o n . No l a r g e 
c i t i e s have developed i n Northern Shikoku although there are 
s i x towns with populations of between 25,000 and 100,000 and 
these are mainly ports and l o c a l business c e n t r e s . There are 
no shipyards of any consequence on the i s l a n d but the s m a l l e r 
harbours, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the south coast of the i s l a n d are 
engaged mainly i n f i s h i n g . Both Tokushima (140 , 000) and 
Matsuyama ( l35,000) are, ports concerned with domestic trade, 
although the former which i s an ancient c a s t l e town, has needed 
an outport at Komatushima because of the shallowness of the 
r i v e r . Kyushu has a population of 13 m i l l i o n s . The i s l a n d 
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i s g e o l o g i c a l l y and morphologically very complex and 
consequently the human geography i s e q u a l l y complex. 
Apart from having a high r u r a l population there i s a 
great concentration of population centred on the towns 
of Yawata, Tobata and Kokura, a l l of which are a s s o c i a t e d 
with the i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y . The town of Nagasaki 
i s the centre of the next most important i n d u s t r i a l complex. 
Nagasaki has been completely r e b u i l t s i n c e i t was s h a t t e r e d 
i n the atom bomb at t a c k i n the l a s t war, and although the 
pre-war years were a period of d e c l i n e f o r i t as a port, i t 
has s i n c e recovered quite d r a m a t i c a l l y . The M i t s u b i s h i 
combine has an important shipyard t h e r e . Fukuoka ( 5 4 4 , 0 0 0 ) , 
o r i g i n a t i n g around a feudal c a s t l e i s an important i n d u s t r i a l 
centre and p o r t . Honshu i s the r e a l heart of Japan. The 
i s l a n d possesses s p a r s e l y populated mountain areas and at the 
other extreme, the g r e a t e s t connubations i n Japan. Many 
of these towns are s i t u a t e d on c o a s t a l p l a i n s and have been 
old n u c l e i , based on feudal c a s t l e s , markets or s h r i n e s 
but exceptions to t h i s are the ports of Kobe and Yokohama, 
which are comparatively recent i n o r i g i n . On the shores 
of the I n l a n d Sea, the S e t t s u p l a i n has fourteen c i t i e s 
i n c l u d i n g (Kyoto (1-J m i l l i o n s X Kobe (1 m i l l i o n ) a n d Osaka 
3^ m i l l i o n . The lowland behind I s e Bay has t h i r t e e n c i t i e s 
i n c l u d i n g Nagoya ( 1 . 4 m i l l i o n ) . The Kwanto p l a i n has no 
fewer than twenty eight c i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g Tokyo ( 9 . 7 m i l l i o n ) , 
Yokohama (1.1 m i l l i o n ) and Kawasaki 3 9 0 , 0 0 0 . 
Migration to c i t i e s 
The r a p i d growth of the major urban a r e a s , which was 
a f e a t u r e of the th**£ties - apart from an abnormal break 
towards the end of the war and immediately a f t e r i t - has 
continued and i s l i k e l y to continue. The continued expansion 
of i n d u s t r y and the l i m i t e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s which e x i s t on the 
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land have a s s i s t e d t h i s movement. There has been a 
steady decrease i n r u r a l population s i n c e the war and 
yet t o t a l production of a g r i c u l t u r a l produce has i n c r e a s e d 
i n s p i t e of the l o s s of farm workers. The s o c i a l freedoms 
of the towns and higher wages there have helped to draw 
workers from the countryside. 
Emigration 
The Japanese Government openly advocated emigration 
as a means of easing the population problem i n the period 
between the wars. There were two main motives i n t h i s : 
the f i r s t was simply to reduce the number of people l i v i n g 
on the sl e n d e r resources of Japan, and the second was to 
f u r t h e r Japan's i m p e r i a l i s t aims. Most Japanese governments 
p r e f e r r e d to support emigration to lands which were e i t h e r 
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y under Japanese c o n t r o l . Quite c l e a r l y 
i n the case of Manchukuo, the aim was to develop a secure base 
on the mainland of A s i a with a strong Japanese element i n i t s 
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l development. From the pure l y 
s t r a t e g i c point of view t h i s was a c o r r e c t one. Since 
the war, we i n B r i t a i n have seen i n so many ca s e s , (Aden, 
Cyprus e t c . ) that an a l i e n population can make a m i l i t a r y 
base v i r t u a l l y u s e l e s s . The str e n g t h of post-war n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements cannot have f o r e c a s t by many, but these have proved 
to be so potent that they have been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the 
dismemberment of most of the pre-war C o l o n i a l empires. 
Japan - apart from many of the i s l a n d s obtained from Germany 
a f t e r the F i r s t World War - was attempting to c o n t r o l l a r g e 
indigenous populations i n Korea, Formosa and Manchuria. 
Neither Korea nor Formosa with t h e i r high populations was 
favourable to Japanese a g r i c u l t u r a l settlement. Manchuria 
obviously was, but the Japanese showed a marked d i s i n c l i n a t i o n 
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to s e t t l e i n lands which experienced i n t e n s e winter c o l d . 
I n g e n e r a l , the Japanese have not been an ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y 
mobile' people. I n Manchuria the bulk of the Japanese 
s e t t l e r s l i v e d i n the towns and were concerned with i n d u s t r i a l 
or commercial development. 
Despite the government's encouragement to emigration 
the number of Japanese r e s i d e n t abroad i n 19*0 was l i t t l e 
more than one m i l l i o n and l a r g e s c a l e r e - p a t r i a t i o n a f t e r 
the war has reduced t h i s f i g u r e . A f t e r 193*, Japanese 
emigration to foreign c o u n t r i e s f e l l s h a r p l y although the 
government hoped to s e t t l e f i v e m i l l i o n s e t t l e r s i n Manchuria 
i n a twenty year period from 1937 onwards, f o r both economic 
and s t r a t e g i c reasons. 
Among fore i g n c o u n t r i e s B r a z i l has the hig h e s t 
Japanese population although Argentina and Peru have s i z e a b l e 
Japanese c o l o n i e s . Most c o u n t r i e s applied r e s t r i c t i o n s to 
immigrants from Japan and t h i s gave a great blow to Japanese 
d i g n i t y . The U.S. r e s t r i c t i o n s , i t w i l l be remembered, caused 
great b i t t e r n e s s i n both c o u n t r i e s . One can be sympathetic 
to both s i d e s on t h i s problem; the Japanese, v i v i d l y aware of 
the p r e s s u r e of population saw r e l a t i v e l y undeveloped lands 
which would be a l l the b e t t e r f o r Japanese settlement, but many 
of these c o u n t r i e s feared an un a s s i r a i l a b l e element i n t h e i r 
populations which would owe a l l e g i a n c e to an i m p e r i a l i s t Japan. 
This was quite c l e a r l y the f e a r of both New Zealand and A u s t r a l i 
I n September, 1960 there were 680 ,000 f o r e i g n e r s r e g i s t e r 
inJapan and of these n e a r l y 590 ,000 were Korean. Many of these 
Koreans came to Japan during the war when the con d i t i o n s of work 
and pay were a t t r a c t i v e to them and now they present quite a 
s i z e a b l e minority problem. A d i f f i c u l t y from the Japanese 
point of view i s the cleavage of p o l i t i c a l opinion between the 
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Koreans, i n view o f t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h e i r c o u n t r y , b u t 
t h i s was a l l e v i a t e d somewhat by t h e R e p a t r i a t i o n Agreement 
w i t h N o r t h Korea, by which 50 ,000 N o r t h Koreans were 
r e p a t r i a t e d i n 1959. 
Summary 
When he examined t h e demographic problem o f Japan i n 
19^0, Trewatha (8 ) suggested t h a t t h e r e were f i v e p o s s i b l e 
s o l u t i o n s which might ease t h e problem. The f i r s t two he 
c a l l e d n e g a t i v e s o l u t i o n s and t h e y were: ( a ) r e d u c t i o n o f 
b i r t h r a t e and an i n c r e a s e i n death r a t e ; and ( b ) e m i g r a t i o n . 
The r e m a i n i n g t h r e e were p o s i t i v e s o l u t i o n s which were: 
( a ) an i n c r e a s e i n a g r i c u l t u r a l e f f i c i e n c y and a t t e m p t e d l a n d 
r e c l a m a t i o n schemes, ( b ) a c q u i s i t i o n and c o l o n i s a t i o n o f some 
empty la n d s i n t h e P a c i f i c and ( c ) , f u r t h e r i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . 
Of t h e n e g a t i v e s o l u t i o n s , t h e b i r t h r a t e has d e c l i n e d 
s h a r p l y - which has he l p e d - b u t t h e death r a t e has a l s o 
decreased. T h i s decrease i n death r a t e i s t o be expected 
and s h o r t o f an a p p l i c a t i o n o f M a l t h u s i a n c o n d i t i o n s , i s 
l i k e l y t o decrease even f u r t h e r . 
When we t u r n t o h i s p o s i t i v e s o l u t i o n s we can be more 
o p t i m i s t i c t h a n many e a r l i e r geographers, even i n c l u d i n g those 
who wr o t e o n l y t e n years ago. (e.g. P r o f e s s o r F i s h e r i n 
East and Moodie). The b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t s o f l a n d r e f o r m , 
a l l i e d t o m e c h a n i z a t i o n , improved t e c h n i q u e s and b e t t e r 
i n s e c t i c i d e s e t c . have seen a farm p o p u l a t i o n f a l l by 2 .2 m i H i 
(5 .6 p e r c e n t ) between 1955 and 1960 (a process which i s s t i l l 
g o i n g on unabated) and y e t o b t a i n a t o t a l r i c e crop i n c r e a s e 
o f 29 per c e n t . Today Japan i s j u s t about s e l f s u f f i c i e n t i n 
her p r o d u c t i o n o f r i c e b u t b e f o r e t h e war, w i t h a s m a l l e r t o t a l 
p o p u l a t i o n , she had t o i m p o r t 25% o f her needs. I n s h o r t , 
t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l scene i s much more r e a s s u r i n g t h a n i t was a 
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few years ago and a l t h o u g h i t i s s t i l l c h a r a c t e r i s e d by 
A s i a n l a b o u r i n t e n s i v e methods, we a r e now b e g i n n i n g t o 
see t h e development o f c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e methods i n 
a g r i c u l t u r e . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e v e l o p i n g m a r g i n a l 
l a n d i s n o t good i n Japan, a p a r t perhaps f o r some p a r t s 
o f Hokkaido, and i n most cases the growing o f new crops -
or a l t e r n a t i v e l y new s t r a i n s o f o l d crops - on e x i s t i n g l a n d 
i s t h e most we can expect i n t h i s sphere. 
As r e g a r d s P r o f e s s o r Trewatha's o t h e r s o l u t i o n s we 
can e a s i l y d i s c o u n t e m i g r a t i o n o r t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f new 
t e r r i t o r i e s . The l y n c h p i n of t h e Japan's success has been -
and must be - i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l sphere. The a g r i c u l t u r a l 
s i d e o f Japan's economy can o n l y p r o g r e s s i f t h e r e i s a 
comparable expansion i n i n d u s t r y . T h i s o f course, i s 
p r e c i s e l y t h e p o s i t i o n i n B r i t a i n a l t h o u g h t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l 
element i n h e r economy i s nowhere near so i m p o r t a n t as i t i s 
i n Japan. 
The e x t r a o r d i n a r y expansion o f Japanese i n d u s t r y , 
accompanied by a g r e a t l y i n c r e a s i n g share i n w o r l d t r a d e , 
i s t h e r e a l l y v i t a l p o i n t . I t c o u l d be s t r o n g l y argued 
t h a t Japan i s most v u l n e r a b l e ; i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e depends 
on peace and s t a b i l i t y and y e t Japan i s i n one o f t h e most 
p o l i t i c a l l y u n s t a b l e areas o f t h e w o r l d . Japan has had 
b i t t e r e x p e r i e n c e o f the e f f e c t o f t a r i f f s and quotas imposed 
upon her t r a d e by o t h e r powers,.and any c o n c e r t e d p r o t e c t i v e 
measures c o u l d a g a i n be s e r i o u s . A f u r t h e r f a c t o r making 
f o r p o s s i b l e i n s t a b i l i t y i n Japanese t r a d e i s t h e f a c t t h a t 
over t h i r t y p e r cent of her e x p o r t s e n t e r U.S.A., which makes 
her p o l i t i c a l l y and e c o n o m i c a l l y dependent on t h a t c o u n t r y . 
I n s p i t e o f t h e somewhat exposed p o s i t i o n o f Japan the 
w r i t e r i n c l i n e s t o t h e o p t i m i s t i c view. C o u n t r i e s such as 
I n d i a , P a k i s t a n and Ceylon have g r e a t needs o f t h e type o f 
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low c o s t , h i g h q u a l i t y p r o d u c t o f Japanese i n d u s t r y and 
these c o u n t r i e s are not l i k e l y t o d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t 
Japan any more th a n t h e y are a g a i n s t any o t h e r c o u n t r y . 
B r i t a i n h e r s e l f cannot hope t o secure any p r e f e r e n t i a l 
t r e a t m e n t f o r h e r own e x p o r t s t o these c o u n t r i e s as she 
c o u l d i n t h e p a s t . I f we were t o go by p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , 
e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e i n t e r - w a r years we would be e x t r e m e l y 
w o r r i e d about Japan's dependence on t h e s t a t e o f U.S. economy. 
The c h a i n r e a c t i o n o f t h e slump o r i g i n a t i n g i n t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s was a n i g h t m a r e b e f o r e t h e war. I n view o f t h e 
p r o g r e s s i n t h i n k i n g i n economics, coming from t h e work o f 
L o r d Keynes, we may e x p e r i e n c e a r e c e s s i o n i n w o r l d t r a d e 
but t h e p a r a l y s i n g slump o f pre-war years i s u n l i k e l y t o 
happen. Japan would be s t r o n g e r , i n her own esteem i f 
n o t h i n g e l s e , i f she were l e s s dependent on U n i t e d S t a t e s 
t r a d e b u t i n her v u l n e r a b l e m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , c l o s e 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s make sense. Japan i s 
n o t overburdened w i t h m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e and h e r economy 
i s b e t t e r t h a n i t has ever been. 
The demographic problem, t h e r e f o r e , i s g r e a t , b u t 
assuming t h a t she does not undergo a f u r t h e r p o p u l a t i o n 
e x p l o s i o n , "there are no grounds f o r b e i n g so p e s s i m i s t i c 
as e a r l i e r w r i t e r s have been. However, l o n g term f o r e c a s t s 
o f p o p u l a t i o n are n o t o r i o u s l y u n r e l i a b l e and t h e demographer 
u s u a l l y devotes most of h i s a t t e n t i o n s t o changes o f t h e 
r e c e n t p a s t and o f t h e n e x t few y e a r s . We know t o o , 
e s p e c i a l l y i n B r i t a i n , t h a t any l a r g e s c a l e war, f o u g h t w i t h 
n u c l e a r weapons, would cause such d e v a s t a t i o n t h a t i t makes 
s p e c u l a t i o n over n a t i o n a l p r o s p e c t s q u i t e f r u i t l e s s i n t h a t 
e v e n t u a l i t y and so Japan's r a p i d growth i n h e r g r o s s - n a t i o n a l 
p r o d u c t c o u l d w e l l be her s a l v a t i o n . ' 
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1 1 . INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
At t h e end o f World War I I , Japan, l i k e N a z i 
Germany, was a p a r i a h among t h e n a t i o n s o f t h e w o r l d . 
The s m a l l e r , non-communist c o u n t r i e s o f South e a s t A s i a 
had f e l t t h e o p p r e s s i v e w e i g h t o f Japanese o c c u p a t i o n 
and t h i s l e f t a p r o f o u n d s u s p i c i o n o f Japanese m o t i v e s 
i n t h e post-war w o r l d . 
I n h e r d e a l i n g s w i t h S o v i e t . Russia, t h e r e were 
l o n g memories o f a g g r e s s i v e a c t i o n s on the b o r d e r s o f 
Manchukuo by the Russian Far Ea s t e r n Armies and t h e i r 
c u l m i n a t i o n i n the d e c l a r a t i o n o f war by t h e U.S.S.R. on 
Japan towards the end o f World War I I - c o n s i d e r e d by most 
Japanese t o be a s t a b i n t h e back. A l l t h i s m i l i t a t e d 
a g a i n s t reasonable r e l a t i o n s between t h e two n a t i o n s . 
Japan was e m b i t t e r e d by t h e l o s s of t e r r i t o r i e s c o n s i d e r e d 
t o be i n a l i e n a b l e p a r t s o f the homeland, by t h e massive 
e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f c a p i t a l p l a n t i n Manchukuo, and by the 
t r e a t m e n t o f her s o l d i e r s who s u r r e n d e r e d t o S o v i e t Armies. 
I r o n i c a l l y , Japan's c l o s e s t a l l y s i n c e t h e l a t e 1940's 
has been t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , s e p a r a t e d from Japan by more 
t h a n 4 ,000 m i l e s . T h i s c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p , o f t e n d e e p l y 
r e s e n t e d by many Japanese, and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t by the 
Americans, has had c l e a r advantages f o r b o t h n a t i o n s . Much 
of t h e o r i g i n a l American t h i n k i n g about ways t o bre a k up 
Japanese heavy i n d u s t r y and t r a n s f o r m h er i n t o a ' S w i t z e r l a n d 
of t h e Far East' was q u i c k l y r e v i s e d because o f t h e emergence 
of a Communist Government i n China and because o f t h e 
i n t r a n s i g e n c e o f t h e S o v i e t Government. American a i d to 
Japan i n t h e e a r l y p o s t war years was v i t a l t o p r e s e r v e l i f e 
and i t c o n t i n u e d w i t h s e n s i b l e a g r a r i a n and s o c i a l r e f o r m . 
The r e a l l y s t a r t l i n g economic p r o g r e s s which t h e Japanese 
economy made, b r o u g h t about i n g r e a t measure by U.S. purchases 
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i n t h e Korean War i n 1950, made Japan a p o w e r f u l n a t i o n 
by t h e m i d - f i f t i e s . Japan has n o t been t r o u b l e d by t h e 
burden o f heavy i n v e s t m e n t i n h e r n a t i o n a l d e f e nce, a 
problem t h a t has plagued post-war B r i t a i n . Even i n t h e 
e a r l y 1960's, o n l y a l i t t l e over one p e r cent o f t h e gross 
n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t went i n t o m i l i t a r y expenses. But t h e 
c h i e f c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o Japan's economic 
r e c o v e r y has been t h r o u g h t r a d e and economic c o - o p e r a t i o n . 
"As Japanese i n d u s t r y began t o g e t on i t s f e e t a g a i n , 
t e c h n i c a l know-how from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , embodied i n 
hundreds o f agreements on p a t e n t s and a f f i l i a t i o n s between 
American and Japanese f i r m s , made a huge c o n t r i b u t i o n t o 
th e r e v i v i n g economy. So a l s o d i d an immense f l o w o f 
American c r e d i t t o c a p i t a l - hungry Japan, i n t h e form o f 
c o r p o r a t e i n v e s t m e n t s i n Japanese s e c u r i t i e s . The U n i t e d 
S t a t e s has become Japan's g r e a t e s t market, s t e a d i l y a b s o r b i n g 
about a q u a r t e r or more o f i t s e x p o r t s . I n r e t u r n t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s accounted f o r more o f Japan's i m p o r t s - r o u g h l y 
a t h i r d . I n f a c t Japan has come t o st a n d second o n l y t o 
Canada as an e x p o r t market f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and i s i t s 
b e s t market f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s . U s u a l l y , U n i t e d S t a t e s 
e x p o r t s t o Japan exceed i m p o r t s by a few hundred m i l l i o n 
d o l l a r s a n n u a l l y , though American m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s i n 
Japan and t h e p r o v i d i n g o f c a p i t a l t e n d t o t u r n t h e balance 
o f payments i n Japan's f a v o u r . I n t h i s tremendous economic 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t h e r e has c o n s t a n t l y been a f r i n g e o f h o t l y 
c o n t e s t e d t r a d e problems, such as t h e l e v e l s a t which Japan 
would l i m i t i t s c o t t o n t e x t i l e e x p o r t s t o t h e U.S. But 
these problems are s m a l l compared w i t h t h e o v e r a l l s i z e o f 
th e Japanese-American economic r e l a t i o n s h i p . By t h e e a r l y 
1960*s t r a d e between t h e two c o u n t r i e s topped t h e #3 b i l l i o n 
mark, making i t by a l l odds t h e g r e a t e s t t r a n s o c e a n i c t r a d e 
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(0 
t h e w o r l d has ever seen." I n r e t u r n f o r her generous 
economic a s s i s t a n c e t o Japan, America o b t a i n e d a v a l u a b l e 
base i n t h e Far East and gained a f a i r l y s t a b l e a l l y . 
Japan i s a key t o t h e U.S. d e f e n s i v e scheme i n t h e Far East 
which has, as i t s main aim, t h e c o n t a i n i n g o f Communist China 
and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t , Russia. W i t h o u t Japan, the U n i t e d 
S t a t e s would f i n d i t almost i m p o s s i b l e t o e x e r t much i n f l u e n c e 
i n t h i s p a r t o f t h e w o r l d as her main i s l a n d bases would be 
f a r t o o v u l n e r a b l e t o a t t a c k and would l a c k s t r e n g t h i n d e p t h . 
Cynics c o u l d contend t h a t t h e v i t a l p o s i t i o n o f Japan i n t h i s 
d e f e n s i v e system has caused the U.S. t o be generous i n i t s 
t r e a t m e n t o f Japan. B r i t a i n has f u l l y r e a l i s e d t h a t i t i s 
u t t e r l y i m p o s s i b l e t o h o l d a base t h a t possesses a h o s t i l e 
i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n - a f t e r b i t t e r e x p e r i e n c e s - and t h e 
U.S., p r o f i t i n g from t h i s , has been a l i t t l e more c o n s i d e r a t e 
t o Japanese f e e l i n g s . 
The. U n i t e d S t a t e s was l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e o f g e t t i n g 
t h e Peace T r e a t y s i g n e d i n 1951 and i t s generous terms t o 
Japan were l a r g e l y a r e s u l t o f U n i t e d S t a t e s i n s i s t e n c e . 
The v e r y closeness o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
has caused many Japanese t o r e a c t a g a i n s t i t . Perhaps i t 
was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t t h e r e would be a r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e 
massive i n t r o d u c t i o n o f U.S. o r g a n i s a t i o n and i d e a s a f t e r t h e 
war. Perhaps, t o o , Westerners can e a s i l y assume t h a t Japan i s 
s i m p l y a r u t h l e s s a d o p t e r o f Western t e c h n i q u e s and i d e a s , and 
t h e y can e a s i l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e zenophobia t h a t 
i s s t r o n g i n most i s l a n d p e o p l e s . I n Japan t h e extremes o f 
b o t h t h e r i g h t and t h e l e f t have argued t h a t Japan i s s i m p l y 
a c o l o n y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , b o t h e c o n o m i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y 
and t h e v i o l e n c e which broke out when the Mr K i s h i ' s government 
s i g n e d t h e r e v i s e d t r e a t y w i t h t h e U.S. Government i n 1960 was 
a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h i s . A l t h o u g h muoh o f th e h o s t i l i t y was 
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c e n t r e d on t h e p a r t o f t h e t r e a t y which gave t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s t h e r i g h t t o use bases i n Japan, most o b s e r v e r s 
agree t h a t i t was, i n g e n e r a l , an i n c h o a t e resentment o f 
American d o m i n a t i o n o f Japan. The spearhead o f t h i s 
v i o l e n c e was the s t u d e n t s ' u n i o n , Zengakuren, which un-
d o u b t e d l y has s t r o n g Communist p r o c l i v i t i e s , and t h e r e i s 
a much l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r c e , t h e u l t r a - r i g h t Great Japan 
P a t r i o t i c P a r t y , a l t h o u g h i t i s d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed t o t h e 
f o r m e r . But i t would be wrong t o a s c r i b e t h e d i s o r d e r s 
s o l e l y t o e x t r e m i s t s and t o i g n o r e a widespread resentment 
a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . What i s perhaps r e a l l y r e a s s u r i n g 
i s t o f i n d t h a t t h e extreme r i g h t had a m i n i m a l i n f l u e n c e i n 
t h e d i s o r d e r s when we r e c a l l how r i g h t wing elements s h a t t e r e d 
any v e s t i g e s o f democracy i n pre-war Japan. The q u e s t i o n o f 
n u c l e a r weapons and t e s t s has always provoked much i l l w i l l i n 
Japan a f t e r h e r t e r r i b l e e x p e r i e n c e s a t Nagasaki and H i r o s h i m a . 
There i s , n a t u r a l l y , a genuine s e n t i m e n t a g a i n s t atomic weapons 
even though t h i s has been e x p l o i t e d by the Communist P a r t y a t 
t i m e s when the U.S. has c a r r i e d out n u c l e a r t e s t s and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
when t h e Japanese f i s h i n g v e s s e l was c ontaminated by r a d i o -
a c t i v e f a l l - o u t near B i k i n i . E s l e r Dening, a f o r m e r B r i t i s h 
Ambassador to Tokyo, r o u n d l y condemns the Communist Governments 
of China and t h e U.S.S.R. which, w o r k i n g t h r o u g h t h e Japanese 
Communist P a r t y , a c t on genuine f e e l i n g and t h e n e x p l o i t i t 
t o undermine Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s . He w r i t e s : "The 
element o f s p o n t a n e i t y i n Japanese d e m o n s t r a t i o n s - i f i t 
e x i s t s - i s h a r d t o d e t e c t , though t h e Japanese temperament 
i s s u s c e p t i b l e t o d e l i b e r a t e i n c i t e m e n t , and i n such c i r c u m -
stances can become b o t h menacing and f o r m i d a b l e . " (2 ) 
The c o n t i n u e d m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e Ryuku and 
Benin groups o f i s l a n d s by t h e U.S. f o r c e s has been a sore 
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p o i n t w i t h t h e Japanese. The U n i t e d S t a t e s government 
c o n s i d e r s Okinawa, i n p a r t i c u l a r , a v a l u a b l e base which 
a l l o w s her a i r c r a f t t o r e i n f o r c e Korea and Japan. The 
U.S. goes t o g r e a t l e n g t h s t o assuage Japanese f e e l i n g 
b u t A r t i c l e 3 o f t h e Peace T r e a t y , which g i v e s her t h e 
a t t r i b u t e s o f s o v e r e i g n t y w i t h o u t s o v e r e i g n t y i t s e l f 
over the i s l a n d s , i s p a r t i c u l a r l y r e s e n t e d i n Japan. 
The U.S. has done much t o g i v e l o c a l automony t o t h e 
Okinawans and has g i v e n them a h i g h s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g 
b u t t h i s has not s a t i s f i e d e i t h e r t h e Okinawans or t h e 
Japanese. The bases have a h i g h l y developed m i l i t a r y 
p o t e n t i a l and American m i l i t a r y t h i n k i n g seems t o be t h a t 
a t l e a s t t h e y cannot be ta k e n away a t w i l l , as c o u l d h e r 
bases i n Japan p r o p e r now t h a t t h e l a t t e r i s a s o v e r e i g n 
power. The r e t e n t i o n o f these bases i s a g r i m r e m i n d e r 
t o t h e Japanese t h a t American f o r c e s can o p e r a t e r e g a r d l e s s 
o f t h e i r s a n c t i o n . But when we come t o t h e whole problem 
o f the'Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s h i p , w h i l e i t i s p o s s i b l e 
t o sympathise w i t h t h e Japanese when t h e i r amour-propre i s 
o f f e n d e d by t h e Americans, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see t h e l o g i c 
o f a p o s s i b l e break w i t h America. China i s n o t t h e weak 
nei g h b o u r t o r n by i n t e r n a l d i s s e n s i o n b u t i s a s t r o n g power, 
w i t h p r o s e l y t i s i n g i n t e n t i o n s . N e u t r a l i s m as a p o l i c y 
has proved d i f f i c u l t even f o r I n d i a , w i t h l i t t l e h e l p from 
what was c o n s i d e r e d a s a f e T i b e t a n 'cordon s a n i t a i r e ^ and 
would prove t o be even more d i f f i c u l t f o r Japan. S m a l l e r 
n a t i o n s such as Sweden and S w i t z e r l a n d have managed t o 
p r e s e r v e n e u t r a l i t y i n w o r l d wide c o n f l i c t s b u t i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o see t h i s as a f e a s i b l e p o l i c y f o r Japan; she i s p o t e n t i a l l y 
t o o p o w e r f u l and t o o g r e a t a p r i z e . She has thrown i n her l o t 
w i t h the w e s t e r n w o r l d , and assuming reasonable a t t i t u d e s 
towards h e r by h e r a l l i e s t h e r e are no grounds f o r t h i n k i n g 
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she w i l l d e v i a t e from t h i s . T h i s c a l l s f o r g r e a t t a c t 
on t h e p a r t o f t h e Americans, One o f t h e most p e r s p i c a c i o u s 
w r i t e r s on Japan, Edwin 0. Reischauer, showed how easy i t i s 
f o r t h e d i s p a r a t e movements i n Japan t o come t o g e t h e r i n a 
common cause o f A n t i - A m e r i c a n i s m . He w r i t e s : "Every i s s u e 
o f p o l i t i c a l , economic, o r s o c i a l i m p o r t a n c e has i t s American 
as p e c t . Those who champion a b s o l u t e n e u t r a l i s m , t o say 
n o t h i n g o f those who advocate a Communist a l i g n m e n t f o r Japan, 
f i n d i n t h e American m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e and American bases t h e 
n a t u r a l t a r g e t o f a t t a c k . Those w i t h a dogmatic b e l i e f i n 
p r i m i t i v e Marxism f i n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , as t h e l e a d e r o f t h e 
c a p i t a l i s t camp, t h e obvious enemy. Those who d i s a p p r o v e o f 
t h e purges or t h e economic, s o c i a l , or e d u c a t i o n a l r e f o r m s o f 
t h e o c c u p a t i o n p e r i o d - and these are l a r g e l y t o be found among 
the Japanese c o n s e r v a t i v e s - n o t u n n a t u r a l l y c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r 
blame on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Those who l o o k w i t h d i s f a v o u r 
on one o r o t h e r o f t h e g r e a t s o c i o l o g i c a l changes sweeping 
Japan - and these i n c l u d e b o t h l e f t i s t s and c o n s e r v a t i v e s -
are a l l t o o prone t o a t t r i b u t e whatever t h e y c o n s i d e r t o be 
t h e i l l s o f t h e modern age t o an e x c e s s i v e • A m e r i c a n i s a t i o n ' 
t h a t i s d e s t r o y i n g t h e r e a l Japan. These who have f e a r s 
about Japan's e x t e r n a l markets, an i n f l o w o f f o r e i g n goods, 
o r f u t u r e economic c o n d i t i o n s , t h i n k i n a l l cases p r i m a r i l y 
about t h e economic r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 
Japan's r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , be t h e y Communist, 
de m o c r a t i c or l e s s developed, almost i n v a r i a b l y i n v o l v e Japan's 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , o r a t l e a s t so i t seems t o 
th e average Japanese." (3) The e x t e n t o f U.S. d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Japan are f u l l y a pparent from t h i s . 
T h i s c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s , i n a l a r g e measure, r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r t h e poor r e l a t i o n s between China and Japan. Under A r t i c l e 
26 o f t h e Peace T r e a t y Japan was empowered t o s i g n s e p a r a t e 
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t r e a t i e s w i t h n a t i o n s who d i d n o t s i g n t h e o r i g i n a l Peace 
T r e a t y and Japan i n e v i t a b l y concluded a t r e a t y w i t h t h e 
N a t i o n a l i s t government of Chiang Kai-Shek and i g n o r e d t h e 
C e n t r a l Peoples' Government o f t h e m a i n l a n d . A f t e r t h i s 
a f f r o n t t o Communist China's d i g n i t y and because o f t h e 
cl o s e m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e U.S. and Japan 
t h e r e i s l i t t l e immediate hope f o r an improvement o f 
r e l a t i o n s between t h e two n a t i o n s . Odd o v e r t u r e s have been 
made between t h e Peoples' Government and t h e Japanese 
Government w i t h a view t o i m p r o v i n g r e l a t i o n s , b u t n o t h i n g 
l e s s t h a n t h e severance o f t h e Japan-U.S. r e l a t i o n s h i p 
would s a t i s f y t h e mainland Chinese Government. Some 
Japanese p r i s o n e r s o f war were r e p a t r i a t e d by t h e Communists 
bu t t h i s , as was t h e case over Russian r e p a t r i a t i o n o f 
p r i s o n e r s t o West Germany, f a i l e d t o p l a c a t e f e e l i n g i n 
Japan as so many p r i s o n e r s were s t i l l unaccounted f o r . 
Even i f i n f l u e n t i a l businessmen i n Japan t a l k 
n o s t a l g i c a l l y o f o l d t r a d e c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e Chinese m a i n l a n d , 
t h e y a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a l i s t i c t o know t h a t t r a d e r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h a Communist Government c o u l d n o t be a s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e 
l u c r a t i v e U.S. Market. I m p e r i a l i s t powers such as B r i t a i n 
and pre-war Japan had an a t t i t u d e o f s u p e r i o r i t y t o China, 
p u r e l y and s i m p l y because o f her la m e n t a b l e weakness. Today, 
Japan r e g a r d s China w i t h a r e s p e c t which stems from China's 
g r e a t m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h . The a t t a c k on t h e n o r t h e r n t e r r i t o r i e s 
o f I n d i a , c o n f i r m i n g e a r l i e r a g g r e s s i v e i n t e n t i o n s i n Korea 
and T i b e t , p l u s the c o n f i r m a t i o n o f Communist China's p o s s e s s i o n 
o f t h e Atom Bomb have a l l had a g r e a t impact on t h e Japanese. 
There i s , however, a good d e a l o f o p i n i o n i n Japan - n o t s o l e l y 
o r t h o d o x Communist - which a s c r i b e s Chinese i n t r a n s i g e n c e t o t h e 
a g g r e s s i v e m i l i t a r y a t t i t u d e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . They p o i n t 
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o u t , w i t h some j u s t i f i c a t i o n - i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e w r i t e r -
t h a t t h e f a t u o u s r e c o g n i t i o n by t h e U.S. o f t h e government 
i n Formosa as t h e l e g i t i m a t e government o f China and t h e 
a g g r e s s i v e sweeps o f t h e U.S. Seventh F l e e t are enough t o 
an t a g o n i s e any independent n a t i o n . Any u n r e f l e c t i v e , 
p r e c i p i t a t e a c t i o n s by t h e U.S. government towards Communist 
China may have v e r y adverse e f f e c t s on moderate o p i n i o n i n 
Japan and i t i s w e l l f o r t h e Americans t o remember t h i s . I n 
the meanwhile, Japan i s i n t h e u n e n v i a b l e p o s i t i o n t h a t any 
c o n c i l i a t o r y g e s t u r e t o one Chinese Government i s bound t o 
i n c u r t h e d i s p l e a s u r e o f t h e o t h e r . Both Formosa and the 
mainland o f China are bound t o be o f c l o s e i n t e r e s t t o Japan, 
b o t h p o l i t i c a l l y and e c o n o m i c a l l y , j u s t as events i n Europe 
are o f v i t a l i n t e r e s t t o B r i t a i n . 
Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U.S.S.R. have been s t r a i n e d 
i n the post-war y e a r s b u t many ob s e r v e r s contend t h a t t h e 
r i f t between Communist China and t h e S o v i e t Union has b r o u g h t 
about a g e n e r a l ' s o f t e n i n g ' o f t h e Russian a t t i t u d e t o Japan. 
The S o v i e t Union i s s t i l l v u l n e r a b l e i n t h e Far East and h e r 
main f e a r s a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y o f t h e U.S. t h e r e b u t more o f 
China, and t o t h i s e x t e n t t h e l a s t t h i n g t h a t t h e Russians would 
want would be a rapprochement between China and Japan. The 
Americans dominated Japan a f t e r t h e S u r r e n d e r , i n t h e same way 
t h a t Russia dominated E a s t e r n Europe, and Russia- was e f f e c t i v e l y 
e x c l u ded from any c o n t r o l over post-war Japan. The S o v i e t 
Government r e f u s e d t o s i g n t h e Peace T r e a t y which t h e U.S. 
and Japan n e g o t i a t e d and i t was not u n t i l 1956 t h a t t h e Russians 
proposed n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t would l e a d t o a peace t r e a t y . There 
was d i f f i c u l t y over t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f sea b o u n d a r i e s between t h e 
S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y o f S a k h a l i n and t h e K u r i l e s and t h e i s l a n d o f 
Hokkaido and s e c o n d l y , t h e S o v i e t Government wanted t o exclude 
f o r e i g n w a r s h i p s from c e r t a i n w a t e r s , a move wh i c h , i n e f f e c t , 
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was an a t t a c k on Japan's S e c u r i t y T r e a t y w i t h the U.S. 
Under A r t i c l e 2 ( c ) o f t h e Peace T r e a t y , Japan 
"renounces a l l r i g h t , t i t l e and c l a i m t o the K u r i l e I s l a n d s 
and t o t h a t p o r t i o n o f S a k h a l i n and t h e i s l a n d s a d j a c e n t t o 
i t over which Japan a c q u i r e d s o v e r e i g n t y as a consequence o f 
the T r e a t y o f Portsmouth o f September 5 t h , 1905" (which ended 
the Russo-Japanese War o f 190^-5 ) . I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s 
c l a u s e was i n s e r t e d because o f t h e Y a l t a agreement between 
t h e U.S.S.R., B r i t a i n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , b u t as has been 
p o i n t e d o u t , the K u r i l e s were n o t a c q u i r e d by Japan i n t h e 
war w i t h Russia b u t she had had her po s s e s s i o n o f these 
i s l a n d s c o n f i r m e d i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . G e o g r a p h i c a l l y 
S a k h a l i n s t r e t c h e s almost due n o r t h from t h e n o r t h e r n t i p o f 
Hokkaido and a p a r t from i t s s t r a t e g i c v a l u e , i t was e c o n o m i c a l l y 
o f some im p o r t a n c e because o f t i m b e r , i t s f i s h e r i e s and 
d e p o s i t s o f o i l and c o a l . Russia a l s o occupied t h e i s l a n d s 
o f Hobomai and t h e i s l a n d o f S h i k o t a n and as these are n o t 
p a r t o f any t e r r i t o r i e s l o s t by Japan by any agreement a t 
Y a l t a or i n any peace t r e a t y , t h e i r occupation- i s u n j u s t i f i e d . 
The r i g i d i m p o s i t i o n o f a t w e l v e m i l e t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t on 
a l l t h e t e r r i t o r i e s occupied by Russia has meant t h e l o s s o f 
v e r y v a l u a b l e f i s h i n g r i g h t s by t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f N o r t h -
e a s t e r n Hokkaido. The S o v i e t Union, as an a d d i t i o n a l p i n p r i c k , 
c o n s i s t e n t l y vetoed t h e Japanese c l a i m t o membership of t h e 
U n i t e d N a t i o n s b u t i n 1956, Japan agreed t o e n t e r i n t o f o r m a l 
d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union, and as a r e s u l t 
o f t h i s , t h e Russians d i d n o t oppose t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r 
membership on t h i s o c c a s i o n . Japanese resentment o f t h e 
S o v i e t Union a l s o r a n .high on o t h e r c o u n t s : t h e l a t t e r had 
been slow i n r e t u r n i n g Japanese p r i s o n e r s o f war, and many 
thousands never cameback home, presumably v i c t i m s o f t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s i n S i b e r i a n p r i s o n camps. On b a l a n c e , r e l a t i o n s 
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between Japan and t h e S o v i e t Union a r e today as good as t h e y 
have ever been s i n c e t h e end o f World War I I and a l t h o u g h 
i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e two p r e c l u d e a c l o s e 
a s s o c i a t i o n , u n d o u b t e d l y S o v i e t problems w i t h China have 
caused t h e S o v i e t Government t o be a l i t t l e more c o n c i l i a t o r y 
t o Japan t h a n she had been f o r m e r l y . 
I n t h e r e s t o f A s i a , Japan's c h i e f d i f f i c u l t y i n 
e s t a b l i s h i n g f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s was i n those t e r r i t o r i e s 
w h i ch she had o v e r r u n i n t h e war. A p a r t from s e n t i m e n t 
engendered i n t h e war, t h e main s t u m b l i n g b l o c k was over 
r e p a r a t i o n s payments. D u r i n g t h e years between 1952 and 
1957i Japan made det e r m i n e d e f f o r t s t o come t o an e q u i t a b l e 
s o l u t i o n t o these problems and most have now been s e t t l e d . 
A l t h o u g h Japan p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e A f r o - A s i a n conference 
a t Bandung i n I n d o n e s i a her r o l e has n o t been a dominant one 
i n South East A s i a . There were memories o f t h e m i l i t a r i s t 
r o l e o f Japan i n t h e war t o l e s s e n her i n f l u e n c e w i t h o t h e r 
Asian n a t i o n s , b u t t h i s has n o t been a c r i t i c a l f a c t o r o f 
r e c e n t y e a r s , b u t r a t h e r has i t been because o f Japan's 
S e c u r i t y Pact w i t h t h e U.S.A., which p u t s h er c o m p l e t e l y 
o u t s i d e t h e n e u t r a l i s t camp. Many Western w r i t e r s have 
complained t h a t Japan s h o u l d have done much more t o a s s i s t 
t h e economic p r o g r e s s o f p o o r e r n a t i o n s o f s o u t h east A s i a 
and t h e r e i s some j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s c o m p l a i n t . By 
the end o f 1963 I n d i a had r e c e i v e d a i d from B r i t a i n i n t h e 
r e g i o n o f 2 ,500 m i l l i o n rupees which was more than t w i c e t h a t 
p r o v i d e d by Japan. 
Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h South Korea have been c o n s i s t e n t l y 
bad i n t h e p o s t war e r a . Japan s t i l l has a l a r g e Korean 
p o p u l a t i o n who came t o Japan t o work i n t h e coalmines b u t 
when Korea o b t a i n e d i t s independence, these Koreans a u t o m a t i c a l l y 
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l o s t Japanese c i t i z e n s h i p and Japan wished to r e p a t r i a t e 
them. As many of these r e p a t r i a t e s opted to r e t u r n to 
North Korea t h i s aroused the antagonism of the South 
Korean government. I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s problem the 
establishment of the Ehee l i n e outside Korean t e r r i t o r i a l 
waters prevented the Japanese from f i s h i n g i n t r a d i t i o n a l 
f i s h i n g grounds and t h i s too caused b i t t e r n e s s . The United 
States was n a t u r a l l y embarrassed at t h i s dispute between two 
A l l i e s , e s p e c i a l l y as she had done much to t r a i n both t h e i r 
armed forces. There i s l i t t l e hope of any r e a l l y c o r d i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between South Korea and Japan as the psychological 
background i s so bad; Japanese occupation of Korea was f a r 
too long and f a r too harsh. 
The war has completely changed r e l a t i o n s between 
Japan and B r i t a i n . The decline of B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e i n the 
Far East and the collapse of the Japanese Empire have removed 
the o l d bases f o r enmity. B r i t a i n , i s i n d i r e c t competition 
w i t h Japan i n so many exports but there has not been the 
b i t t e r n e s s t h a t marked t h i s r i v a l r y before the war. B r i t i s h 
exporters claim t h a t Japan i s o v e r - p r o t e c t i v e to her home 
market and we hear the same complaint about the B r i t i s h 
market from the Japanese. The s t r u c t u r e of Japanese economy 
i s more favourable to a growth of trade w i t h other Commonwealth 
co u n t r i e s , notably A u s t r a l i a and Canada w i t h t h e i r abundance 
of primary products. I n recent years, A u s t r a l i a n wool, wheat 
and i r o n ore have a l l been imported by Japan i n considerable 
q u a n t i t i e s . Much of the rancour f e l t by the A u s t r a l i a n s 
towards the Japanese has been d i s s i p a t e d , and commercially, 
the high q u a l i t y of Japanese goods has been appreciated by 
the A u s t r a l i a n s . 
Japan could undoubtedly do more to help the poor 
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nations of Asia w i t h her great t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s and 
productive power. This has been r e - i t e r a t e d i n t h i s 
work but i t i s .the realm of ideas and p o l i t i c a l philosophy 
t h a t her greatest i n f l u e n c e may l i e i n the f u t u r e . Japan 
appears to have established a working democracy and she i s 
the f i r s t Asian country to do t h i s , w i t h the notable exception 
of I n d i a . I n d i a , however, i s tr o u b l e d by chronic economic 
problems and a p p a l l i n g backwardness of her people and does 
not present the s h i n i n g example t h a t Japan does, w i t h her 
economic success. What Japan h,as done i s to 'demonstrate 
beyond question t h a t there i s l i f e and v i t a l i t y i n t h i s idea 
and p r a c t i c e of democracy i n the second h a l f of the t w e n t i e t h 
century. This i s not t o say t h a t Japan's experience w i t h 
democracy can be extrapolated i n t o s i t u a t i o n s of the new• 
nations of Asia and A f r i c a ; her experience can give ideas 
and clues but should not receive l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , 
but democracy has always been a product of the West and as one 
of the f i r s t o r i e n t a l nations to achieve success i n democracy, 
t h i s has r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the world. Japan's development 
of a democratic system of government i s not a cast i r o n 
defence against f u t u r e aggressive p o l i c i e s by her government 
but i t i s an enormous step i n an e v o l u t i o n to peaceful 
government. 1 (4) 
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12. CONCLUSION 
The two decades which span the period of t h i s 
study are years of i n c r e d i b l e p o l i t i c a l and economic 
achievement i n Japan,. Professor Charles Fisher subscribed 
to a commonsense view at the time when he was p e s s i m i s t i c 
about Japan's f u t u r e when he wrote i n 195^. Japan had the 
t r a d i t i o n a l disadvantages which geographers and economists 
maintained would condemn her t o perpetual poverty; she was 
grossly over-populated, desperately short of c u l t i v a b l e land 
and poor i n n a t u r a l resources. What i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n t e r e s t i n g i s tha t she has a c t u a l l y turned these disadvantages 
i n t o something very much i n her favour. As we saw i n the 
chapter on demography, the argument about her over-population 
postulated t h a t medical science would b r i n g about a decrease 
i n i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y and increase l o n g e v i t y (which i t has done) 
but also t h a t a s l i g h t r i s e i n l i v i n g standards would send up 
ftett>js 
the b i r t h r a t e . This has not happened and t h e ^ b i r t h r a t e of 
17 per 1,000, compared w i t h J>k per 1,000 i n 19^7, i s below 
t h a t of most European c o u n t r i e s . Presumably the strongest 
reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t ordinary people could a f f o r d 
contraceptives because of t h e i r improved economic p o s i t i o n 
but c l e a r l y the reasons f o r a change i n b i r t h r a t e are complex. 
The comparatively recent decline i n b i r t h r a te has r e s u l t e d i n 
fewer babies to feed, but the high post war b i r t h r a t e has 
provided a large supply of young workers, who required 
comparatively low wages, and who came on to the labour 
market at a time of i n d u s t r i a l expansion. Japan's r u r a l 
over-population has also provided her w i t h a fund of labour, 
not r e q u i r i n g - as i s the case i n many Asian countries -
a basic education. 
Japan's shortage of land and raw ma t e r i a l s has meant 
t h a t a g r i c u l t u r e and the e x t r a c t i v e i n d u s t r i e s have been at 
a r e l a t i v e disadvantage compared w i t h those of other c o u n t r i e s . 
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This had made i t l o g i c a l t o concentrate on making and 
exporting products of secondary i n d u s t r y i n order to buy 
raw m a t e r i a l s abroad and t h i s has been done at a time when 
the terms of world trade were i n favour of manufactured goods 
and against primary producers. Technological advance has 
meant t h a t raw m a t e r i a l s have had a less s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of 
the cost of production of manufactured goods and the spread 
of s y n t h e t i c s u b s t i t u t e s has also helped to reduce the costs 
of imported raw m a t e r i a l s . Important developments i n the 
bulk t r a n s p o r t of raw materials have s i m i l a r l y decreased the 
i l l e f f e c t s of her shortage of these i n her own t e r r i t o r y . 
But, as the Economist pointed out i n the admirable work on 
Japan(1) the element of luck should not be ignored. The war 
i n Korea was a tremendous boost to the Japanese economy, and 
many w r i t e r s contend t h a t her economic 'break through' began 
i n t h a t war when her i n d u s t r y received massive orders from 
the United States and when she h e r s e l f was not burdened w i t h 
defence costs. 
The f u t u r e then f o r Japanese i n d u s t r y appears favourable; 
her i n d u s t r i e s are h i g h l y competitive by any standards and 
show a good deal of i n n o v a t i o n and a d a p t a b i l i t y . Her v i t a l 
concern i s t h a t peace should be maintained and t h a t world 
trade should not s u f f e r a major upheaval, but i t should be 
remembered t h a t South east Asia, and not Europe, i s now one 
of the most p o l i t i c a l l y unstable areas i n the world. Japan, 
q u i t e r i g h t l y i n the w r i t e r ' s estimate, eschewed heavy defence 
costs and gave her r e a l a t t e n t i o n to economic problems. She 
worked c l o s e l y w i t h the U.S., which was i n e v i t a b l e i n her 
a w f u l l y precarious p o s i t i o n i n the post-war.world. But the 
question may be asked, i s she not r a t h e r smugly concerned w i t h 
her economic w e l l being and too l i t t l e concerned about the 
welfare of other poorer nations i n South East Asia. There 
i s some substance i n t h i s charge but her methods have not 
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been ex^peme-L*y s e l f i s h . The countries of South East Asia 
have memories of the s i n i s t e r "Mutual Co-prosperity Sphere" 
and have rebuffed Japan and h u r t her p r i d e . I n 1959i a 
former Prime M i n i s t e r , Mr. Yoshida, a f t e r a tour of South 
East Asia, reported b l u n t l y : " I t i s useless j u s t now to 
t h i n k of economic co-operation w i t h these people of the 
South Seas, because the idea only r a i s e s t h e i r suspicions, 
makes them m i s t r u s t our i n t e n t i o n s and w i t h h o l d sympathy 
from our aims." Things have changed a good deal since then 
and Japan now exports almost 30 per cent of her t o t a l volume 
of exports t o t h a t p a r t of the world. Her leading p o l i t i c i a n s 
and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s are more'global* i n t h i n k i n g and are 
beginning to understand t h a t Japan's own continuing p r o s p e r i t y 
depends upon p r o s p e r i t y elsewhere. At a conference of the 
Economic Commission f o r Asia and the Far East held i n Tokyo 
i n 1962 some of the delegates were m i l d l y c r i t i c a l of Japan's 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the f u t u r e welfare of South East Asia. Her 
share of f o r e i g n a i d and investment amounts to l i t t l e more 
than .5 per cent of her gross n a t i o n a l product which i s f a r 
less than t h a t of the U.S.A. or any major Western Power. 
Aid f o r South East Asia has taken the form of loans, t e c h n i c a l 
t r a i n i n g schemes and investment, w i t h a f a i r l y generous 
reparations allowance but i t has not been enough from such a 
r e l a t i v e l y r i c h country. Her loans - 0 80 m i l l i o n f o r India's 
t h i r d Five Year Plan and 0 30 m i l l i o n f o r Pakistan's Second 
Plan - have not been p r i n c e l y and have high rates of i n t e r e s t 
attached to them. The crux of the problem has been discerned 
by the experts of the I n s t i t u t e of Asian Economic A f f a i r s , 
under the d i r e c t i o n of Professor Kiyoshi Kojima and i t i s 
b r i e f l y t h a t both the United States and Japan should import 
more primary products from South East Asia and export more 
manufactured goods to t h i s area. This applies p a r t i c u l a r l y 
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t o the United States, because Japan i s admittedly a f a i r l y 
l a r g e importer of raw m a t e r i a l s from South East Asia. Japan 
should also reduce i t s volume of exports of " l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e " 
l i g h t i n d u s t r y goods, i n order to increase i t s export of 
" c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e " heavy machines and equipment. They 
consider t h a t Japan and the United States should help to 
increase a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y i n the poorer c o u n t r i e s . 
I t should be remembered t h a t Japan, by s c i e n t i f i c methods 
and a widespread use of f e r t i l i s e r s produces four tons of 
r i c e per hectare compared w i t h a y i e l d as l i t t l e as one 
ton per hectare i n many parts of South East Asia. The main 
e f f o r t s should be i n c r e a t i n g large scale i r r i g a t i o n schemes 
and i n making f e r t i l i s e r s and i n s e c t i c i d e s a v a i l a b l e . This 
could conceivably double the r i c e production of South East 
Asia i n twenty years but t h i s w i l l only j u s t keep pace w i t h 
the increase i n p o p u l a t i o n . At the present time the senseless 
c o n f l i c t i n Indo-China, a land t h a t would p r o f i t g r e a t l y by 
t h i s scheme, r u l e s out any chance of progress t h e r e . Japan 
i s worried about the extension of the Indo-China war and her 
attempts at mediation i n the dispute between Malaysia and 
Indonesia are testimony t o her growing confidence and p o l i t i c a l 
presence i n the world. The diverse p o l i t i c a l colours of the 
countries of South East Asia make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r her to 
achieve a hegemony there and former pro-communist countries 
such as Indonesia f o r example have looked upon her as a 
•stooge of C a p i t a l i s t America'. But i n s p i t e of t h i s , 
Japan's stable economy has a v i t a l p a r t t o play i n the 
f u t u r e development of South East Asia and even i f her 
I m p e r i a l i s t war ventures are long remembered, there, she 
s t i l l remains the only t r u l y Asian country which has 
achieved the c a p i t a l i s t 'break through' to a high standard 
of l i v i n g f o r her people, and t h i s alone makes a study of 
Japanese methods worthwhile. 
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The a t t i t u d e of the Japanese government and her 
business men i s by no means as enlightened as i t should 
be i n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h West European powers. Much of 
her trade i s i n d i r e c t competition w i t h these powers but 
i t i s i n some ways a short sighted a t t i t u d e to close her 
home markets to competition. This r e p o r t claims t h a t the 
only commodities Japan wants from abroad are money and the 
knowledge needed f o r f u r t h e r modernisation. The report goes 
on to s t a t e t h a t the planned economy of Japan i s achieved 
without recourse to l e g i s l a t i o n by a group of powerful 
planners - among whom are the Bank of Japan, the M i n i s t e r 
of Finance, the M i n i s t r y of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade and I n d u s t r y , 
and c e r t a i n prominent businessmen. These elements i n f l u e n c e , 
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , what may be imported, and i n what 
q u a n t i t y ; what may be produced at home, and i n what q u a n t i t y , 
and the p r i c e t h a t may be charged f o r various commodities. 
This a t t i t u d e i s c l e a r l y unwise now t h a t more and more European 
powers are buying from Japan and w i l l , i n e v i t a b l y ^ l e a d t o 
r e t a l i a t i o n on the p a r t of these nations. I t i s v i t a l f o r 
Japan to maintain a f l e x i b l e , competitive i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e 
w i t h a f o o t i n many markets so t h a t she can q u i c k l y cope w i t h 
any r e s t r i c t i o n , p o s s i b l y based on p o l i t i c a l grounds, i n some 
of these markets and so avoid widespread economic d i s l o c a t i o n . 
The p o l i t i c a l geographer can understand the expansionist 
e f f o r t s of pre-war Japan but, as we have seen i t would be 
unwise to ascribe these mainly t o a lack of raw ma t e r i a l s or 
to s h r i n k i n g world markets. I n other words he must avoid 
'economic determinism' i n a study of t h i s nature. The post-
war study of Japan shows t h a t economic expertise can circumvent 
a poor raw m a t e r i a l base but a cynic could argue t h a t t h i s 
success has only been possible provided t h a t Japan was prepared 
to adopt a subordinate r o l e t o the United States. This argument 
1 
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sees a mutually p r o f i t a b l e Japan-U.S. t r a d i n g arrangement 
under the p r o t e c t i o n of the a i r and sea forces of the 
superior power, namely the U.S.A. 
This conclusion has given what amounts to an almost 
Marxist p r i o r i t y to economic matters but hardly less important 
and indeed i n e x t r i c a b l y mixed w i t h these, i s the p o l i t i c a l 
development of Japan. The period of t h i s study shows a 
change i n a soc i e t y from autocracy t o democracy of a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y vigorous type. The governments of Japan i n the 
t h i r t i e s and i n the war years were, as Professor J. M i l l e r 
p o i n t s out, i n h e r e n t l y unstable. He w r i t e s t h a t i n pre-war 
Japan, c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c i a n s were r e t a i n e d t o do the bureaucratic 
workwork of government, while c o n t r o l of f o r e i g n and defence 
p o l i c y passed i n t o the hands of one or other of the p r o f e s s i o n a l 
m i l i t a r i s t s . The c o n f l i c t between them may have "deeper 
s o c i a l roots than simply p r o f e s s i o n a l jealousy, as i t d i d i n 
Japan; and there may be extensive connexions between service 
and business i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the community, which may see no 
way of i n f l u e n c i n g p o l i c y than t o c u l t i v a t e the army or navy. 
I t i s possible f o r a charismatic leader t o emerge from t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n , but more l i k e l y t h a t admirals and generals w i l l 
jockey f o r p o s i t i o n i n p r o f e s s i o n a l , not popular terms. I n 
any case, there i s no s t a b i l i t y i n t h i s s o r t of s i t u a t i o n , 
except the s t a b i l i t y of the see-saw". (2) Japan has achieved 
reasonably stable democratic government a f t e r having democracy 
imposed upon her by a conqueror. Perhaps t h i s eliminates 
some of the enthusiasm f o r i t but there i s a general r e a l i s a t i o n 
t h a t the system works. 
Opinion varies i n the West as to how stable t h i s 
democracy i s ; some countries have viewed the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t 
' r i g h t ' w i t h caution and others have seen the main danger i n 
l e f t wing a c t i v i t i e s , mainly epitomized by the communist 
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i n s p i r e d workers union Sojho and by the Zengakuren (Students' 
Union). Fortunately, Japan does not appear t o be on the 
threshold of an economic c r i s i s , f o r t h i s could b r i n g about 
the collapse of a democratic government and the longer she 
enjoys economic progress the more thoroughly democracy becomes 
assi m i l a t e d by her. We may ask, i n a l l f a i r n e s s t o t o t a l i t a r i a n 
'People's' Democracies' why we are so i n s i s t e n t i n seeing Japan 
saddled w i t h a system of democracy. The simple answer i s t h a t , 
i n general, democracies have tended t o be less b e l l i c o s e than 
out and out d i c t a t o r s h i p s and^what i s more to the p o i n t , a 
decent l i f e w i t h d i g n i t y and freedom i s possible f o r the 
i n d i v i d u a l i n a l i b e r a l democracy. The s t a b i l i t y of Japanese 
democracy i s v i t a l i n a vast pa r t of the world t h a t has no 
experience of democracy. 
f t I t must be remembered t h a t what may broadly be t r u e 
f o r one age group need not apply to another, a generation 
younger. For example, the education of any Japanese born 
a f t e r 1937 has been on the whole so d i f f e r e n t from the education 
t h a t shaped h i s parents as t o make him i n a sense a stranger to 
them. Where he has been taught, i n school at any r a t e , t o 
attach supreme importance to' the r i g h t s and a s p i r a t i o n s of 
the i n d i v i d u a l , h i s elders on the other hand, were brought up 
to d i s t i n g u i s h between human f e e l i n g s and c i v i c o b l i g a t i o n s : 
a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t e x i s t s also i n Western s o c i e t i e s but i n a 
much milder form, g e n e r a l l y speaking, than was common i n JapanJ°(3) 
Story p o i n t s out t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l morals have been badly 
battered i n Japan and t h a t the younger generation, with' an 
outlook s i m i l a r t o t h a t of the same age groups i n B r i t a i n or 
the U.S.A., v i r t u a l l y speaks a d i f f e r e n t language from the 
older generation. I n Japan, as i n the case of Germany, we 
must put our f a i t h i n a re-educated youth. 
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I n what must nece s s a r i l y be a 'bread and b u t t e r ' 
study we have been l i t t l e concerned as such w i t h so 
c a l l e d 'national temperament'. So much nonsense i s of t e n 
t a l k e d and w r i t t e n about t h i s t h a t one must approach i t w i t h 
caution but i t remains t r u e t h a t fundamental misconceptions 
of n a t i o n a l t r a i t s o f ten cause t r a g i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
misunderstanding. The Japanese possess a h i g h l y v o l a t i l e 
temperament and i t has been suggested the extreme formalism 
of the t r a d i t i o n a l code of manners was adopted as an e s s e n t i a l 
check on the s o c i a l l y d i s r u p t i v e consequences t h a t could 
f o l l o w the "free exercise of t h i s temperament. Beneath 
t h e i r formalism, the Japanese are also a h i g h l y energetic, 
competitive people but they are not simply A s i a t i c 'go-getters' 
w i t h a few quaint customs. They seem to have also what has 
been described as a q u i x o t i c s e n t i m e n t a l i t y and t h i s , combined 
w i t h emotional r e a l i s m , has o f t e n been compared w i t h t h a t of 
the French. I n s p i t e of the dreadful ugliness of vast urban 
areas t h e i r love of beauty i s never crowded out by commercial 
or u t i l i t a r i a n considerations. S i r George Sansom wrote about 
Japan i n much e a r l i e r p e r i o d : "there seems to be a warmth and 
depth i n t h e i r love of beauty which q u a l i f i e s them as a race 
apart, or at l e a s t d i s t i n g u i s h e s them from other Greeks, as 
the features of a Buddhist image expressing love and mercy 
d i f f e r from cold marble countenances of an Apollo or Artemis." 
I t i s perhaps odd t h a t we should conclude t h i s work w i t h 
a comment on Japanese Culture but at l e a s t i t can serve as a 
cogent reminder t h a t none of our specialisms w i l l give us more 
than p a r t i a l understanding of Japan. 
- 203 -
Consider Japan (Economist) P.76 
The Nature of P o l i t i c s . 
J.D.B. M i l l e r P.2C4 
A H i s t o r y of Japan. 
F. Story- P.279 
A H i s t o r y of Japan to 133^. 
S i r George Sansorn. P. 19^ 
Duckworth 1963 
Pelican Books 1962 
Penguin 
Cresset Press 1958 
- 204 -
13. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ackerman E.A. 
All e n G.C. 









Japan's Resources and t h e i r r e l a t i o n to 
Japan's Economic Future. Chicago, 1953. 
A Short H i s t o r y of Modern Japan. 
A l l e n & Unwin 19^6. 
Japan's Economic Expansion. O.U.P. 19&5 
Japan between East and West. Harper N.Y. 1957. 
An Atlas of World A f f a i r s . D.U.P. 1964. 
Nationalism i n Japan. U. of C a l i f o r n i a 1959. 
Japan Today. P a l l M a l l Press 1963. 
The Economic H i s t o r y of World Population. 
Penguin 1962. 
Japan's Economy and her Reconstruction. 
Minneopolis 19^9. 
Japan. Benn 1960. 
Land Reform i n Japan. 
East W.G. and Moodie A.E. The Changing World. 
O.U.P. 1959. 
World Book Co., 
1956. 
East W.G. and Spate O.H.K. 
Economist Research U n i t . 
The Changing Map of Asia. Methuen.196 







Latoure t t e K.S. 
Maki J.M. 
A Japanese V i l l a g e . 
South.East Asia. 
Pattern of Asia. 
Kegan Paul 1946 
Methuen. 1964. 
Constable 1958 
P o l i t i c a l Geography and the World Map P h i l i p 1956 
Case Studies i n World Geography(Fishing) 
P r e n t i c e - H a l l 1961. 
Hokkaido : I t s present s t a t e of Development 
and Future Prospects. O.U.P. 1958 
A Short H i s t o r y of the Far East. Macmillan 19^7. 
Government and P o l i t i c s i n Japan. 
Thames and Hudson 1962 
Michael and Taylor. The Far East i n the Modern World. Methuen 19S 
M i l l e r J.D.B. The Nature of P o l i t i c s . Penguin 1962. 
Morris I . Nationalism and the Right Wing i n Japan. O.U.P.196 




S t o r r y R. 





Japan: Past and Present. 
Japan and Her Destiny. 
A H i s t o r y of Modern Japan. 




Chatto & Windus 1957 
Japan: A Physical, C u l t u r a l and 
Regional Geography. Methuen 1965 
Modern Japan. A n v i l Books 1955 
Japan's Century. H i s t o r i c a l Association 1964. 
An I n t r o d u c t i o n to Japan. Columbia Univ. Press 
1957. 
Yoshihashi Takenikio Conspiracy at Mukden. Yale U.P. 196?. 
S t a t i s t i c a l Surveys of Japan. Published Annually. 
M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , Japan. 
S t a t i s t i c a l Handbook of Japan. O f f i c e of Prime Mini.:ster. 
